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Preface
Labor market and demographic developments are highly interrelated. One reason is that impor-
tant events in the private domain, such as the formation of a family, can cause large adjustments
in individuals’ labor supply. There is, for example, an extensive empirical literature showing
that female labor supply declines sharply with the presence of children (Lundborg et al., 2017;
Kleven et al., 2018). Moreover, married individuals rely on spousal labor supply to smooth
consumption when facing shocks (Blundell et al., 2016). Reversely, labor market outcomes can
have important consequences for individuals’ health and mortality. For example, a job loss is
related to an increase in mortality and a worsening of mental health (Sullivan and von Wachter,
2009; Kuhn et al., 2009). This dissertation analyzes important intersections between labor and
demographic economics. The first chapter looks directly at the importance of a change in house-
hold demographics, namely in fertility, on labor supply decisions. The second chapter studies
interdependencies in spousal labor supply and the effectiveness of intra-household insurance
in married couples. The third chapter focuses on the impact of a large immigration-related
demographic shift on local labor markets, while the last chapter examines the development of
mortality rates in Germany after reunification, which entailed substantial changes in the labor
market.
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I investigate empirically how maternal labor supply
responds to an increase in fertility in the context of Mexico. Existing empirical research mainly
focuses on high-income countries and points to a negative causal relationship between family
size and maternal labor supply, suggesting that mothers shift time from the labor market to
child care.1 Parents can alternatively focus on monetary rather than time inputs in raising
their children. In the context of Mexico, where informal child care and flexible employment
opportunities are easily available, working in the labor market to obtain additional resources
for the growing family appears relatively attractive. In addition, children can carry high fixed
costs relative to household income, which makes increases in labor supply more valuable. Hence,
parents in middle- and low-income countries may react differently in terms of labor supply.
To address the endogeneity of fertility choices, I use an instrumental variable (IV) approach
that exploits parents’ preference for mixed-sex siblings, as proposed by Angrist and Evans
(1998). The rationale is that, compared to parents who have children of different sexes, parents
1Lundborg et al. (2017) provides a useful review of the existing empirical literature.
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with children of the same sex are more likely to have an additional child. At the same time,
children’s sex mix is assumed to be virtually randomly assigned. Using data on a sample
of about 500,000 Mexican mothers, I show that parents with two children of the same sex
are significantly more likely to have another child relative to parents with mixed-sex children.
Relying on this instrument-induced variation, I find that an exogenous increase in family size
beyond two children leads to a substantial and significant increase in women’s probability to
be employed. This extensive margin response is driven by mothers who start working in the
informal sector. I further show that fertility increases maternal labor supply in the formal
sector at the intensive margin for a small fraction of women, while mainly having an impact at
the extensive margin in the informal sector.
I contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence on a positive effect of fertility at
both the intensive and extensive margin of maternal labor supply in a middle-income country.
Further, I offer an explanation for this positive effect, which stands in contrast to results in
high-income countries, by highlighting that mothers take up informal employment when their
family size increases. This chapter investigates further mechanisms. First, paternal employment
and working hours do not react to an exogenous change in family size, suggesting that mothers
are responsible for providing additional resources for their family. Second, an increase in family
size leads to a higher likelihood of co-residing with a maternal grandparent. Third, the positive
effect on maternal labor supply is more pronounced in households with a particularly high value
from labor income that is those with little household wealth.
The crucial obstacle for my research design is the internal and external validity of the instru-
ment. I provide credible evidence for the internal validity of my results and test the identification
assumptions formally. Regarding external validity, I first estimate the size of the group to which
the estimated effects pertain, which are mothers who had more children than they otherwise
would have only due to the sex composition of their first two children. The size of this group
is very small, and its observable characteristics and potential labor market outcomes are, on
average, different from other mothers in the sample. In further analysis, I therefore bound
the effect of having more than two children on the propensity to be informally employed to
be non-negative for all mothers in the sample using novel methods. Hereby, I complement the
discussion about the local nature of average treatment effects in IV strategies.
The findings of this chapter suggest that policy measures that target the welfare of working
mothers are important. Informal jobs often provide low pay and inadequate social protection
but may offer the only possibility to work for mothers in Mexico. More flexible working con-
ditions, for example, the provision of parental leave or part-time contracts, and more flexible
child care schedules can help parents to combine employment in the formal sector and family
responsibilities.
While private life events are important determinants of labor supply, individual labor market
outcomes can as well change when firms adjust their labor demand. Mass layoffs and firm
closures are instances that give rise to unexpected and large shocks to affected workers with
persistent negative consequences in terms of employment and earnings (Jacobsen et al., 1999).
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Marriage can provide the possibility to share these risks and to attenuate shocks: if one partner
is affected by an unexpected shock, the other partner can increase her labor supply to prevent a
drop in household consumption. The desire to raise a family and gender norms might, however,
interfere with the risk-sharing potential by limiting the flexibility of spouses to respond.
In the second chapter, which is based on joint work with Martin Halla and Andrea Weber, we
disentangle the roles of different channels in the responses to income shocks within married
households. We study a sample of couples in Austria, where the husband loses his job due to
a mass layoff or plant closure. These shocks hit the couples in our sample at crucial stages
of family formation. Because of the complexity of the counterfactual life-cycle labor market
patterns of wives, we propose three independent control groups to identify the causal effects of
husbands’ displacement on wives’ labor supply. The first control group consists of couples with
the husband working in a firm without mass layoff or plant closure. The second control group
consists of couples where the husband works in a plant with a mass layoff but is not laid off
himself. The third control group exploits the randomness in the timing of displacement.
Our main results are remarkably consistent across the three control groups. We find that
husbands suffer large and persistent employment and earnings losses over the first 5 years after
displacement. Wives’ labor supply increases only moderately and they respond predominantly
at the extensive margin. While the additional earnings generated by the wife only cover a
very small fraction of the total income loss, public transfers and taxes are more important
insurance mechanisms. In terms of non-labor market outcomes, we find a small positive effect
on the probability of divorce, but no effect on fertility. The presence and age of children in the
household are crucial determinants of the wife’s labor supply response. The most responsive
group are mothers who are planning to return to the labor market after a maternity break,
while mothers of very young children or wives without children remain unresponsive.
With this chapter, we contribute to the large literature on family labor supply and the long-
term effects of job displacement by providing clean quasi-experimental evidence on the effects
of job loss on family labor supply. We also contribute to the emerging literature on the role of
gender norms in shaping labor market outcomes (Bertrand et al., 2016; Kleven et al., 2018).
Based on our findings, we propose different types of policies that might strengthen the intra-
household insurance channel. The first type of policies targets the re-entry of mothers into the
labor market, by strengthening the job guarantee after parental leave (Lalive et al., 2014) and
by expanding subsidized child care. The second type of policies targets fathers’ involvement in
child care at home, for example, by reserving part of parental leave benefits for fathers. Finally,
policies targeting unemployed workers directly should take the household situation into account
and also extend job search counseling to wives of unemployed married men.
The opening of local labor markets to foreigners is often assumed of having adverse effects
for the labor market opportunities of natives. For example, when asked about whether they
have fears related to the building of the European Union (EU), more than half of all Austrian
respondents mentioned that they were afraid of losing their jobs.2 These fears are mirrored
2This is based on data from the European Value Study from 2008. Respondents could respond on a scale
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in the growing public and political opposition against the principle of free movement of labor
within the EU in recent years. Concerns are particularly pronounced toward the mobility of
individuals from Central, Eastern, and Southeastern European member states; among them the
eight countries that joined the EU in 2004 (EU8). They are especially prominent in Austria,
which shares a large part of its border with four of these eight countries.
In the third chapter, which is based on joint work with Andrea Weber, we investigate how
local labor markets are affected when receiving a large number of immigrant workers. For this
purpose, we examine the effects of increased immigration to the Austrian eastern border region
resulting from the EU enlargement of 2004. We focus on the labor market outcomes of resident
workers across municipalities and follow their employment and average earnings over time. In
addition, we look at the labor demand side by investigating whether firms enter or exit regions
that receive many immigrants.
In our empirical strategy, we combine the temporal variation in immigration resulting from
the EU Eastern enlargement and the later implementation of free labor market access to EU8
workers with the spatial variation that comes from the tendency of immigrants to go to munic-
ipalities that are close to their home country, thus identifying the effect of immigration on the
employment and earnings of different subgroups of workers and on firms. Our analysis is based
on Austrian social security data, which provides us with detailed information on the universe
of employees and employers in Austria over several years.
We find that the EU Eastern enlargement led to significant changes in Austrian labor markets
close to the EU8 border. Over the period from 1997 to 2015, the employment share of EU8
nationals in the Austrian border region increased from 2.2% to 9.3%. The increase after the
enlargement of 2004 is larger in municipalities that are located closer to the border to an EU8
country and is almost entirely driven by an increase in blue-collar employment. The responses
of other workers differ substantially between Austrian and other immigrant workers: There is no
decline in the employment of Austrian nationals in municipalities close to the border. For non-
EU8 foreign workers, average employment decreases significantly and steadily in municipalities
that are within 0 to 20 minutes to the border after 2004. Moreover, Austrians experience
an increase of approximately 2% in their earnings, non-EU8 foreign workers face substantial
decreases of almost 5% by 2015. Finally, we find that immigration leads to an increase in the
number of firms.
This chapter extends our understanding of the relationship between immigration and labor
market outcomes in a unique context. We highlight that the impact of immigration differs
substantially between the group of Austrians and the group of other foreign workers and can
even go in opposite directions. We further contribute to the literature on the role of the labor
demand side in the effects of immigration by investigating whether firms enter markets that re-
ceive many immigrants and, hereby, potentially alleviate the pressure on residents’ employment
and wages. Last, but not least, understanding the labor market effects from the EU Eastern
enlargement and the opening of a national labor market is important and interesting per se;
from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates “very much afraid” and 10 “not afraid at all”. I count the responses from 1 to
3 as being afraid. Source: http://europeanvaluesstudy.eu, last access 05/2019.
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in particular, in consideration of the aforementioned public and political debate. Our findings,
for example, indicate that Austrian nationals do not experience a decline in their employment
or earnings; a result that contradicts the perceptions expressed in the survey data.
The worsening of labor market opportunities can have important consequences for individuals’
well-being and health. For example, Sullivan and von Wachter (2009) find that an involuntary
job loss increases male mortality in the US immediately after the event as well as in the long-run.
Kuhn et al. (2009) find that the mental health outcomes of Austrian men worsen and sickness
benefits strongly increase due to job loss. At the same time, studies for the US show that,
since 1998, mortality rates in midlife are increasing for white non-Hispanics (Case and Deaton,
2015, 2017). This trend is driven by deaths from drug overdoses, suicides, and alcohol-related
diseases, termed as deaths of despair, and by the subgroup of low-educated individuals. Case
and Deaton (2017) suspect that the mechanism behind this development is the deterioration of
life circumstances for low-educated white non-Hispanics over time that is, for example, related
to the worsening of employment opportunities.
In the fourth chapter, which is based on work with Peter Haan and Anna Hammerschmid, we
extend the analyses of Case and Deaton (2015, 2017) for Germany for the period after 1990,
analyzing how mortality in midlife changed for East and West German subpopulations with
a focus on deaths of despair. Germany provides an interesting setting due to its reunifica-
tion in 1990, which led to higher average incomes in East Germany, but also to substantial
discontinuities in employment careers and to high unemployment.
Using official cause-of-death statistics, we descriptively analyze trends in mortality rates be-
tween 1990 and 2015. For men, we find a considerable gap in all-cause mortality between East
and West Germany in the early 1990s. Up to the late 1990s, male mortality had fallen more
rapidly in East Germany, closing part of the East-West mortality gap. However, the remaining
gap has persisted, staying rather constant since the early 2000s. For women, the East German
excess mortality has always been less pronounced and disappeared entirely during the early
1990s. The patterns are similar if we focus on the mortality rates from deaths of despair only,
implying that also deaths of despair are more pronounced among East than among West Ger-
man men. Further, we show that the largest share of these deaths of despair are alcohol-related
diseases.
There are various potential explanations for the differences in the mortality patterns between
Germany and the US. They might be, for example, related to the German welfare system that
provides a broader and more generous safety net for individuals who experience economic or
social shocks than the US. Moreover, the German health care system and pharmaceutical regu-
lations might have been more successful at preventing large-scale drug addiction and its related
mortality.
Chapter 1
Fertility as a Driver of Maternal
Employment∗
1.1 Introduction
An extensive and longstanding literature on the effects of children on household behavior em-
phasizes their costs in terms of maternal time inputs. Empirical research, stemming mainly
from high-income countries, fuels this by almost exclusively finding a negative causal relation-
ship between family size and maternal labor supply (see Lundborg et al. (2017) for a review).
Hence, economists often hypothesize that having more children, especially young ones, clearly
decreases the time mothers spend in the labor market. However, from a theoretical point of
view, the sign of the relationship between family size and maternal labor supply is ambigu-
ous. Under reasonable assumptions, a woman is predicted to decrease her leisure time after
increasing her fertility. However, some women will increase labor supply and focus on monetary
investments while others will reduce labor supply and focus on time investments in order to
increase child quality (Heath, 2017). Besides the monetary inputs in child quality, there are
some fixed costs of children that decrease household income, which makes increases in labor
supply more valuable by increasing the marginal utility of wealth.
∗ Schmieder (2014) provides preliminary results of this chapter and was submitted as my master’s thesis at
the University College London. Schmieder (2014) deals with the effect of an increase in family size from two to
more than two children on the weekly working hours of mothers in Mexico. The research design is similar as the
one applied in this chapter. This chapter, however, contains several new key contributions. First, compared to
Schmieder (2014), I also look at employment at the extensive margin and distinguish between employment and
hours in the formal and the informal sector, which turns out to be crucial for answering the research question. In
addition, I add a section in which I describe informal employment in Mexico and its prevalence among mothers.
Second, I estimate and discuss the effects on fathers. Third, I introduce several further analyses to discuss
the importance of informal child care and household wealth. Fourth, I apply recent econometric approaches to
extrapolate from local treatment effects.
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This paper provides new insights about the effect of fertility on maternal labor supply in
a setting with a low level of average household wealth, informal child care provision within
extended households, and a high prevalence of informal work. These are all conditions that are
typically more prevalent in middle- and low-income than in high-income countries; all playing a
potentially interesting role in the relationship between fertility and maternal employment. First,
little wealth implies that households already have a high marginal utility of income. Budgetary
consequences of children might be more severe in these households and they can have a larger
impact on the mother’s propensity to take up employment in order to provide for additional
resources. Second, if there are other household members who inelastically provide some child
care, this will lower the return to maternal time relative to monetary investments into the
children. Hence, they increase the incentives to augment labor supply and focus on monetary
inputs. Third, the informal labor market might also provide employment opportunities to
mothers: informal employment might be easier to arrange with child care schedules, which are
often half-day, it might provide the possibility to take care of the children while working, and/or
fixed costs of work might be lower in informal compared to formal employment (Gong and van
Soest, 2002; Heath, 2017).
In order to establish a causal link between the two variables, an instrumental variable approach
exploiting parental preferences for mixed-sex siblings, as outlined in Angrist and Evans (1998),
is used. The empirical analysis uses data on a sample of about 500,000 Mexican mothers aged
21 to 35. The setting provides two attractive features. First, in contrast to other low- and
middle-income countries (Wolpin and Rosenzweig, 2000; Schultz, 2008), Mexican parents show
a preference for a mixed-sex sibling composition of their children while at the same time there
are no discriminatory practices toward one sex that might invalidate the identification strategy.
Second, Mexican census data from 2010 allows for observing detailed labor market outcomes in
both the informal and formal sectors as well as for identifying the complex household constel-
lations and characteristics for a large sample of young mothers.
The first set of results confirms the presence of mixed-sex sibling preferences in my sample:
Families with two children of the same sex are 3.3 percentage points more likely to have another
child compared to those with children of different sexes. A considerable and significant negative
correlation between having more than two children and female labor supply is reversed when
the potential endogeneity of fertility is accounted for with the proposed instrumental strategy.
I find that an exogenous increase in family size beyond two children leads to a significant 4
to 6 percentage points increase in women’s probability to be employed. This extensive margin
response is driven by mothers who start working in the informal sector. I further estimate
the effect of an increasing family size at different quantiles of the maternal working hours
distribution. My findings suggest that fertility increases female labor supply in the formal
sector at the intensive margin for a small fraction of women, while mainly having an impact at
the extensive margin in the informal sector.
What are the potential mechanisms behind this positive employment effect? Further analysis
on households in which mothers live with their partners shows that they increase their labor
supply, while paternal employment and hours do not react at all. This might indicate that
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men had a harder time increasing their labor supply compared to women in 2010 in order
to provide for additional resources for their growing family. This assumption is in line with
previous findings that labor market opportunities were relatively better for women in Mexico
during the Great Recession (World Bank, 2012). I further show that having more than two
children increases the probability to live with the extended family. In particular, the probability
of living with maternal grandparents rises by approximately 4 percentage points. Moreover, I
find suggestive evidence that the positive employment effect is mainly driven by women who
live in households with relatively low household wealth. This is in line with the idea that these
households have a particularly high value from labor income as their family size increases.
The crucial obstacle for my research design is the internal and external validity of the in-
strument. I provide credible evidence for the internal validity of my results and I test the
identification assumptions formally by a procedure recently proposed by Huber and Mellace
(2015). The impact of fertility on female labor supply is likely heterogeneous and hence, the
obtained IV estimates are interpreted as local average treatment effects (LATEs) that pertain
to the group of females who had more children than they otherwise would have due to the
sex composition of their first two children. The proportion of these compliers in my sample is
estimated to be around 3 to 4% and I show that the average complier seems to be different
from the average non-complier both in terms of her observable characteristics and potential
labor market outcomes. Hence, the external validity of this local effect appears to be limited. I
subsequently draw on recent approaches proposed by Kowalski (2016) and Brinch et al. (2017)
in order to extrapolate to the treatment effect for non-compliers. My findings indicate that,
for informal employment, the treatment effect is non-negative for all women in the sample and
hence similar across compliers and non-compliers.
My paper is primarily related to the large literature on the relationship between fertility and
female labor supply. Browning (1992) discusses methodological issues that arise in modeling
the effects of children on household behavior. The emerging empirical literature, predominantly
based on quasi-experimental approaches, finds a substantial negative effect of an exogenous
increase in family size on maternal labor supply in high-income countries (see e.g. Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1980), Angrist and Evans (1998), Lundborg et al. (2017) and Kleven et al. (2018)).
Empirical results on middle- and low-income countries are mixed and point to a zero or negative
effect of an increase in family size on maternal employment at the extensive margin (Agu¨ero
and Marks, 2008, 2011; Ca´ceres-Delpiano, 2012; Aaronson et al., 2017).3 Schmieder (2014)
finds that weekly working hours of mothers increase in response to an exogenous increase in
family size from two to more than two children but she does not investigate employment at the
extensive margin. The study by Heath (2017) is closely related to this paper but uses data on
Ghanaian households and a different empirical strategy. She finds a negative effect of fertility
3My results contrast with Cruces and Galiani (2007), who find an inverse relationship between fertility and
mother’s employment using the same identification strategy and Mexican data from the year 2000. There are
different potential explanations for this. Around 2010, the labor market environment was more favorable for
women compared to men, as such, women were increasingly responsible for the provision of financial resources
to the household. Furthermore, two reforms reduced the price of child care substantially between 2000 and 2010:
Preschool education was declared mandatory for all children aged 3 to 5 years and a federal daycare program for
working mothers was launched (Staab and Gerhard, 2010; Mateo Dı´az and Rodr´ıguez Chamussy, 2013). Finally,
it might be that the complier subpopulation affected by the instrument changed over time.
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at the extensive margin of maternal employment and a positive hours response conditional on
employment. In contrast to her, I can identify intensive margin responses with a local quantile
treatment effect model that is more reasonable than conditional-on-positive effects, especially
in a setting in which a positive hours choice is very selective. Hence, I contribute to the
literature by providing empirical evidence on a positive effect of fertility both at the intensive
and extensive margin of labor supply in a middle-income country. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first study that shows that mothers can be pushed into taking up employment when
having a larger family.
I further contribute to the literature by identifying potential channels behind the positive effect
of larger family size on employment. It appears that the effect is mainly driven by mothers
moving into the informal sector. The results line up with Rodin et al. (2012) who find in an
interview-based study in Mexico that the need for greater job flexibility to care for children and
other family member forces some women to take up informal employment. A few other studies
look at heterogeneities across the type of labor arrangement: Agu¨ero and Marks (2011) show
that, in low-income countries, an additional child does not impact maternal employment on
average, but it reduces the probability of paid employment. Ca´ceres-Delpiano (2012) finds for
a sample of several low-income countries that only jobs with a high degree of informality react
to changes in family size, but the results go into the opposite direction as mine. In contrast,
Heath (2017) finds a positive effect of having children on self-employment in Ghana. I add to
the literature on child care and labor supply by showing a positive relationship between family
size and co-residence with maternal grandparents.4 Having a grandparent in the household
might positively affect the availability of child care which makes time less attractive relative to
monetary investments and, hence, increases the incentives to increase labor supply. This relates
to Gong and van Soest (2002) who show that maternal labor force participation in Mexico is
higher when other adults are present in the household. Moreover, my finding that the labor
supply response differs by household wealth is interesting in the light of results by Aaronson
et al. (2017), who estimate the effect of fertility on maternal labor supply across different income
levels by comparing the effect across countries and time. They find that the effect of an increase
in family size on maternal employment is not different from zero at low and negative at higher
(per-capita) income levels. In contrast, by comparing households within the same setting, I can
explore effects across households with different income levels that face the same institutions
and labor market conditions.
Last, but not least, I contribute to the discussion about the validity of the same sex -instrument
in the context of middle- and low-income countries. The internal validity is repeatedly criticized
in the economic literature (see for example Wolpin and Rosenzweig (2000) and Schultz (2008)).
In my paper, I directly address the concerns that were posed and substantiate my discussion
with a formal test procedure. The external validity of the results from IV estimations is rarely
discussed in applied work, despite its importance for interpretation and the derived policy
implications. I show how proposed econometric procedures can be applied in order to discuss
4Posadas and Vidal-Fernandez (2013) provides an excellent literature review on the link between grand-
parental childcare and maternal labor force participation.
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the representativeness of individuals who are affected by the instrument and to extrapolate
from them. Important to mention here is a recent study by Bisbee et al. (2017). They apply
the same sex -instrument across a huge number of countries, including Mexico, and provide an
approach to extrapolate the local average treatment effect from a reference to a target context.
Hence, their study revolves around the external validity of complier-specific LATEs across time
and place. In contrast, my paper zooms in and investigates the potential to extrapolate local
treatment effects within a context. Hence, the two studies are highly complementary in the
discussion about the local nature of average treatment effects that are estimated using an
instrument.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 provides background information
on households and several aspects of the labor market in Mexico. This information is helpful
to put the results into perspective. In Section 1.3, I describe the data and the construction of
the sample. In particular, I provide details on informal employment in the Mexican setting.
Section 1.4 explains the empirical strategy and assesses the underlying identification assump-
tions. Section 1.5 presents my findings on the relationship between family size and parental
labor market outcomes. In Section 1.6, I provide some evidence on the potential mechanism
behind my findings. The extrapolation of the effects for compliers to non-compliers within the
sample is discussed in Section 1.7. The final section offers some concluding remarks.
1.2 Background
Female labor force participation in Mexico was with 43.2% among the lowest in Latin America in
2010.5 One potential explanation for this is that Mexican women face difficulties in reconciling
their family and work life. In 2009, women faced an exceptionally high burden of unpaid work:
They shouldered 6.2 hours per day of housework and care, which amounts to 77% of all unpaid
work in their households.6 Moreover, there is a culture of long working hours in Mexico; the
country has among the highest levels of average weekly working hours in the OECD. At the
same time, working schedules in the formal sector tend to be very inflexible, and only a small
share of workers are observed to work part-time (OECD, 2017). Both the unequally shared
responsibilities at home and the inflexible formal labor market that expects long hours might
force women to drop out of employment as they have more children. On the other hand, many
women can rely on informal child care that is provided by family members who reside in the same
household (Gong and van Soest, 2002). Besides, there were some policies implemented that have
the potential to reduce the child care burden: Preschool education was declared mandatory for
all children aged 3 to 5 years and a federal daycare program for working mothers was launched.
The program targets mothers with children aged 1 to 4 from low-income households that are
not covered by social security-based childcare services (Staab and Gerhard, 2010; Mateo Dı´az
and Rodr´ıguez Chamussy, 2013).7
5Data retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/country/mexico, last access 5/2019.
6Data retrieved from http://ilo.org/ilostat; last access 02/2018.
7By 2011, more than 250,00 children were enrolled, and their mothers exhibited very strong positive em-
ployment responses to the program (A´ngeles et al., 2014).
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As in many other middle- and low-income countries, Mexican women face a high likelihood of
working in the informal sector. For example, in 2007, around 54% of all employed Mexican
women, among them many with young children, worked informally (Cunningham, 2001; Inter-
national Labour Organization, 2009). Moreover, there are large gender gaps: women are more
likely to work informally and to have informal jobs of lower quality than men (OECD, 2017).
In the literature, informal work is both interpreted as a result from segmentation in the labor
market that prevents individuals from taking jobs in the formal sector as well as a free individual
choice between formal and informal jobs resulting from a cost-benefit calculation (Perry et al.,
2007). Perry et al. (2007) provide evidence that the Mexican labor market is well-integrated
and that workers freely choose to be informal. So why would so many women favor informality?
By working in the informal sector, individuals with a relatively small income avoid, on average,
little taxes since the average tax rate in Mexico is close to zero for these households.8 They do
not pay social security contributions, which implies that they cannot claim social benefits, such
as health or parental leave benefits, or retirement payments.9 Still, it might be the case that
women decide to enter the informal sector since it offers more flexibility than the formal sector
to balance work and household activities (Cunningham, 2001; Perry et al., 2007; Rodin et al.,
2012; Heath, 2017). Other hypotheses are that informal employment provides the possibility
to take care of the children while working and that the fixed costs of work are lower in infor-
mal compared to formal employment (Heath, 2017). I discuss the relevance of these different
hypotheses using my sample in Section 1.3.
The economic situation of many Mexican households with children is affected by the Oportu-
nidades program.10 In 2010, there were close to six million beneficiary families (about 20% of all
households), each receiving an average 9,006 Mexican Pesos (715 US$) per year. The program
provides basic health care for all members of the family, as well as means-tested educational
grants and in-kind school supplies conditional on children attending school. The monetary
transfer for school children increases in the grade and is slightly larger for girls than for boys
starting from grade 7. In previous studies, it is shown that the time adult beneficiaries allocate
to work or leisure is not affected by the program (Parker and Todd, 2017). Still, Attanasio
and Lechene (2002) find that the program increased women’s power in important expenditure
decisions within the household.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Data & sample selection
The analysis is based on Mexican Population and Housing Census (“Censo de Poblacio´n y
Vivienda”) data from 2010. The original data is provided by the National Institute of Statistics
8I calculated the tax liability for a monthly income of 3,000 Pesos in the year 2010, which is the mean income
of the women in my sample, using http://www.fiscalia.com/modules.php?name=Calculadoras&op=isr.
9However, there were several universal and noncontributory programs in place in Mexico in 2010, for example,
universal health insurance (Conti and Ginja, 2017).
10The program was initiated in 1997 under the name Progresa and changed its name in 2002 (Parker and
Todd, 2017).
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and Geography (INEGI) in Mexico and was obtained via the IPUMS International database
of the Minnesota Population Center (2014). The data set contains 11,938,402 observations
in 2,903,640 households, which accounts for approximately 10% of the whole population.11 It
includes detailed information on each household member including his or her family relationship
to the other individuals in the household, on labor market outcomes both in the formal and
informal market, as well as on household characteristics such as the housing and economic
situation.
The units of observation in this study are women who are between 21 and 35 years old and who
have at least two children.12 I am limited to look at this specific parity due to the empirical
strategy that is introduced in Section 1.4. At the same time, this seems to be a reasonable
margin to look at given that the reduction in the total fertility rate in Mexico is concentrated
in this range, as described in Section 1.2.
The data set has only incomplete information about a woman’s fertility history: It only includes
the number of children ever born to each woman and the number of those who were still living
at the time of the census. Child-specific characteristics, such as their age and sex, are only
available for those who still live with their mothers at the time of the census. This information
is necessary in order to implement the empirical strategy. Because of this, I match children and
mothers within each household and drop mothers with children who died (6.5%)13 or moved
out of the household (8.3%).14 I only include women whose eldest child was 18 or younger and
whose second child was at least 12 months old at the time of the census (8.4%). Women who
were 14 years or younger at first birth are dropped (1.5%).
The final sample consists of 505,569 women, of whom 90% are married or cohabiting at the time
of the survey. Compared to the group of all women in the Mexican Census aged 21 to 50 (21 to
35), Table A.1 in the Appendix shows that the females in my sample are much more likely to
be married or cohabiting and they tend to have lower education. By construction, the average
woman in the sample has more children than the average Mexican woman. Around 58% (49%)
of the group of women aged 21 to 50 (21 to 35) have at least two children, about 32% (25%)
have more than two. In line with these differences in observable characteristics, women in the
sample have lower employment levels and earnings, conditional on being employed, compared
to the broader groups of Mexican women. Moreover, employed women in the sample are much
more likely to have an informal job.
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Table 1.1: Sample characteristics
All Married | cohabiting Single
(1) (2) (3)
Demographic characteristics
Age (yrs) 29.39 (3.83) 29.39 (3.82) 29.44 (3.89)
Age at first birth (yrs) 19.76 (3.08) 19.78 (3.09) 19.57 (3.00)
Literate 0.91 (0.28) 0.91 (0.29) 0.93 (0.26)
Primary completed 0.62 (0.48) 0.62 (0.48) 0.62 (0.48)
Secondary completed 0.12 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32) 0.14 (0.35)
University completed 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.17)
Household characteristics
Rural 0.49 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49)
Number of household members 5.41 (1.94) 5.38 (1.85) 5.72 (2.66)
Maternal parent present 0.10 (0.30) 0.06 (0.23) 0.49 (0.50)
Paternal parent present 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.28) 0.00 (0.03)
Monthly non-mother income 3,913 (5,634) 4,039 (5,650) 2,712 (5,333)
Ownership dwelling 0.80 (0.40) 0.81 (0.39) 0.75 (0.43)
Fertility characteristics
Children in household 2.84 (1.05) 2.87 (1.07) 2.60 (0.87)
More than 2 children 0.53 (0.50) 0.54 (0.50) 0.42 (0.49)
Same sex 0.50 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50)
Two boys 0.26 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44)
Two girls 0.24 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43)
Age second child (yrs) 6.44 (3.83) 6.43 (3.83) 6.55 (3.87)
Age youngest child (yrs) 3.74 (3.07) 3.65 (3.03) 4.59 (3.35)
Labor market outcomes
Employed 0.25 (0.43) 0.21 (0.41) 0.60 (0.49)
Labor market outcomes for employed
Informal employment 0.42 (0.49) 0.46 (0.50) 0.30 (0.46)
Hours worked per week 37.19 (20.78) 35.76 (20.88) 42.00 (19.68)
Monthly (Pesos) 2,959 (2,507) 2,946 (2,622) 3,001 (2,076)
Observations 505,569 457,546 48,023
Note: 2010 census data from Mexico with restrictions as outlined in the text. The units of observation are women
aged 21–35 with at least 2 children. Statistics depicted are means with standard deviations in parentheses. All
variables are measured at the time of the survey. The labor market outcomes refer to the week before the survey.
1.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.1. The first part of the table shows some demo-
graphic characteristics. The women in my sample are, on average, 29 years old and gave birth
to their first child at the age of 20. The majority of women (62%) completed at most primary
11The sample is clustered by municipality, with enumeration areas selected by simple random sampling
within strata (https://international.ipums.org/international/sample designs/sample designs mx.shtml; last ac-
cess 08/2017).
12This age restriction is motivated in Angrist and Evans (1998). My results do not change if I apply a
minimum age of 18 or a maximum age of 40.
13To be more precise, I exclude women who had children that were no longer living at the time of the census,
considering all live births and, hence, excluding stillbirths.
14I also exclude females for whom at least one of the following variables is missing: Age and/or sex of the
two firstborn children, employment status, working hours, and earnings. Moreover, females who had twins at
the second birth (or triplets at the first birth) are excluded from the sample due to the difficulty of assigning a
birth order to the second and third child.
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school. Only 3% have a university degree. These characteristics are very similar across single
and married or cohabiting women. About half of the women live in very small municipalities
with less than 2,500 inhabitants. This proportion is lower for single women. Ten percent live
with at least one of their parents in the same household, while 8% share a household with a
parent of their partner. Single women have, at 49%, a very high likelihood to live with one of
their parents. The mean monthly labor income of the household, excluding mother’s income,
averages 3,913 Mexican Pesos (307 US$).15 For married and cohabiting women, the former is
mainly earned by the spouse, while for single women by the maternal grandfather. Only 2% of
the eldest children in my sample work.
The fertility characteristics in the third part of Table 1.1 demonstrate that mothers in the
sample live with an average of 2.8 children in the same household. About 53% live with more
than two children, constituting the group I refer to as the treatment group. The first two
children of 50% of the observations in the sample are of the same sex, with two firstborn males
being with a proportion of 26% a bit more likely than two females. This makes sense given that
the natural sex ratio at birth is slightly biased toward boys (Hesketh and Xing, 2006).
Further differences between women with and without a partner arise when it comes to labor
market variables presented in the last part of Table 1.1. At the time of the census, 60%
of single women were working compared to only 21% of women in a partnership. Of these
employed women, 42% work in an informal job, averaging 37 working hours per week with an
income of 2,959 Pesos per month. Single women are more likely to be in formal employment,
working more hours than married or cohabiting women and receiving slightly higher monthly
earnings.16
1.3.3 Informal employment in Mexico
As noted earlier, the Mexican labor market is characterized by a large share of women who are
employed in the informal sector. I use my sample to learn more about informal jobs in Mexico
and to discuss the hypotheses stated in Section 1.2.
I define informal employment as working on one’s own account (self-employment with no em-
ployees hired), day labor, or unpaid work, whereas formal employment refers to self-employment
with employees or blue- and white-collar work.17 In the Census data, I observe Mexican women
in informal employment mainly working as store merchants (20.9%), workers in the cultivation
15Given an average exchange rate of 12.75 Mexican Pesos per US$ in 2010.
16Compared to the sample in Cruces and Galiani (2007), who use 2000 Mexican census data and similar
sample restrictions, the proportion of women working for pay increased by around 7% in the overall sample and
by around 5% in the sample of married women from 2000 to 2010. Moreover, the percentage of women in the
sample who have more than two children is around 18% lower, and they have about 0.5 children less in 2010
than in 2000.
17According to the ILO, Informal employment is defined as comprising employers working in their informal
sector enterprise, employees holding informal jobs (jobs without social protection and other job-related benefits)
both in the formal and informal sector, and own-account workers (International Labour Organization, 2009).
Unfortunately, I can neither observe whether employees are in jobs with social protection and job-related benefits
nor whether employers are formally registered. Still, the job types I define as informal are those typically
associated with informality (Ca´ceres-Delpiano, 2012). Moreover, I observe to what type of health insurance
households have access. Among households with informally employed mothers, 80% are not covered by any
social security institution in Mexico, i.e., they are neither insured nor are they part of the public insurance.
This number is substantially lower (50%) for households with formally employed mothers.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of working hours and wages in formal and informal employment
(a) Working hours
Formal: Mean: 39.7, Median: 40, SD: 17.8
Informal: Mean: 33.7, Median: 30, SD: 23.8
(b) Net hourly wages
Formal: Mean: 26.5, Median: 18.7, SD: 28.8
Informal: Mean: 20.3, Median: 10.4, SD: 37.8
Notes: 2010 census data from Mexico with restrictions as outlined in the text. The units of observation are
women aged 21–35 with at least 2 children. Informal employment is defined as in the text. The graph to the
left shows the distribution of working hours and the one to the right the distribution of net hourly wages by
type of employment (informal/formal).
of maize/beans (6.0%), domestic workers (5.8%), servers of food and drinks (5.0%), and sales
workers (4.5%). This observation is in line with findings in OECD (2017).
In Figure 1.1, I compare working hours and hourly wages between women in formal and informal
employment. Of course, differences in the distribution of hours and wages over the type of
employment must be interpreted with caution. It is likely that women observed in the formal
versus the informal sector are very different from each other. Panel (a) shows that, on average,
women work fewer hours in informal relative to formal employment. Furthermore, the working
hours are much more dispersed for women in the informal sector. This observation suggests
that informal employment is more flexible regarding working schedules. Moreover, women
with an informal job are much more likely to be observed with working hours between zero
and twenty, while around 40% of those in a formal job work full-time (40 to 50 hours). This
supports the hypothesis that the fixed costs of working are higher in formal than in informal
employment. These fixed costs drive women who want to work relatively few hours out of the
formal labor force. Panel (b) shows that formal pays a higher average hourly net wage than
informal employment. Interestingly, more than a third of all informal workers earn only 0 to 5
Mexican Pesos per hour; potentially they receive some payment in kind. To sum up, Figure 1.1
indicates that women face a trade-off between job quality, as measured by wages, and flexibility
when choosing their employment.
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1.4 Estimation strategy
1.4.1 Research design
The empirical analysis focuses on the effect of an increase in family size on household labor
market outcomes. I define the treatment indicator Di equal to 1 if a woman has more than 2
children and 0 otherwise. Let Y1i denote the outcome if i has more than two children and Y0i
the outcome in the absence of treatment, i.e., with two children. For any individual, Y1i and Y0i
cannot be observed simultaneously. The outcome observed for i is Yi = Di×Y1i+(1−Di)×Y0i.
If fertility is randomly assigned, then the difference in the mean outcomes of treated and
untreated individuals would identify the average treatment effect, since individuals of both
groups were comparable and, thereby, had similar potential outcomes independent of actual
treatment assignment.
However, the number of children is potentially endogenously determined. Women decide about
their number of children, given earning potentials and career plans. Moreover, there probably
exist other unobserved factors that influence both fertility and labor market outcomes, i.e.,
preferences for having children that are correlated with those for working in the labor market.
Thus, the average potential outcome for females with two compared to those with three or more
children would differ, even if they had the same number of children. Simply comparing the two
groups confounds the effect of the treatment with other differences across these groups.
The idea of the estimation method is to use the variation from an instrument that indirectly
shifts the number of children while holding other determinants of the outcome variables con-
stant. I exploit parental preferences for a mixed-sex sibling composition to instrument for an
increase in family size from two to three or more children. Introduced by Angrist and Evans
(1998), this instrument is commonly used in the literature. The rationale behind this strategy
is based on previous results showing that, compared to parents who have children of different
sexes, parents with children of the same sex are more likely to have an additional child. At
the same time, children’s sex mix is assumed to be virtually randomly assigned. Zi is hereafter
defined as an indicator that is equal to 1 if the two firstborn children are of the same sex and
0 otherwise.
I use the quasi-random assignment of children’s sex composition to estimate the causal effect
from an increase in family size on household outcomes. In the main analysis, I estimate the
following linear model:
Di = γZi +X
′
iθ + i (1.1)
Yi = βiDi +X
′
iδ + ηi, (1.2)
where Yi, Di, and Zi are defined as above. Vector Xi contains relevant control variables,
including indicators of the sex of the first and second child plus additional variables such as
education and age.18 Since I allow the treatment effect βi to be arbitrarily heterogeneous
18The set of additional control variables includes dummies for the age of the mother in yearly categories,
dummies for her age at first birth in yearly categories, dummies for the age of the second child in yearly categories,
municipality size in categories, dummies for schooling in yearly categories, indicator for literacy, indicator for
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across individuals, I am only able to identify local effects that pertain to the subpopulation
that responds to a change in the value of the instrument, the compliers. The target of the
estimation is the average of βi among compliers. The baseline specification uses 2SLS with first
and second stage equations given by (1.1) and (1.2) to estimate this Local Average Treatment
Effect (LATE). However, the outcomes of interest are limited: Employment status is binary
and weekly hours worked are non-negative with a mass point at 0. The descriptive statistics in
Section 1.3 show that a substantial fraction – 75% – of women in the sample work zero hours per
week. In a model with a non-saturated set of covariates, the Conditional Expectation Function
(CEF) for a limited dependent variable is typically non-linear, and it might be important to
use more flexible modeling strategies (Angrist, 2001). Therefore, I additionally implement
an estimator for the LATE that incorporates the covariates Xi in a fully nonparametric way
(Fro¨lich, 2007). For this nonparametric IV estimator (NP-IV ), the conditional mean outcome
is estimated via a local linear estimator and the conditional mean treatment via a local logit
estimator. Thereby, I avoid the functional form restrictions on the conditional expectation
functions of Di and Yi in the linear model.
The average treatment effect on working hours might hide important heterogeneity in the labor
supply behavior of households. The overall effect comprises both the impact of family size
on the decision to work and on the volume of work conditional on employment. The former
refers to the extensive, the latter to the intensive margin of labor supply. In order to inves-
tigate the impact of fertility on the distribution of hours worked, I compare quantiles of the
potential outcome distributions among compliers. For this purpose, I apply the local quantile
treatment effect (LQTE) estimator developed by Fro¨lich and Melly (2013). The identification
of LQTE does not require any functional form restrictions and relies on the same assumptions
necessary to identify LATE. Thus, the framework naturally accommodates discrete outcomes
and outcomes with mass points (Melly and Wu¨thrich, 2017).19 In contrast, alternative models
that deal with limited outcome variables, such as the Tobit model, often rely on very restric-
tive underlying structural frameworks for identification (Angrist, 2001). Similar to the NP-IV
estimator (Fro¨lich, 2007), I can flexibly include covariates in the model in order to relax the
identification assumptions.
1.4.2 Identification assumptions
In the following, I discuss the assumptions that are necessary for the validity of the above-
described instrumental variable strategy. These assumptions are introduced by Imbens and
Angrist (1994) and I refer to them as LATE assumptions.
I must assume that the sex composition of the two firstborn children is as good as randomly
assigned. This assumption might be violated if parents can influence the sex mix of the two
indigeneity, and state fixed effects. I flexibly control for the age variables, since the outcome variables are
potentially non-linear in these age variables and there may be discontinuities at particular ages; for instance at
the school starting age or at the minimum age to enter early childhood education.
19However, the well-behaved asymptotic distributions for the LQTE estimator rely on the continuity of the
dependent variable. This implies that the inference procedures are not valid in the neighborhood in which the
dependent variable has a mass point, i.e., at 0 (Melly and Wu¨thrich, 2017).
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firstborn children, for example by sex-selective abortions or discrimination in care practices
for one sex. Sex ratios of children aged zero to four that are close to the biological ones
speak against the former (Cruces and Galiani, 2007). Moreover, sex-selection technologies are
very expensive (Dahl and Moretti, 2008) and abortions themselves carry high costs, given that
access to abortion is prohibited or severely restricted in most of Mexico (OECD, 2017). It seems
implausible that families have such extreme preferences for a particular sex composition of their
children that they are willing to bear the burden of a sex-related abortion. In general, family
institutions in Mexico do not exhibit extreme preferences for male children as observed in some
Asian countries by Schultz (2008): For instance, there is no dowry custom and no systematic
discrimination against girls (Cruces and Galiani, 2007).
Even in the absence of manipulation, the sex ratio at birth is around 105-107 male births for
every 100 female births (Hesketh and Xing, 2006). This implies that having a male child among
the two firstborn children makes it more likely that a couple has two firstborn children of the
same sex, i.e., children’s sex is systematically related to the same sex instrument. This is a
problem if children’s sex is related to potential labor market outcomes or potential fertility.20
Since I cannot rule out that this is the case, I impose the weaker assumption that the instrument
is randomly assigned conditional on the sex of the two firstborn children and account for the
latter in the analysis.
Table 1.2 illustrates the correlation between predetermined characteristics of women and their
instrument status. Columns (1) and (2) give the mean characteristics of the corresponding vari-
able in households with two children of different sexes and the same sex, respectively. Columns
(3) and (4) show the mean difference between the two groups and its standard error, respec-
tively. Mothers with children of mixed sexes are remarkably similar in almost all observable
characteristics to those with children of the same sex. Still, there is a small but statistically sig-
nificant age difference between the two groups. As explained earlier, having a male child among
the two firstborn children is positively associated with the instrument: parents with children of
the same sex have, on average, a significant 1.3 percentage points (2.2 percentage points) higher
likelihood of a male first (second) child. Given these differences between mixed- and same-sex
children mothers, the main model will condition on the sex of the first- and second-born child.
Additional controls include the variables listed in Footnote 18, among them maternal age, in
a very flexible way. However, the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these additional
controls.
To interpret the IV estimates as identifying the causal effect of fertility on parents’ labor
market outcomes, I further have to rule out that the sex composition of the two firstborn
children has a systematic effect on labor supply other than through its effect on having an
additional birth. This exclusion assumption might be violated if the sex composition affects
child costs (Wolpin and Rosenzweig, 2000). Lower levels of expenditures for children can result
20There is some evidence that this might be the case. Dahl and Moretti (2008) show that having a firstborn
boy increases the likelihood to marry and decreases the probability to divorce. Moreover, there might be
differences in the monetary or time cost of raising girls versus boys (Angrist and Evans, 1998; Dahl and Moretti,
2008). At the same time, marriage, divorce, and child costs are likely to be related to maternal labor market
outcomes. Moreover, Dahl and Moretti (2008) show that having a male firstborn reduces the likelihood to have
additional children.
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Table 1.2: Testing for the quasi-random assignment of children’s sex composition
Mean Difference in Means
Mixed [Zi = 0] Same [Zi = 1] Coefficient SE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable:
Age (yrs) 29.408 29.381 0.027 (0.011)
Age at first birth (yrs) 19.765 19.760 0.005 (0.009)
Age of second child (yrs) 6.440 6.443 -0.003 (0.011)
Literate 0.911 0.912 -0.001 (0.001)
Primary completed 0.622 0.624 -0.002 (0.001)
Secondary completed 0.119 0.120 -0.001 (0.001)
University completed 0.029 0.029 0.000 (0.000)
Years of schooling 7.333 7.342 -0.009 (0.011)
Indigenous 0.343 0.342 0.001 (0.001)
Locality size [2,500-14,999] 0.242 0.241 0.001 (0.001)
Locality size [15,000-99,999] 0.125 0.127 -0.002 (0.001)
Locality size [100,000+] 0.140 0.140 0.000 (0.001)
First child boy 0.505 0.518 -0.013 (0.001)
Second child boy 0.495 0.518 -0.022 (0.001)
Observations 251,305 254,264
Note: This table illustrates the balancing of predetermined characteristics by the value of the instrument.
Columns (1) and (2) show the mean of the corresponding variable among households with a mixed and same
sex composition of the two firstborn children, respectively. The coefficient and SE in column (3) and (4),
respectively, are obtained by regressing the corresponding variable on the instrument dummy.
from hand-me-downs (i.e. for clothing and footwear) when children have the same sex. Wolpin
and Rosenzweig (2000) demonstrate that these savings are existent for Indian households and
that they account for a substantial fraction of the household income. Nevertheless, these results
might vary significantly across countries. Bu¨tikofer (2011), for instance, examines the Mexican
Family Life Survey in 2000 and 2005. She finds no statistically significant differences in the
economies of scale across households with different sibling sex compositions due to clothing- and
room-sharing. Even if savings related to the sex composition were existent and affected female
labor supply directly, their size would have to be meaningful enough to violate the exclusion
restriction severely. In contrast to India, data on household expenditures in Mexico suggest
that the fraction of household income spent on clothing and footwear for all members of the
family in 2010 is, at 2.3%, very small.21
Another potential concern is that many poor households receive subsidies through the Opor-
tunidades program as explained in Section 1.2. The amounts that can be received depend on
the age and gender of the children in the household. Hence, there might be direct effects of
children’s sexes on maternal employment through differences in the subsidies. However, condi-
tional on the sex of the first two children, the sex composition does not impact the amount of
subsidies and hence, Oportunidades should not invalidate our empirical strategy. The exclusion
21Data is from OECD StatExtracs/Final consumption expenditure of households,
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SNA TABLE5; last access 09/2017.
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assumption might also fail to hold if the sex composition of the two firstborn children directly
affects the marginal utility of parents’ leisure and, thus, labor supply. Conditional on the sex of
the first and second-born children, assuming separability of sex-sameness and parental leisure
does not seem to be too restrictive.
The third assumption needed for a causal interpretation of the IV estimates is the monotonicity
of the same sex instrument. Monotonicity requires that while having mixed-sex siblings com-
pared to same-sex siblings may not affect the fertility of some women, all of those affected are
assumed to be affected in the same direction. It fails, for instance, if there are mothers who
have a preference for at least two children of the same sex and, thereby, choose to have a third
child if the first children have different sexes. Lee (2008), for example, shows that parents with
two sons are less likely to continue childbearing than parents with one son and one daughter in
South Korea. Wolpin and Rosenzweig (2000) find a similar pattern in India. However, fertility
preferences are likely to vary between settings, and both of the countries above are well known
for their sex bias due to extreme son preferences. I show in Section 1.5 that, in my sample,
households with two boys are more likely to increase their family size compared to those with
one boy and girl. This implies that the preference for mixed-sex siblings is more prevalent
than the preference for two boys. Nonetheless, this does not rule out that households with a
preference for the latter exist in my sample. Similar to De Chaisemartin (2017), I estimate
the proportion of “revealed” defiers in the Demographic and Health Survey data, which has
information on the desired sex composition of children. As there is no data available on Mexico,
I examine a sample of mothers from Colombia, which is geographically and culturally close.22
Among women whose two firstborn children are a boy and a girl, 0.77% had three children or
more and retrospectively declare that their ideal sex composition would have been two boys
and no girl, or no boy and two girls. Thus, only a small fraction of women was induced to have
a third child because their two children were of different sexes.23
Beyond the argumentation in favor of the validity of the instrument based on empirical and
institutional facts, I also apply a testing procedure proposed by Huber and Mellace (2015)
for a just identified (heterogeneous) treatment effect model with endogeneity. The intuition
behind the test is that assuming independence, exclusion, and monotonicity, the mean potential
outcomes of always-takers under treatment and of never-takers under non-treatment are both
point-identified and bounded. The fact that the point-identified moments have to lie within the
respective bounds provides testable restrictions. A rejection of the null hypothesis points to
the violation of independence, exclusion, monotonicity, or any combination of them. However,
asymptotic non-rejection does not imply the validity of the assumptions: the instrument might
be invalid without violating the testable restrictions implied by the model. Hence, given the
large data set, I have a high finite sample power to detect violations of the instrument validity if
and only if the instrument is invalid in a way as to cause violations of these testable restrictions.
Applying the test to the sample, I obtain a p-value above 0.7. This means that I cannot reject
22The data was retrieved from https://dhsprogram.com/Data/; last access 05/2018. I use the Standard DHS
from Colombia in 2010, Individual Recode, and apply the same sample restrictions as for the main sample.
23Angrist and Evans (1996) show that even if non-monotonicity does not hold, it is still possible to capture
the local treatment effect of compliers if defiers and compliers have the same treatment effects.
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the hypothesis that the instrument satisfies the assumptions for validity.24
To sum up, the discussion based on empirical observations for the Mexican context and the
formal test procedure provide no evidence that the same sex -instrument is invalid.
1.5 Empirical results
To estimate the effect of fertility on household labor market outcomes, I follow the instrumental
strategy described in Section 1.4. I begin by examining the first stage relationship between
fertility and the sex mix of the two firstborn children in Table 1.3. Column (1) suggests
that there is a statistically significant relationship between the treatment and the samesex
indicator: Women with two children of the same sex are 3.3 percentage points more likely to
have an additional child relative to those with children of distinct sexes. This coefficient does
not change if I add a large set of control variables including indicators whether the first and
second born child is male (boy1 and boy2, respectively) in column (2). The significantly negative
effects of boy1 and boy2 indicate that women stop having more children in response to having
a boy. The model in column (3) splits up the same sex instrument in two indicators that are
equal to one if the first two children are boys or girls, labeled twoboys and twogirls, respectively.
The estimated coefficients suggest that females increase childbearing both in response to the
birth of two boys and two girls, but the response to two boys is significantly smaller than to
two girls (2.6 compared to 4.1 percentage points, respectively). In column (4), the association
between having first a male child and reduced childbearing at higher parities turns insignificant
when the twoboys and twogirls indicators are entered separately.25 This means that there is no
relationship between boy1 and fertility when the effect of sex composition is allowed to differ by
sex. To sum up, the first stage results suggest that women in the sample have a preference for
a balanced sex mix combined with a bias for boys. The latter should not be of concern per se.
As outlined earlier, there is no evidence for strong discrimination against girls and the sex mix
of children is unlikely to affect the outcome through a channel other than family size. Hence, it
seems likely that the bias for boys does only reflect cultural preferences that do not challenge
the identification assumptions. Furthermore, I condition on the sex of the first two children in
the estimations.
The small partial R2 of the first stage results indicates that the instruments can only explain
a small amount of the variation in the treatment and, hence, the IV estimates are going to
have relatively large standard errors. Still, the F-Statistics on the excluded instruments are
well above the corresponding critical values, and I can reject the null that the instruments are
weak in all specifications. The instrument is subsequently used in order to estimate the effect
of an exogenous increase in family size from two to three and more children on mothers’ labor
market outcomes.
24The validity of the same sex instrument is formally tested for a sample of mothers in the 1980 US Census
by Huber (2015). He uses the same testing procedure I outline here. Mourifie´ and Wan (2017) apply a different
testing procedure to the 1990 US Census. Both studies find no evidence that the assumptions for the validity
of the same sex strategy are violated.
25The second model allows the effect of having first two boys and having first two girls to differ. In order to
avoid linear dependence of the included indicators in this model, either boy1 or boy2 must be dropped.
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Table 1.3: First stage relationship: Fertility and children’s sex composition
Dependent variable: More than 2 children











Additional controls X X
Dependent mean 0.529
Observations 505,569
Partial R2 (excluded Zi) 0.0011 0.0016 0.0012 0.0016
F(excluded Zi) 558.55 802.75 293.65 418.09
Note: This table reports the first stage coefficients based on equation 1.1. Columns (1) and (2) use as instrument
an indicator whether the two firstborn children are of the same sex. Columns (3) and (4) use as instruments
indicators whether the two firstborn children are boys or girls. F(.) reports the robust Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk
F statistic on the excluded instruments. Additional control variables include dummies for the age of the mother
in years, dummies for her age at first birth in years, dummies for the age of the second child, municipality size
in categories, dummies for schooling in years, indicator for literacy, indicator for indigeneity, and state fixed
effects. In column (4), boy2 is excluded from the set of control variables because of multicollinearity. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
1.5.1 Fertility and mothers’ labor supply at the extensive margin
In Table 1.4, I present the results from OLS and IV estimations of the relationship between
maternal employment and fertility for all women in the sample. The OLS estimates in column
(2) illustrate that women with more than two children have a weaker labor market attachment
than those with two children: They are an average of 8 percentage points less likely to be
employed, which is mainly driven by lower employment in the formal sector. Including a set of
control variables in column (3) indicates that only a small amount of this negative correlation is
driven by differences in observable characteristics across these two fertility groups. In contrast,
instrumented samesex -effects in columns (4) and (5) reveal a positive relationship between
family size and the probability of employment: having more than two compared to two children
induces an increase in employment by an average of about 4.8 percentage points. Given the
relatively low employment rate in the sample, this corresponds to a 19% increase. This effect is
statistically significant at the 10% level. The employment definition includes both employment
in formal and informal jobs (own-account work, day labor, and unpaid work outside the home).
In the following, I look at formal and informal employment separately. The rise in employment
seems to be driven by an increase in the likelihood to be in informal employment when fertility
increases beyond two children. However, the effect of fertility on informal is not statistically
different from its effect on formal employment. In Table 1.3, I show that mothers in my
sample tend to have more children when their two firstborn are of the same sex independent
36 1. Fertility as a Driver of Maternal Employment
of whether they are boys or girls. In column (6), I split up the samesex instrument into the
two separate instruments twoboys and twogirls. The coefficients in these alternative 2SLS
estimations increase slightly, and standard errors become a little bit smaller, but they are very
similar to before. The coefficients in the nonparametric IV estimations in column (7) are slightly
smaller than in the linear models.
Table 1.4: Relationship between fertility and mother’s employment probability
Mean OLS 2SLS 2SLS+ NP-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable:
Employed 0.248 -0.082 -0.076 0.043 0.048 0.063 0.042
(0.001) (0.001) (0.037) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030)
Formally employed 0.143 -0.080 -0.058 0.004 0.005 0.011 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028)
Informally employed 0.105 -0.002 -0.018 0.038 0.043 0.052 0.041
(0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
Additional controls X X X X
Observations 505,569
Note: This table illustrates the relationship between mothers’ employment status and the treatment. Each
row shows the results for the stated outcome variable. Column (1) shows the mean of the dependent variable.
Columns (2) and (3) show the estimated coefficients on the treatment in an OLS regression without and with
additional control variables. Columns (4) and (5) show the 2SLS regression results using samesex as instrument
without and with additional control variables and (6) using twoboys and twogirls as instruments plus control
variables. (7) shows the results from the nonparametric IV estimation with samesex as instrument. Columns
(2)–(7) all include indicators for the sex of the first- and second-born child. Employed is an indicator equal to
1 if a woman is employed in the week prior to the survey and 0 otherwise. Formally (informally) employed is
an indicator equal to 1 if a woman is employed in a formal (informal) job in the week prior to the survey and 0
otherwise. Control variables are as in Table 1.3. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The comparison of the OLS and IV estimates suggests that the preference for further child-
bearing are inversely related to working in the labor market, particularly in the formal labor
market. An exogenous increase in childbearing beyond two does not have an impact on the
probability to be formally employed, but it does increase the propensity of informal employ-
ment. As discussed earlier and in line with previous results, this might happen because informal
jobs offer more flexibility to combine work and family responsibilities. In the following, I look
at employment responses beyond the extensive margin.
1.5.2 Fertility and maternal working hours responses
Table 1.5 shows the estimated effects of more than 2 children on hours worked per week in
total and both in formal and informal jobs. Similar to the probability of employment, women
with more than two children are observed to work fewer hours compared to those with two
in columns (2) and (3). The coefficients turn positive when instrumenting for the potentially
endogenous fertility decision in columns (4)–(7), but they are not statistically distinguishable
from 0 in almost all specifications. The coefficients in the regression with informal hours as
outcome variable tend to be larger than those with formal hours. Subsequently, I go beyond
the mean effects and look at the distributional impact of higher parity childbirth on hours to
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allow for different responses at the extensive and the intensive margin of labor supply.
Table 1.5: Relationship between fertility and maternal working hours
Mean OLS 2SLS 2SLS+ NP-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable:
Working hours 9.228 -3.492 -3.391 1.977 2.134 2.674 1.922
(0.054) (0.064) (1.618) (1.570) (1.547) (1.756)
Working hours, formal 5.519 -3.252 -2.542 0.691 0.650 0.813 0.503
(0.043) (0.051) (1.283) (1.230) (1.211) (1.073)
Working hours, informal 3.708 -0.240 -0.849 1.286 1.483 1.861 1.420
(0.037) (0.046) (1.116) (1.123) (1.105) (1.314)
Additional controls X X X X
Observations 505,569
Note: This table illustrates the relationship between maternal working hours and the treatment similar to
Table 1.4. Working hours measure the number of hours worked in the week prior to the survey and are set to
0 for those not employed. Working hours formal (informal) are the working hours in a formal (informal) job.
Control variables are as in Table 1.3. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
I estimate the quantiles of the potential outcome distributions for compliers based on Fro¨lich
and Melly (2013) using the samesex instrument. Figure 1.2 illustrates the estimated quantiles
of maternal working hours separately for formal (a) and informal employment (b).26 The blue,
solid (red, dashed) line shows the estimated quantiles of working hours for compliers with more
than two children (with only two children). The difference between the two lines corresponds
to the local quantile treatment effect at the τ quantile. Appendix Table A.2 quantifies the
results and provides the corresponding standard errors. First, if they had only two children, a
large fraction of women, around 85% and 90%, would have zero working hours in formal and
informal employment, respectively. Second, increasing fertility beyond two children does not
have an impact at the extensive margin of formal work, but it seems to have a positive effect
at the intensive margin by shifting a few quantiles from around 20 to 40 hours. The second
panel in Appendix Table A.2 shows that this effect is statistically significantly different from
zero. Third, having more than 2 children tends to increase some quantiles that would be
equal to zero or to a small number of hours in informal employment if women had two children
only. The quantiles are augmented by statistically significant 13 to 15 hours at this part of
the outcome distribution (see the third panel of Appendix Table A.2). Summing up, fertility
increases female labor supply in the formal sector at the intensive margin for a small fraction of
women, while having mainly an impact at the extensive margin of labor supply in the informal
sector.
1.6 Mechanisms
In Section 1.5, I find that an increase in fertility beyond two children leads to a positive employ-
ment response of mothers. As outlined in Section 1.1, this finding contrasts with the negative
26The effect of the treatment on total hours in both formal and informal employment is presented in Appendix
Figure A.1.
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Figure 1.2: Distributional impact of fertility on mother’s hours worked per week
(a) Working hours, formal
(b) Working hours, informal
Notes: This graph illustrates the estimated quantiles for the potential outcome distributions of maternal weekly
working hours in formal (top) and informal jobs (bottom). The blue, solid and the red, dashed line show the
estimated quantiles of working hours for compliers with more than two children, Qˆτ
Y1|c, and with only two
children, Qˆτ
Y0|c, respectively. The model includes the control variables that are listed in Table 1.3.
effect found in most previous studies. There are different potential explanations for this de-
viation. I already show that the increase in employment is due to a rise in informal labor.
Employment opportunities in the informal sector tend to be more prevalent in low- and middle-
income compared to high-income countries. Most studies, focusing on the latter, find a negative
relationship between fertility and female labor supply. In the following section, I discuss three
more potential reasons for my empirical results. First, I show that husbands in couples do not
increase their employment propensity or hours in response to an increase in their family size,
which might indicate that they face difficult labor market conditions. If work opportunities
were better for women around the time of the census, then this might provide a reason why
they increase their labor supply. Second, I discuss the provision of informal child care within
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Table 1.6: Relationship between fertility and mother’s and father’s employment
Mean OLS 2SLS 2SLS+ NP-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable:
Mother employed 0.211 -0.070 -0.056 0.033 0.043 0.052 0.035
(0.001) (0.001) (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
Mother employed, formal 0.114 -0.068 -0.041 -0.019 -0.011 -0.010 -0.019
(0.001) (0.001) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Mother employed, informal 0.097 -0.002 -0.015 0.052 0.055 0.062 0.054
(0.001) (0.001) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Mother hours worked 7.531 -2.793 -2.316 2.345 2.732 3.017 2.410
(0.054) (0.063) (1.565) (1.494) (1.472) (1.279)
Father employed 0.903 -0.017 0.000 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023)
Father hours worked 43.319 -2.561 -0.117 0.152 -0.178 -0.520 -0.036
(0.071) (0.084) (2.038) (1.965) (1.936) (2.109)
Additional controls X X X X
Observations 412,452
Note: This table illustrates the relationship between a set of employment outcomes for parents and the treatment
similar to Table 1.4. The sample is restricted to households in which both parents are present in the household
at the time of the survey and in which employment outcomes for both of them are observed. Control variables
are as in Table 1.3. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
extended households that favors monetary relative to time investments by the mother. Third,
I look at the response of women conditional on different proxies of household wealth.
1.6.1 Labor supply responses of married and cohabiting couples
In the following, I have a closer look at households in which mothers live together with their
partners.27 Table 1.6 shows the estimation results for the subsample of married and cohabiting
couples in a similar way as for the overall sample before. The total employment response of
women who live with their partners is similar to that of all women in the sample. Standard
errors tend to be a bit larger in the subsample, and the estimated effects are not statistically
significantly different from zero. The response of the probability to be informally employed and
of total working hours is positive and significant for partnered women and tends to be slightly
larger (but not statistically different) than in the overall sample.
Column (1) shows that average paternal is much stronger than the maternal labor market
attachment in terms of participation and working hours: 90% of all fathers are employed, and
they work an average of 43 hours per week. Column (2) illustrates that fathers with more than
two children have worse labor market outcomes, on average, than those with two. In contrast to
women, these differences in labor market outcomes are to a large extent explained by differences
in observable characteristics, which I include in the regressions in column (3). The coefficients
27For 5.1% of the women who report that they are married or cohabiting, I do not observe their partner in
the data. The cohabiting partner of a mother might not necessarily be the biological father of her children. In
the following, “father” refers to the biological father, stepfather, or adoptive father of the children of the women
in the sample.
40 1. Fertility as a Driver of Maternal Employment
in the IV models of paternal employment on more than 2 children are very close to zero and
not statistically significant.
In a model with a unitary household, we would expect that the partner with the higher wage
worked unambiguously more when having additional children because he or she had a compara-
tive advantage in providing earnings for consumption and monetary inputs. The other partner
would work more inside the home because his or her opportunity costs were lower (Heath,
2017). Surprisingly, the results here indicate that mothers increase their labor supply, while
fathers do not react at all. Although wages are unobserved for most women and some men,
one would probably expect that potential wages are higher for male partners.28 One potential
explanation for the contrary results are labor market frictions that impacted men differently
than women in 2010, the year of the analysis. In Mexico, male labor market outcomes were
the most vulnerable to the Great Recession with decreasing participation rates and income
due to the economic contraction. At the same time, females labor market success was largely
unaffected by the crisis (World Bank, 2012). Therefore it might have been easier for women to
earn additional income that provided for the enlarged household in 2010 than it was for men.
Another explanation is that the men’s labor supply is less elastic.
1.6.2 Informal childcare through extended families
Another potential explanation for the positive effect of fertility on employment is that the
availability of informal child care provided by the extended family makes time investments
less attractive relative to monetary investments. Hence, they raise the incentives to increase
labor supply and focus on monetary inputs. Several studies show that the availability of
grandparent-provided childcare significantly increases maternal labor supply (see Posadas and
Vidal-Fernandez (2013) for an excellent literature review). In particular, Compton and Pollak
(2014) show that geographical proximity to mothers or mothers-in-law has a substantial positive
effect on the labor supply of married women with young children.
In the data, I can observe whether the parents or parents-in-law are present in households. It
is likely that women who live in the same household as their parents (or parents-in-law) are
not comparable to women who live with their nuclear family. For instance, the descriptive
analysis already revealed that co-residence is correlated with being a single mother. Moreover,
co-residence with parents might be itself determined by fertility: Mothers (and their spouses)
might decide to join their parents’ household, or parents might choose to live with their children
in order to offer them childcare when their family size increases. In order to examine the latter,
I use the same IV estimation strategy as before, putting an indicator of whether grandparents
are present in the household as the dependent variable. I assume that the sex composition of
the two firstborn children does not affect co-residence with grandparents other than through
its impact on fertility.
Table 1.7 illustrates the relationship between fertility and the presence of grandparents in the
household. On average, mothers with two children are less likely to live with either their
28Although this is very selective, I observe that only 5% of women in the sample earn more than their partners
in terms of their hourly wages among all couples in which both partners work.
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Table 1.7: Relationship between fertility and household composition
Mean OLS 2SLS 2SLS+ NP-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable:
Maternal grandparent present 0.100 -0.064 -0.040 0.053 0.046 0.044 0.046
(0.001) (0.001) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.031)
Paternal grandparent present 0.076 -0.019 -0.000 0.011 0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Additional controls X X X X
Observations 505,569
Notes: This table illustrates the relationship between the household composition and the treatment similar
to Table 1.4. Maternal (paternal) grandparent present is an indicator equal to 1 if at least one maternal
(paternal) grandparent lives in the same household as the mother and her children. Control variables are as in
Table 1.3. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
or their partners’ parents. The negative correlation between fertility and the presence of a
mother’s parent is sustained even if I control for a broad set of variables. When I instrument the
variable of interest, more than 2 children, there is a marginally significant positive relationship
between family size and co-residence with maternal grandparents. The 4.4 to 4.6 percentage
points increase is considerable given that 10 percent of the women in the sample live in the
same household as their parents. Unfortunately, there is no information on child care in the
data set, so it is not possible to test the hypothesis that the increased likelihood to live with
grandparents allows women to work more when they have more children. Still, this pattern is
consistent with the hypothesis.
1.6.3 Household wealth
As discussed earlier, negative budgetary consequences from fixed costs of additional children
are likely to be more severe in households with low wealth. As a result, an increase in the family
size of a “poor” households should have a larger impact on the mother’s propensity to take up
employment in order to guarantee a minimum income level for the household. I propose three
different measures to proxy household wealth. The first one is the number of rooms in the
house, the second is a mixed wealth measure generated using a principal component analysis
using several characteristics of the households’ dwelling (such as ownership of a dwelling, car,
TV, or radio, as well as the type of electricity used and water supply), and the third is based
on spousal earnings. Importantly, I do not find an effect of the instrumented treatment on any
of these three variables. So it is reasonable to split the sample by these measures.
The corresponding results from the second stage using the samesex -instrument are presented in
Table 1.8. The findings provide suggestive evidence that mothers in households with relatively
low household wealth particularly increase their labor supply in response to an increase in their
fertility beyond two children. There is no statistically significant effect of larger family size
on formal employment or hours for any subgroup. In contrast, the positive effects on informal
employment are larger and more likely to be statistically significant among women in low-wealth
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Table 1.8: Effect of fertility on maternal employment by household wealth
Employment Hours Obs.
Formal Informal Formal Informal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Household wealth measure:
1. Number of rooms
2 or less -0.001 0.062 1.019 2.945 327,123
(0.036) (0.036) (1.589) (1.502)
More than 2 0.021 0.029 0.151 0.238 174,833
(0.044) (0.038) (1.968) (1.728)
2. Mixed wealth measure
Low 0.009 0.032 1.436 1.803 255,249
(0.040) (0.047) (1.782) (1.864)
High 0.001 0.050 0.100 1.265 250,320
(0.037) (0.030) (1.652) (1.399)
3. Husband’s earnings
Low -0.025 0.068 -1.638 3.876 197,536
(0.031) (0.042) (1.260) (1.757)
High 0.004 0.048 1.716 1.457 218,110
(0.039) (0.033) (1.636) (1.476)
Notes: This table illustrates the relationship between maternal employment and hours with the treatment by
different household measures. Columns (1) to (4) show the estimated coefficients on the treatment in a 2SLS
regression using samesex as instrument and including the control variables listed in Table 1.3. The mixed
wealth measure is generated through a principal component analysis based on different dwelling characteristics.
Standard errors in parentheses.
households.
These findings are in line with the idea that low-wealth households gain a particularly high
value from labor income when their family size increases.
1.7 Beyond local treatment effects
So far, I estimated and discussed treatment effects for the group of compliers. The internal
validity of these estimates hinges on the assumptions discussed in Section 1.4, namely condi-
tional random assignment, exclusion, and monotonicity. In the following, I discuss the external
validity of my results. To be more precise, I show whether the estimation strategy allows for
drawing inferences about treatment effects for individuals in the sample other than those af-
fected by the instrument.29 This is important since a researcher might be interested in a policy
that affects the fertility of women who are different from those that have another child due to
a variation in their previous children’s sex composition.
The following discussion is based, in large part, on the concept of marginal treatment effects
introduced by Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005).30 Under the conditional exogeneity of the in-
29I am interested in the extrapolation of the effects for compliers to non-compliers within the sample. A paper
by Bisbee et al. (2017) looks at the extrapolation of the relationship between fertility and maternal employment
across samples from different countries and/or time periods.
30This paragraph additionally builds on a survey by Cornelissen et al. (2016).
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strument Zi, the monotonicity condition introduced in Section 1.4 is equivalent to the existence
of a weakly separable treatment selection equation Di = 1[p(Xi, Zi)−Ui ≥ 0], where p(Xi, Zi)
is defined as the probability of receiving treatment based on Xi and Zi, P [Di = 1|Xi, Zi], and
where Ui is a measure of the unobserved distaste for treatment that is uniformly distributed over
[0, 1] conditional on Xi (Vytlacil, 2002). As P (.) increases, individuals with successively higher
unobserved distaste for treatment select into treatment. Treatment effects can vary across
households with the same Xi in a way that depends on the unobservable component of the
treatment choice Ui. The marginal treatment effect, MTE(u, x) = E[Y1i−Y0i|Ui = u,Xi = x],
can be interpreted as the treatment effect for individuals who are indifferent to treatment if they
are exogenously assigned a value of Zi such that their propensity score P (.) is equal to u. For a
Ui close to zero, the MTE measures the effect of treatment on individuals with unobservables
that make them most likely to participate in treatment. If Ui is large, P (.) would have to be
large to induce people to participate. The MTE(u, x) is equal to MTO(u, x) −MUO(u, x),
where MTO refers to the marginal treated outcome and MUO to the marginal untreated
outcome.
Section 1.7.1 is carried out maintaining the LATE assumptions from Section 1.4 only, while
Section 1.7.2 relies on further assumptions that are subsequently introduced and discussed.
1.7.1 External validity under the LATE assumptions
In the following, I group individuals according to their unobserved distaste for treatment Ui.
Since Zi and Di are both binary, I can partition the population into three types, Ti (Angrist
et al., 1996).31 Always-takers have low resistance for having additional children: they choose to
have three or more children irrespective of their previous children’s sex composition. Compliers
have an intermediate distaste for having more than two children: They are treated when the
instrument is switched on and abstain from it when not, i.e., they have more than two children
if the two firstborn children are of the same sex and otherwise not. Never-takers have a high
resistance for having additional children. This means that always-takers select into treatment
before compliers who themselves select into treatment before never-takers. More formally,
define u1 ≡ P (Di = 1|Zi = 1) and u0 ≡ P (Di = 1|Zi = 0). Then, always-takers are individuals
with an unobserved distaste for treatment 0 < Ui < u0, compliers with u0 < Ui < u1, and
never-takers are individuals with u1 < Ui < 1. The previously discussed LATE parameter is a
version of the MTE and can be expressed as LATE = E[Y1i − Y0i|u0 < Ui < u1].
The compliance type of an individual cannot, in general, be identified. However, under inde-
pendence (random assignment and exclusion) and monotonicity some always-takers, individuals
observed with Zi = 0 and Di = 1, and some never-takers, individuals observed with Zi = 1 and
Di = 0, can be detected. The percentage of never-takers, φn, is equal to P (Di = 0|Zi = 1),
that of always-takers, φa, is equal to P (Di = 1|Zi = 0), and the share of compliers can be
deduced by φc = 1 − φn − φa (Imbens and Rubin, 1997). Column (1) in Table 1.9 shows the
31In the following, I abstract from covariates Xi. This is under the more restrictive assumption of uncon-
ditional, rather than conditional, independence and exclusion. This is supported by the fact that my previous
results are invariant to the inclusion of the control variables.
44 1. Fertility as a Driver of Maternal Employment
estimated proportion of the different compliance types among the households in the sample.
The estimated share of compliers is, at 3%, very low. Never-takers are estimated to be 46% of
the individuals; 51% are always-takers. The small number of compliers raises concerns about
the external validity of the previously estimated local treatment effects since I estimate the
effect over a very narrow range of the distribution of Ui.
Table 1.9: Compliance types: Estimated proportions & fraction employed
Compliance type (T) Fraction (φˆ) ̂E[Employed1|T ] ̂E[Employed0|T ]
(1) (2) (3)
Always-taker 0.512 0.208
Complier 0.033 0.259 0.220
Never-taker 0.455 0.294
Note: This table shows the estimated proportion of the compliance types in the sample (φˆ) and their estimated
average potential employment levels with and without treatment.
In order to investigate the possibility that the LATE is representative for the treatment effect
of non-compliers, I exploit some more information that can be obtained using the LATE as-
sumptions (Kowalski, 2016). Using independence, the average characteristics of always-takers,
compliers, and never-takers can be identified. If they were the same across all types, then this
would suggest that the LATE is indicative for the treatment effects of non-compliers. Table 1.10
shows the mean observable characteristics for the different groups in the sample. The average
complier in my setting seems to be different from the average never-taker and always-taker in
terms of her pre-determined characteristics. Never-takers are an average of about 1.5 years
younger than always-takers and compliers. The mean age of mothers at first birth and of their
second-born children is increasing and decreasing, respectively, when going from always-takers
to compliers to never-takers. Education in terms of years of schooling is increasing in the
unobserved distaste for more children. Furthermore, always-takers are more likely to live in
rural areas and to be indigenous compared to compliers and never-takers. These differences
in observable characteristics that are likely related to potential employment outcomes suggest
that treatment effects might be heterogeneous across Ui.
Table 1.10: Mean of observable characteristics by types
Always-taker Complier Never-taker
Age (yrs.) 30.02 30.21 28.63
Age at first birth (yrs.) 19.03 19.75 20.59
Age second child (yrs.) 8.26 7.02 4.35
Indigenous 0.40 0.24 0.28
Years of schooling 6.34 7.72 8.35
Literate 0.87 0.94 0.95
Rural 0.56 0.47 0.42
Notes: This table reports average characteristics of the different compliance types in the sample.
Even though it is not possible to identify treatment effects for never- and always-takers, I can
identify the expectation of Y1i for always-takers, of Y0i for never-takers, and of both Y1i and
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Y0i for compliers. These outcomes can be informative: A difference in the average Y0i of com-
pliers and never-takers provides evidence of selection into a larger family size. A difference in
the average Y1i of compliers and always-takers provides evidence of selection, treatment effect
heterogeneity, or both (Kowalski, 2016). Columns (2) and (3) in Table 1.9 show the estimated
average potential employment with and without treatment, respectively. The proportion of
employed women with only two children is estimated to be substantially larger for never-takers
(29.4%) than for compliers (22.0%). This means that a low preference for having more than
two children is related to a stronger labor force attachment.32 Furthermore, the average em-
ployment levels with more than two children is around 5 percentage points larger for compliers
compared to always-takers. Given the set of assumptions, I cannot disentangle to what extent
this difference is due to selection or treatment effect heterogeneity.
To sum up, the size of the group of compliers is small, and it appears that they are different from
the rest of the sample in terms of their observable characteristics and their potential outcomes.
Hence, the effect of fertility on maternal employment is potentially different for women who do
not comply with the samesex-instrument. Still, imposing further assumptions on the potential
outcomes as functions of the unobserved distaste for treatment allows me to learn more about
the effects of non-compliers.
1.7.2 External validity imposing further assumptions on marginal out-
comes
Assuming weak monotonicity in the marginal untreated and treated outcome from always-takers
to compliers to never-takers allows for estimating a bound on the average treatment effect for
always- and never-takers, respectively (Kowalski, 2016; Brinch et al., 2017). This assumption
means that the labor force attachment is either non-increasing or non-decreasing in the distaste
for additional children regardless of the actual number of children. A stronger assumption is
that both MTO = E[Y1i|U ] and MUO = E[Y0i|U ] are linear in Ui (Brinch et al., 2017). This
means that a one percentage point change in the unobserved distaste for children Ui leads to
an average increase in Yd of λd. Linearity gives point identification of the MTO and MUO,
and hence of the MTE function.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the estimated marginal outcomes and the M̂TE under the assumption
of weak monotonicity and linearity. The vertical axis measures the outcome of interest (here
the estimated probability of maternal employment), whereas the horizontal axis measures the
unobserved distaste for having more than two children. Tracing the potential outcomes and the
effect of treatment over the unit interval shows how they vary with the unobserved component,
where higher values of Ui correspond to lower propensities to have additional children. The
black lines in both graphs illustrate estimates of moments that are point-identified under the
respective assumption, while gray lines are the bounds. The estimated marginal outcome with
and without treatment (or their bounds) are indicated with a solid and dotted line, respectively.
The marginal treatment effect is drawn with a dashed line and is equal to the difference between
32The comparisons of formal and informal employment, and the working hours of never-takers and untreated
compliers in Appendix Table A.3 go into the same direction.
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Notes: This figure illustrates point estimates and estimated bounds for the (marginal) treated outcomes
(M̂TO), untreated outcomes (M̂UO), and treatment effects (M̂TE) as functions of the unobserved resistance
toward having more than two children, U . Panel (a) assumes weak monotonicity, whereas (b) assumes linearity
in the marginal treated and untreated outcome. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a mother is
employed.
the former two lines.
In Panel (a), I impose the weak monotonicity assumption on the potential untreated and treated
outcome. Given that the estimated average outcome without treatment is increasing from
compliers to never-takers, i.e., Ê[Y0|N ] > Ê[Y0|C], the weak monotonicity assumption implies
that the M̂UO is weakly upward-sloping in Ui. This suggests that the average outcome without
treatment for compliers is an upper bound for always-takers. Similarly, the average outcome
with treatment is increasing from always-takers to compliers implying that the M̂TO is weakly
upward-sloping as well. This means that the mean outcome with treatment for compliers is a
lower bound for never-takers. From these bounds, I can infer a lower bound for the marginal
treatment effect over the distribution of Ui: The former is −0.01 for always-takers and −0.03 for
never-takers. So treatment effects are bounded to be close or slightly below zero also for non-
compliers given the weak monotonicity assumption suggesting that there is no strong negative
effect. Panel (b) shows that under linearity, the estimated marginal treated outcome, M̂TO, is
larger than the estimated marginal untreated outcome, M̂UO, up to a value of Ui close to 0.8.
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This means that an increase in family size from two to more children increases employment
for all mothers with an unobserved distaste for treatment below the 80th percentile of the
distribution of U . At the same time, the M̂TE is falling in Ui: low-resistance households have
a higher treatment effect compared to those with a higher resistance toward having more than
two children. Given the linearity assumption, I can formally test for unobserved treatment
effect heterogeneity. If the slope in the linear MTE model is non-zero so that the MTEs are
non-constant, I reject the external validity of the LATE (Brinch et al., 2017). In this setting, I
estimate the slope to be within the 95% confidence interval of [−0.39, 0.18]. Therefore, I cannot
reject the null hypothesis of constant MTE.
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Notes: This figure illustrates point estimates and estimated bounds for the (marginal) treated outcomes (MTO),
untreated outcomes (MUO), and treatment effects (MTE) as functions of the unobserved resistance toward
having more than two children, U . Panel (a) assumes weak monotonicity, whereas (b) assumes linearity in
the marginal treated and untreated outcome. The outcome variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a mother is
informally employed.
In parallel, Figure 1.4 illustrates the estimated marginal outcomes and the marginal treatment
effect on informal maternal employment. The effect of an increase in family size on the prob-
ability that a mother is informally employed is bounded to be non-negative for all values of
Ui under the weak monotonicity assumption in panel (a). This suggests that the non-negative
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effect of an increase in the number of children on informal employment is not specific to the
group of compliers, but it instead applies to all women in our sample. Under linearity, I find
that the treatment effect is positive and increasing in the unobserved distaste for having more
than two children, as illustrated in panel (b). The latter implies that mothers with a higher
distaste for additional children are on average more likely to increase informal employment
compared to those with a lower distaste when their family size increases.
Appendix Figure A.2 shows the estimated marginal propensity to be formally employed and
the corresponding M̂TE similar to Figure 1.3. Under the linearity assumption, the M̂TE of an
increase in fertility beyond two children on formal employment is decreasing in absolute terms
in Ui, which is the same as for the M̂TE on overall employment. It is positive for always-takers,
close to zero for compliers, and negative for never-takers.
To sum up, I provide evidence that the small group of compliers in my setting is different
from the group of always- and never-takers in terms of observable characteristics and potential
outcomes. This challenges the one-to-one transferability of the effect for compliers to non-
compliers. However, in further analysis, I can bound the effect of having more than two children
on the propensity to be informally employed to be non-negative for all mothers in the sample
under further assumptions.
1.8 Conclusions
Many low- and middle-income countries demonstrate a very dynamic evolution in both their
fertility rates and their female employment levels over the past decades. However, the research
on the relationship between these two variables is still surprisingly scarce. This research paper
uses Mexican census data from 2010 in order to investigate the complex relationship between
fertility and female labor supply. The endogeneity of fertility complicates disentangling causal
effects of higher parity childbirth on labor market outcomes. The exogenous variation in fertility
in my estimation strategy derives from parents’ preference for mixed-sex siblings, as proposed by
Angrist and Evans (1998). 2SLS estimates indicate that the compliant subpopulation of women
significantly increases the probability of being employed due to an increase in the propensity to
be in informal employment. I also find positive responses of working hours in formal employment
at the intensive margin for a very small share of women. Further analyses provide suggestive
evidence that an increase in the fertility beyond two children increases the propensity of living
together with the maternal grandparents. Moreover, there is some indication that women in
households with low wealth are the ones who especially increase their labor supply.
Declining fertility is often assumed to be an important shifter for female labor supply that
is likely to account for part of the increase in women’s labor force participation over the last
decades. In contrast, the results of this study suggest that increased childbearing beyond the
second child does not decrease female labor supply in a setting with low household wealth and
high availability of informal child care and employment opportunities. Thus, policies targeting
small family sizes are not a reasonable measure to increase the employment of women.
On the other hand, there might be ample scope for policies, if policy-makers are interested
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in increasing the welfare of working mothers. It seems to be the case that women substan-
tially decrease their leisure time to provide for an additional child by taking up employment
in the informal sector. Informal jobs often provide low pay and inadequate social protection
but may offer the only possibility to work due to inflexible working hours in the formal market.
Public and corporate policies should encourage more flexible working contracts in the formal
labor market, for example by providing the possibility of maternity leave,33 access to work-
place support, and part-time work to young mothers and fathers. Additionally, more flexible
preschool and school schedules can help to combine employment in the formal sector and family
responsibilities.
Talking about the interpretation and implications of the findings of this study, one has to keep
in mind that the estimated effects in this research paper are specific to the parity of going
from two to more than two children, which does not necessarily generalize. The compliant
subpopulation of women for whom the effects are estimated is, moreover, very small and is
likely not representative for the rest of the population. Still, under further assumptions, I can
reject that there is a negative effect of an increase in fertility on overall employment for most
women and on informal employment for all women in the sample.
33Mothers are currently obliged to take 12 weeks of maternity leave (six weeks before and six weeks after the
birth). During this period, they receive benefits equal to their full wage if they work in the formal sector and meet
some work requirements. Information retrieved from http://www.leavenetwork.org/introducing the network/;
last access 05/2018.
Chapter 2
Job Displacement, Family Dynamics
and Spousal Labor Supply
2.1 Introduction
An important economic motive for marriage is the opportunity to share risk within a couple. If
one partner is affected by an unexpected shock, such as illness or job loss, the second partner
can increase her labor supply as an insurance against a drop in household consumption. Other
economic motives for marriage, such as the desire to have children and raise a family as well
as the division of labor between home production and market work (Weiss, 1997), might, how-
ever, interfere with the risk sharing potential within marriage. For example, if preferences for
spending time with children are unequally distributed in the couple, the spouses might not be
willing to switch roles in response to an income shock. More generally, gender norms and role
models might limit the flexibility of spouses to respond to changes in economic conditions.
From a policy perspective, the risk sharing potential of marriage is important, as strong intra-
household insurance reduces the need for public insurance. Thus, the empirical literature has
long sought to assess the importance of the risk sharing potential of marriage studying the
so-called added worker effect (henceforth AWE). Early studies provide evidence of a negative
correlation between the employment of married women and men across labor markets and over
time (Mincer, 1962; Heckman and Macurdy, 1980), while later work focuses on the timing of
spousal transitions between employment and unemployment within couples (Lundberg, 1985;
Stephens, 2002; Juhn and Potter, 2007; Bredtmann et al., 2018). The findings from these
studies are mixed, depending on the economic context and institutional framework. However,
most studies indicate small employment responses by wives and little evidence for a substantial
AWE.34 In contrast to these empirical results, recent studies estimating structural life-cycle
family labor supply models based on earnings and consumption data identify family labor
34See Appendix Table B.1 for an overview of cross-elasticity estimates in the literature.
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supply as one of the major factors allowing married households to smooth consumption, even
when they are facing persistent income shocks (Haan and Prowse, 2015; Blundell et al., 2016).
The literature provides several arguments on why the risk sharing channel via family labor
supply might be less relevant in practice. One is the generous availability of social insurance
programs that crowd out self-insurance or family insurance (Cullen and Gruber, 2000; Autor
et al., 2019). A second argument is correlated shocks at the household level, for example,
due to economic recessions. Children and fixed gender roles within the household might also
reduce the potential to share risk, but they receive comparably less attention in the literature.
Blundell et al. (2018) address the importance of children in understanding family labor supply
decisions over the life-cycle, within a unified model framework that captures the trade-offs
between providing child care and insuring consumption against shocks within the household.
Indeed, their findings confirm that families with children respond differently to income shocks
than families without children.
In this paper, we try to disentangle the roles of different channels in the responses to income
shocks within married households, paying special attention to the effects of children. Our evi-
dence is based on a quasi-experimental setup of married couples in Austria, where the husband
loses a job due to a plant closure or mass layoff. These layoff events provide credibly exogenous
shocks to household income, allowing us to disregard problems with reverse causality. Also, the
timing of the shock is precisely defined. A large literature documents persistent employment
and earnings losses due to job displacement (Ruhm, 1991; Jacobson et al., 1993; Ichino et al.,
2017; Lachowska et al., 2018). Thus, we have a setup in which couples face large, persistent, and
unexpected shocks to household income, allowing us to explore the response of both partners
around the time of the shock.
We show that, in the Austrian case, layoff events affect couples at different stages of the life-
cycle. In particular, we observe many young couples with children, for whom we can study
the trade-offs between insurance and child care. This is particularly interesting, as Austria is a
very conservative society with strong gender identity norms (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). The
typical Austrian household follows the characterization of the male breadwinner model, where
wives mostly enter the labor market as secondary earners and in part-time jobs (Bertrand et al.,
2016). This social model is supported by Austrian welfare and family policies, which provide
a generous parental leave system, but low levels of subsidized child care. As an illustration
of the importance of gender norms and family values, Appendix Figure B.1 shows the share
of individuals who agree with the assessment that “a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his
or her mother works” for several countries. In this comparison, Austria stands out with more
than a third of respondents who strongly agree. In Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries,
less than 10 percent of survey respondents agree with this statement. In terms of labor market
institutions, Austria has a universal UI system and an individual based income tax system.
Our empirical analysis is based on detailed data from linked Austrian registers, which allow us
to identify partners in marriages and divorces as well as plant closure and mass layoff events at
the plant level. In total, we have a sample of about 48,000 married couples where the husband
is laid off. The data indicate a strong specialization in market and household work within the
52 2. Job Displacement, Family Dynamics and Spousal Labor Supply
couples. Only 50% of wives are working before the husband loses the job and a large fraction
of wives are working part-time.
We show that our setup of high volatility in female life-cycle labor supply profiles, with mothers
dropping out from the labor force after childbirth for extended periods, requires a careful choice
for a control group to measure responses to the displacement shock. In the empirical analysis,
we use three different control groups to confirm the robustness of our results. Following the
literature, the first control group consists of couples with the husband working in a firm without
mass layoff or plant closure. The second control group consists of couples where the husband
works in a plant with a mass layoff but is not laid off himself. The third control group exploits
the randomness in the timing of displacement, following the strategy applied by Fadlon and
Nielsen (2017). We compare outcomes in couples who marry in the same year, but in one
case, the husband is displaced earlier than in the other, and we use the time between the two
displacement events as counterfactual.
Our main results are remarkably consistent across the three control groups. We find that
husbands lose on average 21 to 24% of earnings over five years after displacement and have a
16 to 17% lower employment rate relative to the control group. The labor supply responses of
wives are positive and statistically significant, but small compared to the husbands’ losses. On
average, the female employment rate increases by 1% and earnings by about 2%. We find that
wives mainly respond at the extensive margin and are more likely to enter the labor market
if they were not employed before the husbands’ job loss. The implied participation elasticity
with respect to the husband’s earnings shock is very small, roughly -0.04 in the full sample and
-0.07 in the sample of wives not employed at displacement.
The intra-household insurance mechanism plays a negligible role compared to public insurance
via government transfers and taxes, as the wives’ labor supply recovers only a tiny fraction of
the overall loss in household income. In particular, UI benefits cover the sizable initial drop in
household income following job loss. However, due to time-limited benefit durations, the longer
term losses in household income are not covered by government transfers.
Overall, these results indicate a small role of risk-sharing within married couples in Austria.
To disentangle the importance of mechanisms that limit the risk-sharing potential, we consider
several channels. First, we investigate the stability of the family structure with respect to the
husband’s job loss. If the shock leads to divorce or changes in fertility plans, this could explain
the limited scope of the insurance mechanism. We find a small increase in the probability of
divorce comparing displaced couples with couples where the husband works in a firm without
mass layoff or plant closure. However, there is no increase in the divorce rate of displaced
couples relative to those where the husband works in a plant with mass-layoff, indicating some
spill-over effects. Furthermore, we do not see any effects of the husband’s job loss on fertility,
which indicates that couples are not willing to revise fertility plans.
Second, we investigate heterogeneity in responses by the age of the youngest child in the house-
hold. The wife’s labor force participation before the husband’s job displacement varies greatly
in size by the age of children in the household. Women with very young kids below the age of
3 are mostly on parental leave, and only 18% of them are employed. In contrast, wives with
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children above compulsory schooling age or without children have a much higher employment
rate of 66%. We find that the most responsive group are mothers with children between ages 3
and 15, who increase their employment rates and earnings persistently after the husband’s job
loss. We find no response among mothers of very young children or women without children
or with older children. This seems to imply that some trade-off in child care provided by the
mother and by formal channels occurs, especially among women who bring forward their entry
into the labor market after a maternity break. Notably, we find no evidence on substitution
in child-care responsibilities between mothers and fathers of very young children for whom no
formal child care is available.
Third, it could be the case that labor market shocks are correlated among wives and husbands.
Assortative matching and the fact that they work in the same labor market could reduce
employment opportunities for wives. Indeed, we do not find any female labor supply responses
in couples where the husband loses the job in a market with a high unemployment rate. Even
in markets with low unemployment, the additional earnings from the wife’s employment covers
just a tiny fraction of the total household income loss. We further find that wives with high
earnings potential, i.e., those with high earnings before marriage, respond more strongly to the
husband’s job loss. In addition, the wife’s labor supply response is stronger in couples, where
the husband loses a well-paid job from a firm that pays above average wages to all their other
workers. If labor market shocks within couples were strongly correlated, we would not expect
to find heterogeneity along these two dimensions.
Our paper relates to the large literature on family labor supply and the long-term effects of job
displacement, to which we contribute clean quasi-experimental evidence on the effects of job
loss on family labor supply in married couples. We also contribute to the emerging literature on
the role of social norms and gender identities in shaping labor market outcomes (Bertrand et al.,
2016; Kleven et al., 2018). In our setup, we show that the traditional male breadwinner model
of the family can severely limit the insurance potential of marriage. Further, we contribute to
the literature on the motives of marriage and fertility (Weiss, 1997). In particular, we provide
empirical evidence that in Austria, fertility decisions often precede marriage decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 discusses relevant aspects
of the institutional setting. Section 2.3 introduces our data sources. We also discuss how we
identify plant closures and mass-layoffs, subsequently providing descriptive statistics for the key
outcome variables. Section 2.4 describes the life-cycle patterns of women of displaced husbands
and motivates our three alternative quasi-experimental counterfactual scenarios. Section 2.5
outlines our estimation strategy. Section 2.6 presents our main estimation results along with a
number of robustness checks and three extensions. First, we examine the consequences of the
husband’s displacement on households’ disposable income by accounting for changes in taxes
and benefits. Second, we explore the underlying mechanisms of the AWE that go beyond an
income effect and affect the family structure. Third, we investigate heterogeneity in responses
for different types of households. This last step helps us to understand the reasons for the
limited responses by wives. The final Section 2.7 concludes the paper and discusses potential
policy implications.
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2.2 Institutional setting
In this section, we provide background information on several aspects of the institutional setting
in Austria. This information helps to put our results into perspective.35
Trends in household formation Austria witnessed trends in marriage and fertility behavior that
are quite comparable to other high-income countries. Both the age at first marriage and first
birth have increased substantially over time, while other patterns have remained stable.
The vast majority of Austrian females will be married at some point in their lives and will
give birth to at least one child. About 90 percent of females 45 years of age or older have
been married at some point (see Census 1981, 1991, and 2001). An almost equal share of this
age group gave birth to at least one child. The relative timing of marriage and first birth
also remained constant. Most women give birth to their first child within the first two years
following marriage. A sizeable (but declining) fraction of these women gives birth to a second
child a couple of years later. The birth timing gives rise to drastic changes in women’s labor
market participation in the years following marriage, as we will see below.
Development of the female labor force participation In 1990, about 64 percent of all Austrian
women between the ages of 25 and 54 were participating in the labor market. This rate has
increased over time and, since the early 2000s, the female labor force participation has been
consistently above 80 percent.36
However, even in 2018, the female participation rate is still well below the male rate of 92.5.
Moreover, at any point in time, there is much more heterogeneity in the female than in the
male participation rate. The most important dimensions predicting labor force participation
are women’s age, marital status, and the number and age of children. Married women with
children, especially those with young children, are the group with the lowest participation rates
(see Appendix Figure B.2).
Gender identity norms and beliefs about child care One potential explanation for the rather
low participation rates of (married) women with children are prevailing gender identity norms
and beliefs about the quality of child care. Using data from the European and World Values
Surveys, Appendix Table B.2 shows that a large share of Austrians believe that “a pre-school
child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works”, while few agree with the statement that
“a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as
a mother who does not work”. A comparison with figures from other high-income countries
reveals that Austrians hold a comparably high degree of conservatism toward gender roles and
the labor force participation of mothers. In line with this, relatively few Austrians consider
“sharing household chores”, as “important for [a] successful marriage”. This is supported by
the evidence presented by Bertrand et al. (2016), who classify Austria, based on a series of
measures of gender attitudes, as a high-sexism country. These patterns are not only very
robust across subpopulations defined by sex and marital status, but also hardly change over
35Time-constrained readers may appreciate the five most important stylized facts at the end of this section
and skip to Section 2.3.
36All figures are according to estimates of the International Labour Office, Source: ILOSTAT Database, last
access 09/2016).
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the available sample period from 1990 to 1999.
Maternity and parental leave policies Another explanation, for the rather low participation
rates of (married) women with children, is the generous parental leave system. Austrian law
mandates a compulsory maternity leave period of eight weeks before and after delivery for
all working mothers (Lalive et al., 2014). Subsequently, eligible parents are entitled to paid
and job-protected parental leave up to the child’s third birthday. In the vast majority of the
cases, it is the mother who takes the leave. Thus, almost all women leave the labor market at
least temporary after the birth of a child, while a significant share also leaves the labor market
permanently. The latter particularly applies to mothers with two or more children (see above).
Child care The Austrian system of formal child care distinguishes between facilities for children
below the age of three (nurseries) and for those aged three to six (kindergarten). While the
vast majority of communities have offered a kindergarten since the 1980s, the local availability
of nurseries has been traditionally much lower. In 1995, only about 3 percent of communities
had nurseries. These nurseries were predominantly located in more densely populated areas
and covered about 35 percent of the total population. A widespread problem with both types
of institutions are oversubscriptions, short opening hours (until noon) and long holidays.
Taxation of families The Austrian tax system follows the standard of individual income taxa-
tion, which means that partners in married couples are taxed separately. Thus, the entry tax
rate for the second earner is lower, all other things equal, than in joint or family-based taxation
systems. In addition, basic family allowances are rewarded universally and independent from
the level or distribution of earnings (OECD Economic Surveys: Austria 2015). Both aspects of
the tax system should promote dual-earner households. On the other hand, certain characteris-
tics of the tax and benefit system work in favor of a single-earner household or a “ 1.5 model”.
In particular, the quite high marginal tax wedge for medium incomes promotes part-time work.
Unemployment insurance In Austria, all private sector workers are automatically enrolled in
the universal UI system. Eligibility for and duration of unemployment benefits depends on
the individual’s work history and age. UI payments replace around 55% of the previous net
wage and are subject to a maximum and minimum. Job losers in our samples can receive UI
benefits for 20 to 39 weeks. After exhausting regular unemployment benefits, job losers can
obtain means-tested income support, unemployment assistance (UA), that pays a lower level of
benefits indefinitely. Unemployment assistance is reduced euro for euro by the amount of any
other family income (Card et al., 2007).
The five most important stylized facts are: First, within the typical Austrian couple, the man
is still the primary earner. Second, women in the age range between 20 to 35 have complex
employment patterns. This is particularly true in the initial years after marriage and first birth.
Third, Austrians have on average very traditional views on gender roles and prefer mothers of
(young) children not to participate in the labor market. Fourth, the supply of formal child care
facilities for children below the age of three does not meet demand. Fifth, married couples are
taxed individually.
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2.3 Data sources, firm events, and descriptive statistics
Our empirical analysis is based on combined data from several administrative registers. In-
formation on individual labor market careers is provided by the Austrian Social Security Data
(ASSD). This is a linked employer-employee database that covers the universe of Austrian
workers in the private sector from 1972 onward (Zweimu¨ller et al., 2009).37 The data record
individual employment spells on a daily basis along with an employer identifier, as well as indi-
vidual earnings per calendar year and employer. In addition, the data include information on
other social security relevant events such as unemployment, retirement, parental leave, and, in
the case of women, births. Information on a worker’s marital status and the identity of their
partner is provided by the Austrian Marriage Register and the Austrian Divorce Register.
2.3.1 Plant closures and mass layoffs
We make use of the linked employer-employee structure of the ASSD to identify plant closures
and mass layoffs. Our identification strategy relies on an approach investigating detailed flows of
workers between employer identifiers and is described in Fink et al. (2010).38 In particular, we
organize plant level information from ASSD employment records in a quarterly panel measuring
the number of blue- and white-collar employees at each employer identifier on February 10, May
10, August 10, and November 10 of each year.
Plant closures are observed in the quarter when an employer identifier vanishes from the ASSD.
We analyze the flows of workers from the exiting identifier to subsequent employer identifiers
to distinguish “true” closures from identifier reassignments or mergers with existing plants. We
refer to the closing quarter as the last quarter in which the plant employs workers. To define
our sample of closing plants, we consider all closures in the period from 1990 to 2007, restricting
the sample to plants with at least five employees during the last four quarters of their existence.
Mass layoffs are defined by a similar approach. We identify large drops in plant size in the
quarterly time series but exclude events in which a large group of employees moves to the
same employer identifier. The exact thresholds to define a reduction in plant size between
two quarters as a mass layoff is inspired by the Austrian system of advance layoff reporting.
Employers planning to lay off an unusually large number of workers within the next month must
provide advance notice to the employment office if the number of layoffs exceeds a threshold
that depends on the size of the plant.39 In analogy to the closing quarter, we define a mass
37The ASSD comprises only incomplete information on self-employed and civil servants (Beamte). Since we
do not observe earnings for these two groups, we exclude them from our main analysis. Notably, the majority
of persons employed with public authorities today are not civil servants, but so-called contractual civil servants
(Vertragsbedienstete). Since we have precise information for this group, we include them in our main analysis.
38In the ASSD, we cannot distinguish between firms and establishments as there is no uniform rule for
recording employer identifiers. As the vast majority of identifiers refers to small units, a plant in most cases will
refer to an establishment (Fink et al., 2010).
39Our definition only considers plants with more than 10 employees in the quarter before the mass layoff
and we apply the following rules for size reductions. In plants with 11 to 20 employees, the size must decline
by at least three individuals; in plants with 21 to 100 employees, the size has to decline by a minimum of five
individuals; in plants with 100-600 employees the size has to decrease by at least 5%. In firms with more than
600 employees, the number of employees between two quarters has to decline by at least 30 employees. In the
robustness analysis in Appendix B.3, we present our main results with a more restrictive definition of mass
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layoff quarter as the quarter immediately before the large drop in employment. In our sample,
we consider all mass layoff events between 1990 and 2007. As the Austrian labor market
is characterized by strong seasonality in employment, which makes it difficult to distinguish
closures or mass layoffs from purely seasonal employment fluctuations, we exclude plants from
sectors with a high share or seasonal employment (i. e. agriculture, construction, and tourism).
Restrictions on the sample of displaced workers At the individual level, we define workers as
being affected by a plant closure if they are employed at a closing plant on the closure date or in
the two preceding quarters. Workers affected by a mass layoff are employed on the mass layoff
date, but leave the plant in the subsequent quarter. Our sample of displaced workers consists of
men displaced by a plant closure or mass layoff, who have been married for at least two years,
and who have at least one year of tenure at layoff. We further restrict the age at displacement to
25–55 for husbands and to 25–50 for wives, selecting the upper age limits to exclude transitions
into early retirement.40 Some individuals are displaced by firm events multiple times over their
careers. We only consider the first displacement event for each husband, as subsequent outcomes
might be influenced by the first displacement. We also drop couples who are displaced by the
same firm event.41 Our final sample comprises 18,466 couples, with the husband displaced by
a plant closure and 30,027 couples with the husband displaced by mass layoff.42
2.3.2 Outcome variables and sample characteristics
The main outcome variables considered in our analysis are the employment and earnings of
husbands and wives. We organize individual observations at the quarterly level and define
employment by an indicator equal to one if the individual is employed at the quarter date
(February 10, May 10, August 10, and November 10). Earnings refer to average monthly real
earnings in Euro (2000 prices) over the quarter with the main employer. Note that the ASSD
do not provide information on working hours. Thus, our earnings measure combines wages and
hours. For each individual, we collect quarterly observations in the 5 years before and after the
displacement. We define the individual reference quarter by the mass layoff quarter or closing
quarter or by the quarter in which the individual is last employed in the case of workers, who
leave before the closing quarter. In further analysis, we also analyze registered unemployment,
receipt of UI benefits and unemployment assistance, household income, divorce, and fertility.
Table 2.1 presents the main descriptive characteristics measured in the reference quarter.
Columns (1) and (2) list the plant closure and mass layoff samples, respectively. Both groups
of displaced workers are quite similar in the personal characteristics of husbands and wives, but
firm characteristics are different. Mass layoffs tend to happen in larger plants than closures
layoffs.
40Our data suggest that this age restriction is reasonable: Less than 1% of all husbands and wives in our
sample receive pensions when they are last observed in our sample. On average, 0.7% and 0.5% of husbands
and wives, respectively, receive pensions in any quarter in our sample period.
41663 couples are affected by the same plant closure and 344 by the same mass layoff. Relative to all
households that experience a plant closure (mass layoff) these are 3.47% and 1.13%, respectively.
42The highest numbers of displacements are observed in the late 1990s and early 2000s (see Figure B.3 in
the Web Appendix). There is evidence of seasonality in the number of displacements with peaks in the fourth
quarter of each year.
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and plants with different industry and regional composition. Mass layoff plants also pay higher
wages to their average workers. This is reflected in the difference in husbands’ pre-displacement
earnings of both groups.
Displaced couples in our sample are relatively young: husbands are on average aged about 39
years, and their wives are roughly 2.5 years younger. Note that the median age of husbands and
wives is slightly younger than the mean. At displacement, the average couple has been married
for 12 years (median is 11 years), and they have 1.4 children. Looking at the distribution of
the age of the youngest child in the household, we can see that about 18% of couples have a
child below the age of three, 57% have children between age 3 and 15, and roughly a quarter
of households either have no child or children aged 16 or older.
Furthermore, the employment rate among wives before the husband’s job displacement is low,
with only 50% of wives working. If they are employed, their earnings are significantly lower than
their husband’s. On average, a working wife earns about 62% of her husband’s earnings, which
corresponds to 38% of the household’s labor income. The large earning gap within couples can
only be explained by a high share of part-time work among wives.
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Table 2.1: Sample characteristics
Displaced Control
Closure Mass layoff Group 1 Group 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
I. Husband
Age (yrs) 39.41 39.05 40.09 39.74
[38.95] [38.54] [39.84] [39.44]
(6.75) (6.79) (6.63) (6.67)
Experience in employment (yrs) 16.97 16.70 18.54 18.06
[17.03] [16.75] [18.61] [18.36]
(6.77) (6.72) (6.61) (6.46)
Tenure (yrs) 6.92 6.92 9.66 8.77
[4.58] [4.73] [6.86] [8.11]
(6.24) (6.06) (6.91) (6.70)
Number of previous jobs 4.44 4.11 2.90 3.14
(4.34) (4.17) (3.29) (3.49)
Number of previous mass layoffs 1.41 1.92 0.53 1.94
(2.26) (2.39) (1.31) (2.46)
Share blue collar 0.47 0.48 0.38 0.44
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Real Monthly Earnings (e) 2443.16 2500.61 2706.99 2672.92
[2319.86] [2455.63] [2722.46] [2649.97]
(918.09) (776.33) (725.15) (722.34)
Censored earnings 0.16 0.20 0.25 0.24
(0.37) (0.40) (0.43) (0.43)
II. Wife
Age (yrs) 36.66 36.39 36.99 37.40
[36.38] [35.97] [36.77] [37.23]
(6.14) (6.20) (6.14) (6.13)
Experience in employment (yrs) 9.50 9.41 9.95 9.72
[8.50] [8.37] [8.94] [8.73]
(6.15) (6.06) (6.28) (6.19)
Number previous jobs 1.57 1.52 1.49 1.53
(2.64) (2.49) (2.46) (2.56)
Employed 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Blue collar | employed 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.31
(0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.46)
Real monthly earnings (e) | employed 1320.50 1343.11 1321.56 1320.63
[1196.09] [1232.67] [1181.57] [1207.13]
(788.78) (800.86) (806.11) (795.31)
Earnings rel. to husband | employed 0.63 0.61 0.52 0.53
(0.67) (0.66) (0.39) (0.44)
Censored earnings | employed 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
III. Household composition
Marriage duration (yrs) 12.20 12.00 13.06 12.84
[11.20] [10.93] [12.40] [12.13]
(6.80) (6.76) (6.92) (6.84)
Number of children 1.39 1.38 1.41 1.38
(1.00) (1.00) (0.99) (0.99)
Share with youngest child 0–2 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.16
(0.38) (0.39) (0.37) (0.37)
Share with youngest child 3–9 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
Share with youngest child 10–16 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.22
(0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41)
Continued on next page.
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Table 2.1 — continued from previous page.
Displaced Control
Closure Mass layoff Group 1 Group 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV. Employer (husband)
Firm size 51.94 244.39 397.15 326.87
[20.00] [138.00] [135.00] [239.00]
(97.79) (312.98) (771.13) (315.70)
Turnover 0.25 0.19 0.14 0.17
[0.16] [0.14] [0.10] [0.13]
(0.34) (0.24) (0.22) (0.19)
Mean monthly wage 1903.49 2072.28 2232.27 2160.57
[1878.23] [2025.60] [2191.31] [2106.37]
(553.48) (582.05) (597.37) (551.37)
Industry
Manufacturing 0.41 0.46 0.47 0.59
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Sales 0.29 0.23 0.20 0.17
(0.45) (0.42) (0.40) (0.38)
Transport 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.05
(0.30) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22)
Services 0.19 0.25 0.28 0.19
(0.40) (0.43) (0.45) (0.39)
Region
Vienna 0.22 0.24 0.15 0.20
(0.41) (0.43) (0.36) (0.40)
Eastern Austria w/o Vienna 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.22
(0.41) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41)
Southern Austria 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.22
(0.40) (0.39) (0.40) (0.41)
Western Austria 0.35 0.36 0.44 0.36
(0.48) (0.48) (0.50) (0.48)
Observations 18,466 30,027 58,516 61,360
N otes: Statistics depicted are means with standard deviations in parentheses. Medians are presented in
brackets. Column (1) refers to households with a husband displaced through a plant closure, column (2) to
those with a husband displaced through a mass layoff in the quarter after the reference date. Column (3)
refers to a 10% random subsample of households with husbands without a firm event in the quarter after
the reference date. Households in column (4) are a 40% random sample of non-displaced husbands employed
at a firm where other workers are displaced from a mass layoff in the quarter following the reference date.
There is one observation per household-event. All variables (except firm size, turnover, and mean monthly
wage) are measured at the reference date (one year before the reference date, respectively). All households
fulfill the following requirements: Husband and wife are aged 25–55 and 25–50, respectively, at the reference
date. They are married for at least two years and husbands have at least one year of tenure at the reference
date.
2.4 Family dynamics around displacement and definition
of control groups
Fertility plans and the presence of young children typically affect household labor supply deci-
sions. Therefore, we investigate marriage durations and the timing of first births in our sample
of couples with displaced husbands. The mode of marriage durations in the sample is around 5
years, and the distribution has a long right tail. This implies that even though we only consider
couples, who have been married for at least 2 years, the majority are relatively recently married
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Figure 2.1: Distance between marriage and first birth
Notes: The figure displays the distribution of the distance from marriage to the birth of the first child in 2
months bins. The sample includes couples experiencing a displacement through a plant closure or a mass layoff.
They are married for at least two years at the reference date. We include one observation per household event.
when the husband experiences the job displacement.43 How quickly after marriage do couples
have their first child? Figure 2.1 showing the distribution of the time between marriage and
birth of the first child demonstrates that in Austria the marriage date is very strongly related
to the birth of a child. While a few couples have their first child before marriage, we see a big
spike in births 4 to 8 months after the marriage date and then a relatively long right tail. This
pattern suggests that in many couples, marriage follows the fertility decision rather than the
other way round. Overall, about 64 percent of first births occur within five years after marriage,
and 30 percent occur in the first year. Due to the aforementioned generous Austrian parental
leave system, fertility is also strongly related to female labor force participation. Together, the
high prevalence of short marriage durations, the presence of young children in the household,
and long parental leave periods imply that we observe the husband’s job displacement shock
during a period of high volatility in household labor supply. The next set of figures illustrates
this argument by investigating the husband’s and wife’s employment around the displacement
date.
Figure 2.2a plots the husband’s employment probability around job displacement. We restrict
displaced workers to be employed for at least one year at the plant closure or mass layoff event
and, therefore, the graph shows full employment prior to the reference date and slightly lower
employment rates in earlier years. After displacement, we see a sharp drop in employment of
about 30 percentage points. This is followed by a quick recovery over the next 4 quarters. In
the longer run, however, displaced workers cannot fully recover and their post-displacement
43The distribution of marriage durations at the reference date is shown in Appendix Figure B.4.
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Figure 2.2: Employment of displaced husbands and their wives
(a) Husband (b) Wife
Notes: Panel (a) and (b) show the mean employment probability around the reference date for all displaced
men and their wives, respectively.
employment levels are about 20 to 25 percentage points below full employment.
Figure 2.3 examines the employment of the wives of displaced husbands. To point out the
variation in female labor supply around childbirth and marriage, we plot employment rates for
5 groups with different marriage durations. The figure reveals substantial heterogeneity across
groups. Starting with the group with the shortest marriage duration of 2 to 4 years, we can
see that the average employment probability of women drops shortly after marriage — in line
with the arrival of children — and then slowly recovers after maternity leave. This pattern is
repeated in groups with longer marriage durations, by parallel shifts to the right of the wives’
employment trajectories.44 Thus, the life-cycle pattern creates a huge variation in female labor
supply over time. Depending on the duration of the marriage, the wife’s employment probability
at the time of the husband’s displacement varies between 40% and 50%, rising almost linearly
for each group after the reference quarter. Prior to the husband’s displacement, there is a lot
of variation in the wife’s employment across the different groups.
Figure 2.2b shows the average quarterly employment probability aggregated over all groups
of wives. After having investigated different marriage cohorts, it is clear that the aggregate
pattern of wives’ employment rates is not at all informative about their response to husbands’
job displacement.45
Because a simple event study design without a control group is highly sensitive to female
life-cycle patterns, our empirical strategy relies on the choice of appropriate control groups of
couples who did not suffer a job displacement. The idea is to compare labor market outcomes of
44Alternatively, we show in Appendix Figure B.5 the employment probability of wives around their husbands’
displacement by the age of the youngest child in the household. Given the close relationship between marriage
and fertility established above, the patterns look very similar.
45The latter interpretation is supported by Appendix Figure B.6. This graph shows quarterly means of the
employment probability around displacement, while flexibly adjusting for marriage duration and the calendar
quarter of observation. While husbands’ employment results are hardly changed by the adjustment (see panel a),
wives’ results now show a very different pattern (see panel b). After the reference date the employment of wives
still increases, but only by about 3 percentage points in the long-term. This indicates that the displacement
effect on wives’ employment is one order of magnitude smaller than that on husbands.
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Figure 2.3: Wife’s employment by different marriage durations
Notes: This figure shows the mean employment probability around the reference date for subsamples of wives
of displaced husbands with different marriage durations at the reference quarter.
couples with and without displacement of the husband holding fixed the stage in the life-cycle.
As we lack a design with full randomization of job displacements, we control for the complex
counterfactual pattern in female employment using three different control groups: (i) house-
holds who are not affected by a firm event, (ii) households with husbands employed during a
mass layoff, but not displaced themselves, and (iii) households who experience a displacement
through a firm event in the near future.
Control group 1: Non-displaced husbands without a firm event. The first control
group consists of couples fulfilling the same age, tenure, and marriage duration restrictions
as our displaced sample. Husbands are employed at any reference quarter from 1990–2007
at firms that are not experiencing a closure or a mass layoff. Because this is a large group,
where many couples are observed repeatedly, we draw a ten percent random sample. Workers
in control group 1 are not affected by a displacement event, neither themselves nor in their
plant. Table 2.1 column (3) reports descriptive statistics showing that their characteristics
differ from those of displaced workers in terms of age, labor market experience, job stability,
and earnings. Importantly, non-displaced workers are employed by larger firms that pay higher
wages also to their average workers. Appendix Figure B.7 illustrates that firms that do not
experience a mass layoff or closure are substantially larger and pay on average higher wages
than event firms. Wives of non-displaced workers in control group 1 are slightly older than
wives of displaced workers, but overall the difference in wives’ characteristics are smaller than
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among husbands.46 The differences in observable characteristics between displaced couples and
control group 1 couples gives rise to concerns that workers might be sorting into more and less
risky firms and jobs also on the basis of unobservable characteristics.
Control group 2: Non-displaced husbands in mass layoff firms. To confront the concern
of workers sorting into different firms, we define the second control group by husbands employed
in mass layoff plants at the mass layoff date, who do not leave their employer in the subsequent
quarter. As the number of non-layoff workers at the mass layoff plant typically exceeds the
number of layoffs, we draw a 40% random sample of all observations. The reference date for
this control group is defined by the mass layoff date.47 Workers in control group 2 suffer a mass
layoff at their plant but do not lose their jobs. As we see in column (4) of Table 2.1, these workers
share average firm characteristics with workers displaced by mass layoffs. The mean firm size
differs between columns (2) and (4) because larger firms tend to have more workers who survive
a mass layoff event. With the definition of control group 2, we do not worry about selection into
firms, but we might worry about selection into a layoff. Many firms apply “ last-in first-out” or
similar policies to determine mass layoffs (Sorensen, 2018). A further concern is that economic
and psychological shocks related to a mass layoff can also affect non-displaced workers and their
spouses, due to increased uncertainty or stress or because of a general deterioration of labor
market conditions.48
Control group 3: Husbands displaced at a later date. For the third control group we
do not sample individuals who were not displaced, rather, we exploit the timing of firm events
and construct control groups of workers who are displaced themselves, but at a later date. Our
approach is inspired by Fadlon and Nielsen (2017) and Hilger (2016), who exploit the timing
of events to investigate the effects of spousal health shocks on employment and the effect of
father’s displacement on child outcomes, respectively. Under the assumption that the process
determining involuntary job loss does not vary over time, workers who are displaced in later
periods should not differ in unobserved characteristics from those who are displaced in the base
period. Thus, the confounding effects of unobserved heterogeneity should be accounted for by
a comparison of workers displaced at different times (Ruhm, 1991).
Our strategy to construct control group 3 is as follows. We start with a cohort of couples get-
ting married in a fixed quarter and define households with husband displaced in a (reference)
quarter h as the displaced group. The control group is given by the set of households in the
same marriage cohort, who experience husband’s displacement in the near future, in h + ∆.
We then assign a placebo shock at h to the households in the control group. It is important
to hold the marriage date of the displaced and control group fixed to make sure that they are
46Family dynamics, i.e., the marriage duration at the reference date and the time between marriage and first
birth, are similarly distributed for households that experience displacement and for those in the control groups.
See Appendix Figures B.8 and B.9 for a comparison.
47We also exclude workers who are ever displaced from a plant closure or mass layoff over our observation
period from control groups 1 and 2. However, individuals can be in the control group in more than one reference
quarter. This happens for about 10% of the individuals in control group 1 and 26% of individuals in control
group 2.
48Gathmann et al. (2018) show that mass layoffs worsen the local labor market situation in a causal way.
They find that mass layoffs have sizeable negative effects on the regional economy, especially of firms in the
same sector.
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at the same stage of their life-cycle at date h. The choice of ∆ is restricted by the trade-off
between the length of the horizon over which we can observe post-displacement outcomes and
the comparability of displaced and control couples. The two groups should be highly compa-
rable if there is only a little time difference between displacements, i.e. if ∆ is short. However,
a short ∆ also limits the period over which the counterfactual outcome can be observed. We
experimented with values for ∆ between 4 and 16 quarters, selecting only multiples of 4 because
of the seasonality in mass layoffs and plant closures (see Appendix Figure B.3 and the robust-
ness analysis summarized in Appendix B.3). As we do not find much evidence for reduced
comparability, we present the main results for ∆ = 16.
We repeat the construction of the control group for every combination of the marriage quarter
and reference quarter h and construct weights such that the displaced and control group size
is balanced within each cell.
Due to the sample restrictions on marriage duration and tenure at displacement, we must
put two additional restrictions on households in control group 3. This has implications for
the comparability in the case of some of the outcome variables. First, the restriction on the
husband’s job tenure in control group 3 has to hold in quarter h and in quarter h + ∆, which
implies that there is full employment among husbands in control group 3 in the 4 quarters
preceding h+∆. Therefore, we cannot directly compare the husband’s employment and earnings
outcomes in control group 3 with the displaced group. Second, due to the restriction on a
marriage duration of at least 2 years prior to displacement, households in control group 3 are
continuously married between h and h+∆. If job displacement has an effect on the probability
of divorce, this cannot be measured by a comparison of couples with a displaced husband and
couples in control group 3. We return to these arguments in the results section.
2.5 Estimation strategy
We measure the effects of the husband’s job displacement by comparing outcome variables at
the individual wife or husband level, as well as family outcomes for the displaced and control
couples in the quarters before and after the reference date. In the results section, we present a
set of graphical results that are quantified by regression estimates.
Our graphical results are based on the following regression model
Yik = θDi +
20∑
l=−20




δqlDi ∗ I{k = l}+ υik, (2.1)
where Yik is the outcome of individual or household i in quarter k ∈ [−20, 20]49, k measures
the number of quarters relative to the reference quarter, Di is an indicator equal to one if
the husband is displaced at k = 0, I{.} is the indicator function, and υik is the error term.
The parameter θ estimates the overall mean difference in the outcome between displaced and
49In the estimations with control group 3, we compare the displaced and control group only for four years
around the reference date. Hence, l varies only from −16 to 16 in (2.1) and from -4 to 4 in (2.2).
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controls, the parameters γql measure the quarterly time profile of the outcome in the control
group and δql measure the difference in time profiles between the displaced and the control
group relative to the reference quarter.
For the presentation of our quantitative estimation results, we average the difference between
displaced and control individuals relative to the reference date over the 20 quarters after dis-
placement. In addition, the model controls for the full set of industry and calendar quarter
interactions, λtj . The model is given by
Yik = θDi +
20∑
l=−20
γql I{k = l}+
−1∑
l=−20
δqlDi ∗ I{k = l}+ δpostDi ∗ I{k > 0}+ λtj + υik. (2.2)
By construction, average household characteristics do not differ between control group 3 and
the displaced households. However, we show in Table 2.1 that the other two control groups
differ from displaced households in terms of their observed characteristics. To control for
these differences, we apply a propensity score weighting strategy following Imbens (2004). In
particular, we estimate flexible logit specification for the probability that the household is in
the displaced group based on a large set of family and individual characteristics measured
at the reference quarter and characteristics of the husband’s employer one year prior to the
reference date. A plant closure or mass layoff does not come as a complete surprise, and
households might be able to foresee the event. To allow for responses of the wife in anticipation
of the husband’s displacement, we only control for the husband’s time-invariant characteristics,
his employment outcomes prior the reference date, his employer characteristics, and overall
household characteristics at the reference date such as marriage duration and the number of
children in yearly age categories. However, we do not condition on labor market outcomes of
the wives before the reference date.50
Appendix Figure B.10 shows the distributions of the estimated propensity scores in the displaced
group versus control group 1 and control group 2. The distributional overlap in pre-determined
characteristics is closer between control group 2 and the displaced group than between control
group 1 and the displaced. This is mainly due to the similarities in firm characteristics.
Based on predicted propensity scores from the logit models, we construct weights for members
of the control groups such that the distribution of observable characteristics in each control
50We estimate the probability that the husband in a household is displaced by plant closure or mass layoff
using a logit model separately for control groups 1 and 2 based on the following variables:
1. Husband characteristics: Interaction of year and season of displacement dummies, age (cubic), tenure in
current job (dummies for deciles), employment experience (5 dummies), experience in unemployment (4
dummies), number of previous jobs (4 dummies), number of previous mass layoff events (7 dummies),
indicator for blue-collar status in last job, and for the years -4, -3, -2 and -1 before the reference date:
monthly wage, indicator for being employed and for being unemployed.
2. Wife characteristics: Labor market experience measured in last quarter of employment (5 dummies), age
distance to husband (5 dummies).
3. Household characteristics: Marriage duration (30 dummies), number of children aged 0,1,2,...,12 (13
dummies) and total number of children under 18 at the reference date.
4. Husband’s employer variables: Indicators for industry and region, firm age (16 dummies), firm age and
industry interactions.
We impose common support. Based on the estimated propensity score pˆ, we assign control group households
weights equal to pˆ
1−pˆ . The normalization ensures that the weights of the control group add up to 1.
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group equals the distribution among displaced households. Using the weights, we estimate
weighted regressions of equations 2.1 and 2.2. Hence, the estimated parameters reflect the
treatment effect on the treated. In all weighted regressions, standard errors are bootstrapped
(500 replications) with clustering at the household level.
2.6 Empirical results
To measure the shock of the husband’s job loss on household income, we start by investigating
the effect of job displacement on husband’s employment and earnings outcomes up to five years
after displacement. Next, we turn to labor supply responses of wives, reporting employment,
earnings, and job search outcomes.
2.6.1 Husbands’ employment and earnings responses
Figure 2.4 compares quarterly employment rates before and after job displacement for husbands
in the displaced group and in control groups 1 and 2. The graphs on the left present employment
profiles in the displaced group (blue line) and the control groups (red lines). The graphs on the
right show the absolute difference between displaced and controls along with the corresponding
95% confidence intervals. A comparison across panels (a) and (b) confirms that the results do
not differ by the choice of control group. Prior to job displacement, the weighted difference
in employment rates is close to zero, but immediately after the event the employment rate in
the displaced group drops by more than 30%. We see a rapid recovery in subsequent quarters,
which stalls after about 3 to 4 years. Employment rates also decline in the control group after
the reference date, but more gradually.
In Table 2.2, we summarize estimation results of equation (2.2) for the mean effects of job
displacement on employment (in panel A) and earnings (in panel B). As we do not observe
working hours in our data, we use monthly earnings in Euro (in 2000 prices) as the dependent
variable and set the earnings of individuals who are not employed equal to zero. Columns (1)
and (3) show the estimated effects for husbands referring to control group 1 and 2, respectively.
The estimated coefficients of Displaced×Post report the difference between displaced and control
individuals relative to the reference date averaged over the twenty quarters after displacement.
Compared to the control group, displaced husbands suffer an average employment loss of about
16 to 17 percentage points over the first five years. The equivalent estimate for earnings amounts
to, 22 to 25% of the pre-displacement mean earnings, depending on the control group. The
relative magnitude of the earnings loss from job displacement mirror the husbands’ employment
losses, which indicates that lower employment rates are the main driver of earnings drops.51
Appendix Tables B.3 and B.4 present the effects of the husband’s job displacement on his labor
market outcomes by year. This set of results confirms that employment and earnings of the
51The estimated employment effects are similar in magnitude to those reported for male Austrian workers
displaced in the 1980s by Schwerdt et al. (2010). These estimated effects on male earnings are of comparable
size to those reported in Jacobson et al. (1993) and slightly smaller than in Davis and von Wachter (2011) for
the US. They are also a bit larger than those reported in Sullivan and von Wachter (2009) for Germany.
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Figure 2.4: Employment of displaced husbands with control groups
(a) CG1: No firm event
(b) CG2: Non-displaced in mass layoff
Notes: Comparison of the probability to be employed of men that are displaced (blue, square) to men without
firm event at the reference date (red, x) in panel (a) and to non-displaced men working in mass layoff firms at the
reference date in (b) based on estimation equation (2.1). Control groups are reweighted to resemble the displaced
group in time-invariant husband and wife characteristics, household composition, employment outcomes of the
husband and characteristics of husband’s employer (see Footnote 50 for details). The employment probability
of the control group is adjusted by its mean difference relative to the displaced group. The graphs to the right
plot the difference between the two lines with the corresponding 95% confidence interval.
displaced and control groups evolve similarly in the years prior to displacement. The largest
employment and earnings losses occur in the first year after displacement, with a decreasing
trend thereafter.
2.6.2 Wives’ labor supply responses
2.6.2.1 Wives’ employment and earnings
The graphs on the left-hand side in Figure 2.5 shows the employment rates of wives in the
displaced group and each of the three control groups around the reference date. Irrespective
of husbands’ job loss, wives’ employment rates in all groups follow the same upward sloping
pattern, which confirms the importance of controlling for life-cycle profiles in female labor
supply. Prior to the reference date, differences in employment rates between the displaced and
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Table 2.2: Effects of husband’s displacement on household labor market outcomes
Control group 1 Control group 2 Control group 3
Husband Wife Husband Wife Wife
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Employment
Displaced×Post −0.170 0.011 −0.162 0.008 0.006
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ηparticipation −0.043 −0.036
(0.011) (0.010)
Pre-event mean 1 0.490 1 0.486 0.468
B. Earnings
Displaced×Post −601.237 11.262 −542.034 9.245 13.064
(6.473) (3.789) (5.819) (3.402) (4.402)
Pre-event mean 2458.082 658.549 2463.521 647.718 613.938
C. Job Search
Displaced×Post 0.007 0.003 0.005
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Pre-event mean 0.041 0.041 0.039
Households 101, 609 93, 666 45, 886
Observations 4, 386, 508 4, 502, 579 2, 161, 764
Notes: This table displays the impact of husband’s displacement on household labor market outcomes based on
equation (2.2), which includes displaced group, distance to event, and industry×quarter fixed effects. In panel A
(C) the dependent variable is equal to one if the individual in household i is employed (unemployed) in a given
quarter. In panel B it equals monthly earnings in Euro (2000 prices), with zeros for those not employed. Column
(1) and (2) ((3) and (4)) compare individuals in households with a displacement to a reweighted control group
with no firm event (with households in which husbands keep their jobs during a mass layoff). In column (5),
we match to displaced households a control group of households from the same marriage cohort that experience
displacement four years after the reference date. Displaced×Post measures the average difference in the outcome
variable between displaced and control groups relative to the reference date in the twenty quarters after the
reference quarter. ηparticipation is the implied participation elasticity of wives with respect to the earnings of
their husbands. Pre-event mean refers to the mean of the dependent variable in the year before the reference
date. Standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications, with clustering at the household level) and reported
in parentheses.
each of the control groups are close to zero (see the right hand side in Figure 2.5).52 After the
reference date a significant gap between the displaced and control groups opens and persists
over the 5 year horizon. This gap is remarkably similar across all three control groups, which
makes us confident that we can interpret it as the wife’s labor supply response to the husband’s
job loss.
These findings are confirmed by the estimation results summarized in Table 2.2. The estimated
effects shown in columns (2), (4), and (5) show that wives of displaced husbands increase
52Note that we adjust for differences in observed characteristics between the displaced group and control
groups 1 and 2 by propensity score weighting on family, husband, and employer characteristics, which elim-
inates differences in wives’ employment rates prior to the husbands’ displacement. We do not correct for
pre-displacement differences in observable characteristics between the displaced group and control group 3, as
this control group is drawn from the same pool of couples and, thus, pre-displacement mean differences are zero
by construction.
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Figure 2.5: Employment of displaced husbands’ wives with control groups
(a) CG1: No firm event
(b) CG2: Non-displaced in mass layoff
(c) CG3: Displaced in the future
Notes: Comparison of the probability to be employed of wives with displaced husbands (blue, square) to those
with husbands without firm event at the reference date (red, x) in panel (a), with non-displaced husbands
working in mass layoff firms at the reference date in (b), and with husbands displaced 16 quarters after the
reference date in (c) based on estimation equation (2.1). CG1 and CG2 are reweighted to resemble the displaced
group as explained in Figure 2.4. The employment probability of the control group is adjusted by its mean
difference relative to the displaced group. The graphs to the right plot the difference between the two lines with
the corresponding 95% confidence interval.
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their employment on average by about one percentage point during the first twenty quarters
after displacement (see panel A). While the employment effects are small, they are precisely
estimated and highly robust to the choice of the control group. Compared to the displaced
husbands’ employment losses, the gains in wives’ employment are small. Along with increases
in employment, earnings increase by 1.5 and 2% (see panel B). The estimated effects are again
similar across all three control groups. Comparing wives’ earnings gains with husbands’ earnings
losses makes clear that the shift in labor supply within a household is hardly able to cover losses
in household income.53
As explained in Section 2.3, the ASSD only records earnings consistently for employees in the
private sector. To check the importance of self-employment as an alternative source of income
after job displacement, we can examine the participation in self-employment. We find that self-
employment increases among displaced husbands relatively rapidly after a job loss. However,
the overall effect is rather small; five years after displacement, the self-employment rate is 5
percentage points higher among displaced husbands than in the control groups. The rate of
self-employment is very low among wives in both the displaced and the control groups (see
Appendix Figure B.11).
2.6.2.2 Anticipation of husbands’ job displacement and job search
In the job displacement literature, which typically identifies job displacements from major firm
events characterized by sudden drops in the employment level, it is difficult to deal with the
anticipation of a worker’s own job loss (Schwerdt et al., 2010). This is problematic in the
light of Hendren (2017), who provides evidence from several sources that individuals have some
knowledge about their future job loss. Evidence from married spouses offers an opportunity
to assess the importance of anticipation at the household level, as the second spouse is not
restricted to respond at a particular point in time and can start searching for a job before the
first spouse is displaced. Here, we investigate job search and employment responses of wives
prior to the husbands’ displacement.
An important feature in Figures 2.5 is that the gap in wives’ employment rates opens only
after the husband’s displacement. Thus, there is no evidence of wives’ anticipation of the
household shock, at least in terms of employment. This could be due to unawareness of the
shock itself or its magnitude and persistence. However, job search takes time and wives’ entry
into employment could be delayed due to labor market frictions, even if they are aware of their
husbands’ job displacement in advance.
To confirm the lack of anticipation at the household level, we investigate responses in registered
job search, as an alternative measure of the wife’s labor supply that should be less affected
by labor market frictions. In the ASSD, we observe job search by individuals who register as
unemployed at the employment office. Registered individuals are not necessarily eligible for
unemployment benefits, but can receive all job search counseling services. If the wife learns
about her husband’s planned job displacement, she can immediately register with the employ-
53Results for the effects of husbands’ displacement on their wives’ employment and earnings over time are
provided in Appendix Tables B.3 and B.4. They confirm the patterns observed in Figure 2.5.
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ment office. Thus, this measure should convey more direct information about the anticipation
of the household shock.
In Figure 2.6, we plot the quarterly patterns of wife’s registered unemployment. Let us first
consider wives of displaced husbands, shown by the blue line in the graphs on the left. Job
search rates among wives in the displaced group remain small and stable until one quarter
prior to the husband’s displacement. Job search rates start increasing in the final quarter
before displacement and rise until the first quarter after displacement, thereafter they remain
stable over the next five years. Thus, even in terms of job search, there is little evidence of
anticipatory responses. Panels (a) to (c) consider the three different control groups. Among
wives in control groups 1 and 3, we see no corresponding reactions. Their job search rates
remain rather flat throughout. Wives in control group 2, whose husbands were not affected by
the mass layoff in their plant, raise their job search rates with some delay after the reference date.
This could indicate spillovers from the mass-layoff event to unaffected households, who react
to rising uncertainty. The graphs on the right show the absolute difference between displaced
and controls and provide a 95% confidence interval to assess statistical significance. Table 2.2
summarizes the mean effects for the twenty quarters after the reference date. Depending on the
control group used, the estimated average difference in job search rates is between 0.3 and 0.7
percentage points. Given pre-treatment means of around 4 percent, these responses correspond
to an increase in wives’ job search by 7 to 17 percent.54
2.6.2.3 Intensive versus extensive margin labor supply responses
From the evidence in the previous section, we conclude that anticipation of the income shock
due to the husband’s displacement is moderate and does not affect the wife’s labor supply prior
to the displacement event. Given that, in the year when their husbands are displaced, only
about 50% of wives in our sample participate in the labor force, this offers an opportunity
to investigate whether wives’ earnings respond at the intensive or the extensive margin. Put
differently, we analyze to which extent already participating wives increase their working hours
or switch to higher-paying jobs versus how many previously inactive wives join the labor force.
In Table 2.1, we show that employed wives earn less than 40% of household labor income prior
to the husband’s displacement, probably due to part-time work. This means that in both groups
of households, there should be room for labor supply responses, either on the intensive margin
or at the extensive margin.
To identify the margin of response, we split the sample and distinguish between couples in which
wives worked in the year before their husbands’ job loss and those with inactive wives. Specifi-
cally, we define a woman as employed if she is employed in all four quarters before the reference
date. As before, we weight each control group to resemble the observable characteristics of the
displaced households and estimate equation (2.2) for each subgroup. Table 2.3 presents results
by the wife’s employment status before the reference quarter comparing women with displaced
husbands with those in control groups 1 and 2. The estimated coefficients report the average
54Results for the effects of husbands’ displacement on their wives’ unemployment over time are provided in
Appendix Table B.5.
2.6. Empirical results 73
Figure 2.6: Job search, probability of registered unemployment
(a) CG1: No firm event
(b) CG2: Non-displaced in mass layoff
(c) CG3: Displaced in the future
Notes: Comparison of the probability to be unemployed of wives with displaced husbands (blue, square) to those
with husbands without firm event at the reference date (red, x) in panel (a), with non-displaced husbands working
in mass layoff firms at the reference date in (b), and with husbands displaced 16 quarters after the reference date
in (c) based on an adapted version of estimation equation (2.1), in which we measure unemployment relative
to its value in the quarter one year before the reference date. CG1 and CG2 are reweighted to resemble the
displaced group as explained in Figure 2.4. The unemployment probability of the control group is adjusted by
its mean difference relative to the displaced group. The graphs to the right plot the difference between the two
lines with the corresponding 95% confidence interval.
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Table 2.3: Displacement effects by wife’s employment status prior reference date
Wife employed Wife not employed
Outcome Husband Wife Husband Wife
Earnings P(employed) Earnings Earnings P(employed) Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Control group 1
Displaced×Post −610.110 −0.008 −10.793 −595.601 0.019 22.378
(9.853) (0.003) (6.060) (8.120) (0.004) (5.002)
ηparticipation −0.079
(0.016)
Pre-event mean 2490.909 1 1376.356 2435.549 0.111 122.813
Households 43,366 59,165
B. Control group 2
Displaced×Post −549.429 −0.005 −4.616 −536.020 0.015 16.652
(8.979) (0.003) (5.207) (7.539) (0.003) (4.479)
ηparticipation −0.069
(0.015)
Pre-event mean 2495.640 1 1365.551 2441.058 0.113 124.521
Households 40,492 55,237
Notes: This table displays the impact of husband’s displacement on own earnings, spousal employment and
earnings by the employment status of the wife before the reference date. The left panel refers to the group of
households in which the wife was employed in all four quarters before the reference date. The panel to the right
refers to the group of households in which the wife was not employed in all four quarters before the reference
date. Cluster-robust (at the household level) standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications) and reported
in parentheses.
difference between displaced and control groups relative to the reference date over the first five
years after displacement.
Results in columns (1) and (4) of Table 2.3 show that earnings losses of husbands are similar
in the two types of households. This indicates that the husband’s labor supply after job dis-
placement is independent of the wife’s labor market status at displacement. Results for wives
in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) show that positive employment and earnings responses among
wives are driven by couples, in which the wife was not working prior to the husband’s job loss.
Point estimates for the group of couples with wives employed in the year prior to husband’s
displacement are even negative, but small in magnitude and only marginally significant. Thus,
we conclude that wives’ labor supply responses are concentrated at the extensive margin, as
wives who were not employed prior to husbands’ displacement enter the labor market.
The interpretation of wives’ labor supply responses to husbands’ displacement as extensive
margin responses allows us to compute a semi-elasticity of female labor force participation with
respect to the husband’s earnings. We relate the absolute change in the wife’s employment rate
to the husband’s relative earnings loss averaging over the five years following job displacement
for the group of couples with employed wives prior to the displacement shock. The estimated
elasticity, ηparticipation, is reported in Table 2.3. Depending on the control group, the elasticity
estimates range from -0.07 to -0.08. As about half of the total sample consists of couples with
working wives, who are unresponsive to the husbands’ job displacement, the corresponding
participation elasticity for the full sample, reported in Table 2.2, is about half as big in absolute
terms with -0.04, but still significantly different from zero.
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2.6.3 Household income after displacement
Next, we explore what fraction of the overall household earnings loss due to the husband’s job
displacement is covered by the tax and transfer system. If benefits are very generous and taxes
progressive, intra-household insurance might be crowded out by public social insurance. In
particular, we account for the role of income taxes and the receipt of unemployment benefits
(UB) and unemployment assistance (UA) at the household level. In the data, net earnings and
benefit income are only recorded from 2000 onward. As we want to observe outcomes for at least
one year before the husband’s job displacement, this part of the analysis focuses on households
with a reference date of 2001 or later. As before, we weight couples in control groups 1 and 2
to have the same average predetermined characteristics as households in the displaced group.
Figure 2.7: Social benefits around displacement, CG1
(a) Probability that household receives
unemployment insurance benefits (UB)
(b) Probability that household receives
unemployment assistance (UA)
Notes: Comparison of the probability of receiving benefits of households with displaced husbands (blue, square)
to those with husbands without firm event at the reference date (red, x). The control group is reweighted to
resemble the displaced group within each subgroup as explained in Figure 2.4. The outcome variable of the
control group is adjusted by its mean difference relative to the displaced group. With some exceptions, job losers
can receive UB for up to 30 weeks. After exhausting UB, job losers can obtain means-tested income support,
UA, that pays a lower level of benefits indefinitely.
Starting with benefit incomes, Figure 2.7 shows the quarterly probability that any household
member receives unemployment benefits or unemployment assistance in graphs (a) and (b),
respectively. The share of household receiving benefits is low prior to the displacement date,
but in the displaced group UB receipt shoots up to more than 30% in the first few quarters
following displacement. The potential duration of unemployment benefits is limited to 30 or 39
weeks for most unemployed workers in Austria, therefore we see a relatively sharp decline in
the UI benefit rate after the initial quarters. In the long run, UI receipt is higher among the
displaced households than in the control group, which can be explained with the lower stability
of post-displacement jobs. Unemployment assistance benefits become available once UI expires,
which is reflected in the delay with which UA receipt sets in after job displacement. However,
note that the peak in the probability of receiving UA is at about 6%, which is much lower than
the peak in UI. Only a relatively small fraction of households transit from UI to UA benefits
after UI benefits exhaustion. The estimated effects summarized in Table 2.4 show that over
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the first five years after job displacement, the average rate of UI benefit receipt is 8 percentage
points higher in the displaced group and the average UA benefit receipt is 2 percentage points
higher than in the control group. This already suggests that benefit income cannot fully cover
the long-term earnings loss experienced by displaced households.55
Figure 2.8 shows the quarterly pattern of the estimated difference in household income between
the displaced group and control group 1. The left panel plots the treatment effects in abso-
lute terms, and the right panel provides a relative comparison to the corresponding pre-event
level of household income. The blue line with the sharpest drop shows gross household labor
earnings. This is the income measure we used, separately for husband and wife, in the analysis
above.56 Husband and wife’s combined gross labor earnings drop sharply after the husband’s
displacement, recover in the next few quarters (see column 3 in Appendix Table B.6). The
average difference over the five years after displacement is about 21 percent (see column 3 in
Table 2.4).
Figure 2.8: Displacement effect on household income, CG1
Notes: This figure shows the effect of husband’s displacement on monthly household income measures (in
Euro, 2000 prices). The effect is given by the difference between households that experience a displacement
and reweighted and mean-adjusted households that have husbands without any firm event at the reference
date. Household Gross Earnings is the sum of husband’s and wife’s labor earnings in each quarter according
to tax data. Household Net Earnings subtracts social security contributions and payroll taxes from the former.
Household Net Earnings + benefits adds benefits from unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance.
The red line in Figure 2.8 shows net household labor income. After income taxes and social
security contributions, the average absolute gap in household income between displaced and
control groups is smaller than the gap in gross earnings. Due to progressive income taxation,
the relative income gap is also smaller for net income and amounts to about 19% over the first
five years (column 4 in Table 2.4). If we add UI and UA benefits received by the household
to the net labor income, shown by the green line in Figure 2.8 and column 5 in Table 2.4),
55Appendix Figure B.12 replicates Figure 2.7 for control group 2. The Appendix Tables B.6 and B.7 report
in the first two columns estimation results for the effects over time for control groups 1 and 2, respectively.
56Notice that the reported average household income measures and the effects of displacement on the former
are larger than those for the sum of husband’s and wife’s gross earnings in Section 2.6. There are two reasons
for that. First, we only look here at events in 2001–2007, whereas we previously considered events in 1990–2007.
Appendix Figure B.7 shows that median real earnings were increasing over the relevant period. Hence, they are
on average larger for later observations. Second, we use data from tax records for the income measures in this
section, while we use earnings records from the ASSD in Section 2.6. The latter are top-coded at the maximum
threshold for social security contributions; whereas the former are not.
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Table 2.4: Effects of husband’s displacement on household income
Prob. of HH receiving Monthly household income
UB UA Gross Net Net + benefits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Control group 1
Displaced×Post 0.077 0.023 −769.902 −474.298 −429.653
(0.003) (0.002) (18.332) (11.442) (11.164)
Pre-event mean 0.040 0.015 3701.048 2515.338 2530.745
Households 40, 771
B. Control group 2
Displaced×Post 0.066 0.021 −711.126 −441.015 −401.320
(0.003) (0.002) (17.695) (11.046) (10.789)
Pre-event mean 0.040 0.015 3772.018 2553.295 2575.851
Households 34, 031
Notes: This table displays the impact of husband’s displacement on household income measures based on (2.2)
for the subsample of households with a reference date in 2001 or later. The dependent variable is equal to
one if the household receives unemployment insurance benefits and unemployment assistance in column (1) and
(2), respectively. In column (3), the outcome is household gross earnings (sum of the couple’s labor earnings).
Household net earnings in column (4) are gross earnings minus social security contributions and payroll taxes. In
column (5), we add unemployment benefits and assistance to the former. All income variables are measured in
Euro (2000 prices) on a monthly basis. In panel A (B) we compare individuals in households with a displacement
to a reweighted control group of households with no firm event (with households in which husbands keep their
jobs during a mass layoff). Standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications, with clustering at the household
level) and reported in parentheses.
we see that public social insurance primarily covers the large initial income shock suffered by
displaced households, but it hardly affects household income in the long run. After five years,
the red and green lines in Figure 2.8 almost overlap. See also columns (5) in Table 2.4 and in
Appendix Table B.6.57
Overall, the Austrian tax and transfer system covers a larger fraction of the household income
loss than the intra-household insurance mechanism, especially in the short run.
2.6.4 Effects of husband’s job displacement on family structure
Husband’s displacement may affect household outcomes other than his wife’s labor supply. In
particular, we consider fertility and divorce. These outcomes could be mediators that lie on
the causal pathway between displacement, the associated negative income shock, and the wife’s
labor supply response. Alternatively, the female labor supply response could be a mediator in
the causal effect of displacement on these other outcomes. Let us consider divorce, for example.
Negative earnings shocks may cause divorce due to changes in the expected gains from marriage
(Charles and Stephens, 2004; Rege et al., 2007; Eliason, 2012). This change in marital status
could, in turn, affect women’s labor supply behavior. Alternatively, the negative income shock
due to displacement and the associated labor supply response of the wife might trigger a marital
breakdown. In either case, the wife’s labor supply adjustment and divorce are causally related
to the husband’s displacement, but the order in the causal chain differs. While a full mediation
57Control group 2 provides very similar results, see also Appendix Figure B.13 and Appendix Table B.7.
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analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, we investigate the effect of displacement on family
stability and fertility to provide more context for the estimated effects in our main analysis.
Divorce
Figure 2.9: Divorce and fertility around displacement
(a) CG1: No firm event
(b) CG2: Non-displaced in mass layoff
Notes: Comparison of the probability to live in divorce (left) and the number of births (right) for households
with husbands experiencing a displacement (blue, square) to households with husbands without firm event (red,
x) at the reference date in panel (a) and with non-displaced husbands working in mass layoff firms at the
reference date in (b). CG1 and CG2 are reweighted to resemble the displaced group as explained in Figure 2.4.
The number of births of the control group is adjusted by its mean difference relative to the displaced group.
Divorce is only displayed after the reference date, since couples are required not to divorce until that date.
Our sample includes couples who have been married for at least 2 years at the reference date;
thus, we investigate the probability of divorce in the subsequent years. The left panels of
Figure 2.9 show the divorce rate over 20 quarters for the displaced group and for control
groups 1 and 2.58 In panel (a), we see a gradual increase in divorce probability among control
group 1 couples, where husbands are employed in firms without mass-layoff or closure at the
reference date. After five years, about 6% of these couples are divorced. Among couples with
displaced husbands, the rise in the divorce probability is slightly steeper over the five-year
58In the case of divorce, control group 3 does by construction not provide a valid counterfactual. By assump-
tion, control households remain married up to four years after the reference date.
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horizon. However, the gap between both groups opens gradually, rather than immediately after
the displacement shock. After five years, the divorce probability is about half a percentage
point higher in the displaced group than in control group 1. This corresponds to an average
difference in the probability of divorce of 0.04 percentage points, as shown in column (1) of
Table 2.5. Interestingly, control group 2 couples, with husbands employed in mass layoff firms
but not laid off themselves, face the same divorce rate patterns as the displaced group, which
is shown in the left graph in panel (b) of Figure 2.9. These couples are potentially exposed
to higher uncertainty and stress themselves, which may change their gains from marriage and
affect their divorce decisions.
Overall, we do not find evidence of strong effects of husband’s job displacement on divorce;
thus, we conclude that husbands’ job displacement is affecting relatively stable households
whose partners share the income shock over a five-year period.59 Marital stability after the
displacement shock also implies the enforceability of intra-household insurance contracts.
Table 2.5: Effects of husband’s displacement on divorce and fertility
P(Divorce) No. of births
(1) (2)
A. Control group 1
Displaced×Post 0.004 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Pre-event mean 0.000 0.014
Households 101, 609
B. Control group 2
Displaced×Post −0.001 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Pre-event mean 0.000 0.014
Households 93, 666
Notes: This table displays the impact of husband’s displacement on the risk to be divorced in a given quarter
in column (1) and the number of births per quarter in (2). The upper (lower) panel compare households with
a displacement to a reweighted control group with no firm event (with households in which husbands keep
their jobs during a mass layoff). Cluster-robust (at the household level) standard errors are bootstrapped (500
replications) and reported in parentheses.
Fertility
In Austria, fertility and women’s labor supply decisions are strongly related, as we discuss
above. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate whether the husband’s displacement leads
59In the case of divorce, the Austrian divorce law may mandate some redistribution of income between the
former spouses depending on the grounds of divorce. There are three main types of divorce: i. divorce by mutual
consent; ii. divorce on the ground of fault; and iii. divorce on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown. Divorce
by mutual consent is the simplest and cheapest way to obtain a divorce and is the most popular type of divorce.
Since 1985, between 80 and 90% of all divorces were by mutual consent. In the case of this type of divorce, the
law does not regulate alimony. However, an agreement on alimony is a condition to obtain such a divorce. In
the case of the other types of divorce, typically the spouse whom the court found to be (solely or primarily)
at fault must pay alimony to the other spouse if the latter does not have sufficient income or assets to live on.
The amount of alimony depends on the spouses’ financial circumstances. Spouses with no income of their own
are entitled to 33% of the net income of the other spouse. Spouses who are employed are entitled to 40% of the
common income, less their own income. Additional support obligations for children or another ex-spouse will
reduce alimony payments by 3 to 4%.
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to an adjustment of fertility decisions. The right-hand side panels of Figure 2.9 contrast the
number of births per quarter in the displaced group versus control groups 1 and 2. Consistent
with the evidence from Figure 2.1, fertility rates in our sample of married couples decline over
time for all groups. At the reference quarter, about 1 in 100 women gives birth to a child.
Given the low baseline fertility rate, it is perhaps not surprising that we find no indication of
an impact of the husband’s job loss on fertility. In Figure 2.9 fertility patterns in the displaced
group follow the controls very closely. This is confirmed by the estimation results in column (2)
of Table 2.5, which show a precise zero effect on fertility.60 This result implies that households
do not adjust fertility plans to cope with the income shock from the husband’s job displacement.
2.6.5 Heterogeneity
Our results based on the full sample indicate that intra-household insurance against the hus-
band’s job displacement is almost negligible in Austria. To understand the reasons for the
limited responses by wives and to identify impediments to the intra-household insurance mech-
anism, we investigate heterogeneity in responses for different types of households with the goal
of identifying more and less responsive groups in the overall population. In particular, we seek
to capture the impact of children on household labor supply decisions (Blundell et al., 2018),
the role played by the earnings potential of the wife, by heterogeneity in the magnitude of the
income shock (Lachowska et al., 2018), and by correlated shocks at the household level.
2.6.5.1 Heterogeneity by the age of youngest child
We document in Section 2.4 that labor supply patterns of young wives vary substantially over
time and are largely determined by the timing of births. Thus, it is important to analyze how
the wife’s response to the husband’s job displacement interacts with the presence of children in
the household. To guide our analysis and the interpretation of results, we refer to the model
of household labor supply with children introduced by Blundell et al. (2018). In this model,
both partners in the household split their time between market work, child care provided at
home, and leisure. Model estimates for the US indicate complementarity in husbands’ and
wives’ leisure decisions, but substitutability in the spouses’ time input in child care services. If
the husband suffers a negative wage shock, this model predicts that the wife will increase her
labor supply and, thus, partially insure the household against the income shock. If children
are present in the household, two additional factors boost the wife’s labor supply. First, as
the husband’s earnings drop and he works less, the husband takes over some of the wife’s child
care responsibilities at home. Second, the wife substitutes some of her time at home with the
children with formal child care from outside of the household. Together these effects result in
stronger predicted female labor supply responses in households with children.
60Existing evidence for Austria (Del Bono et al., 2012) points to small negative and not very robust effect
of job displacement on the paternity of male workers in a sample that also includes non-married workers. In
Finnish data, no effects are found (Huttunen and Kellokumpu, 2016). Notably, the focus of both studies is
the effect of women’s own displacement on subsequent fertility, which is found to be statistically significantly
negative in both studies.
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Now we translate the model predictions to the Austrian case, which is characterized by generous
parental leave regulations, a scarce supply of formal child care for children below age 3, and
by traditional gender roles within the household. According to the model, we expect the wife’s
labor supply responses to vary by the age of the child in the following way. First, a strong driver
of labor supply responses among women with very young children should be the substitutability
of home provided child care within the household. In this group, most mothers are on parental
leave with the option of returning to their previous job; however with poor availability of formal
child care. These households have the option to respond by spouses switching roles after the
husband’s job loss with the wife returning to her job and the husband taking over child care at
home.
Second, in households with older children for whom formal child care is more widely available,
mothers have the additional option of substituting their child-care time at home with child
care outside the household, if they want to increase their labor supply. Third, among couples
with children too old to require child care or without children, we should see wives’ labor
supply responses to the income loss after taking into account leisure complementarities with
their husbands. A factor that might limit labor responses within all household is gender roles
and differences in gender-specific preferences for spending time with children. This might be
relevant in the Austrian case, where almost 40 percent of all Austrians agree that “a pre-school
child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works” (see Appendix Figure B.1).
To test these predictions, we start by defining three categories of households with children
below compulsory schooling age, where the youngest child is (a) 0–2 years old and parents are
eligible for parental leave; (b) 3–9 years old; (c) 10-15 years old, and an extra fourth category
(d) of households with no child or all children aged 16 years or older. As before, we weight the
corresponding subsamples in control groups 1 and 2 to resemble the observable pre-determined
characteristics of the displaced households for each category. Figure 2.10 plots employment
rates of mothers in the displaced group and in control group 1 by the age of the youngest
child.61 Table 2.6, summarizes the corresponding estimation results of the average effects of
husbands’ job displacement on wives’ employment probabilities for each of the three control
groups in panels A to C.
A comparison of wives’ average employment rates at the reference date across the four categories
of households in Table 2.6 highlights the amount of heterogeneity in wives’ labor supply over
the life-cycle. Only 18% of the mothers of very young kids are employed at the reference date.
If employed, they work few hours, as reflected in the wives’ earnings, which are less than a
third of the overall household labor earnings prior to the husband’s job displacement. Wives’
employment rates at the reference date rise with the age of the youngest child as mothers
outgrow their maternity breaks. However, the wives’ earnings are still low compared to their
husbands’, as wives on average contribute slightly more than a third of household labor income,
if they are employed. We see the highest employment rates among wives, who have no children
or all children above the compulsory schooling age; among those women the employment rate
is 66% at the reference date and their share in household labor earnings is 41%, if they are
61Equivalent graphs for the other two control groups are provided in Appendix Figures B.14 and B.15.
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Figure 2.10: Employment of displaced husbands’ wives by age of the youngest child, CG1
(a) 0-2 yrs. (b) 3-9 yrs.
(c) 10-16 yrs. (d) No children aged younger than 16 yrs.
Notes: Comparison of the probability to be employed of wives with displaced husbands (blue, square) to those
with husbands without firm event at the reference date (red, x) for subgroups defined by the age of the youngest
child at the reference date based on estimation equation (2.1). The control group is reweighted to resemble the
displaced group within each subgroup as explained in Figure 2.4. The employment probability of the control
group is adjusted by its mean difference relative to the displaced group.
employed.
The blue and red lines in Figure 2.10, show employment rates in the displaced group and control
group, reflecting the wife’s labor supply responses after the husband’s job displacement. We can
see small and positive employment gaps opening after the husband’s displacement in panels (b)
and (c) among mothers with a youngest child aged 3 and older. However, no gap appears for
mothers with very young children in panel (a) or for wives without school-age children in panel
(d). The graphical results are confirmed by estimates in Table 2.6. The response is close to zero
and never statistically significant for the household category with very young children aged 0
to 2 in column (1). The wives’ employment response increases in the groups with older children
across all three control group comparisons in columns (2) and (3) where we see small positive
and mostly statistically significant employment responses among couples with children aged 3
to 9 and 10 to 15. The corresponding participation elasticities, estimated for control groups
1 and 2 for which we can identify husbands’ earnings losses, range between -0.03 and -0.07.
In the fourth category of households without children of compulsory schooling age, column
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Table 2.6: Wife’s employment response by age of the youngest child
0–2 years 3–9 years 10–15 years None younger
than 16 years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Control group 1
Displaced×Post 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.001
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
ηparticipation −0.054 −0.033 −0.034 −0.005
(0.038) (0.022) (0.020) (0.015)
Pre-event mean 0.182 0.466 0.584 0.659
Earnings rel. to husband | employed 0.491 0.514 0.539 0.709
Households 18,248 36,950 22,031 26,894
B. Control group 2
Displaced×Post 0.005 0.007 0.015 0.005
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ηparticipation −0.031 −0.035 −0.065 −0.020
(0.034) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016)
Pre-event mean 0.181 0.465 0.585 0.661
Earnings rel. to husband | employed 0.482 0.515 0.548 0.699
Households 17,623 34,883 20,560 25,153
C. Control group 3
Displaced×Post -0.001 0.013 0.011 0.006
(0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Pre-event mean 0.178 0.447 0.567 0.656
Households 11,927 20,619 10,844 11,536
Notes: This table displays the impact of husband’s displacement on spousal employment for subgroups defined
by the age of the youngest child at the reference date. The first (second) panel compare households with a
displacement to a reweighted control group with no firm event (with households in which husbands keep their
jobs during a mass layoff). The third panel compares the displaced group to a control group of households that
experience displacement four years after that date. Standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications, with
clustering at the household level) and reported in parentheses.
(4), the wife’s employment responses are precisely estimated zeros in all three control group
comparisons. The corresponding participation elasticities are also close to zero.62
Overall, we find evidence for heterogeneity in the wife’s labor supply response by the age of the
youngest child. The only caveat is that the sample split reduces the number of observations and
decreases statistical power; thus differences between columns are never statistically significant.
If we interpret the estimates in the light of the predictions from the model by Blundell et al.
(2018), we draw the following conclusions.
First, couples who are eligible for parental leave are unlikely to switch roles after the husband’s
job displacement, and the mother prefers to stay at home with the child in any case. Thus,
62Appendix Table B.8 reports detailed estimation results of the husband’s earnings loss, wife’s employment
and earnings responses in each of the four categories of households using our three different comparison groups.
These result document zero earnings responses among wives in the category with no children or all children aged
16 years or older, which confirms the absence of intensive margin labor supply responses even in the group of
women with the highest employment rates.
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there is no evidence for mothers and fathers substituting child care at home, at least among
couples with children younger than three. For these children, the mother holds the main child-
care responsibilities, even if the husband reduces his time in the labor market. Notably, in the
sample of wives who are on parental leave at the time of the husband’s displacement, we find
no evidence for any employment response (these results are available on request).63
Second, the main respondents are mothers of children age 3 to 15, who still face child-care needs.
These mothers respond to the trade-off between time spent on child care and time spent in the
labor market after the husband’s job displacement and substitute time at home with children
and time in the labor market. Interestingly, this is also the group of wives on a strongly
upward sloping profile in their life-cycle labor supply, as shown in Figure 2.3. These mothers
are planning a return to the labor market after their maternity break, and their husbands’ job
loss might induce them to return sooner than otherwise, which is also in line with the evidence
of extensive margin labor supply responses.
Third, we find smaller responses in the wife’s labor supply to a permanent shock of the hus-
band’s wage for couples without children. This might not be surprising, given the relatively
high employment rate of wives prior to the husband’s job displacement in this category. The
magnitude of effects in Austrian households is smaller than those reported by Blundell et al.
(2018) for the US, as we discuss below.
2.6.5.2 Heterogeneity by wife’s earnings potential
Next, we test whether the intra-household insurance mechanism is more important if the wife
has a higher earnings potential or has a higher chance to cover the income loss. We use
three different definitions of the wife’s earnings potential: (i) relative earnings of wife and
husband before marriage; (ii) years of wife’s labor market experience before marriage; and
(iii) wife’s educational attainment. Information about education is, however, only available
at the date of first birth and, thus, we can only measure education for mothers. Along each
measure of earnings potential, we split the sample into two groups with high and low earnings
potential and measure the responses in terms of the average husband’s earnings, the wife’s
average probability of employment, and the wife’s average earnings in the first 5 years after
the husband’s job displacement. Results comparing the displaced group with control group
1 are shown in Table 2.7.64 For all three measures, the husbands’ earning losses are slightly
higher in the group of households with high wives’ earnings potential, which might be due to
assortative matching. However, there is also a clear difference in the wives’ responses across
both types of households. Wives with high earnings potential are more likely to be employed
and have higher earnings after their husbands’ job loss than wives with low earnings potential.
63In Austria, the labor supply of young mothers may not only be restricted by low substitutability of child-
care time within the couple but also by the lack of formal child care. Therefore, we also check whether the
mother’s willingness to return to employment depends on the availability of formal child care for under three-
year-olds. We split the sub-sample of mothers of young children by the availability of a nursery in the residential
community. In neither subsample do we find a significant employment response among mothers (see Appendix
Table B.9). However, it is hard to tell whether these results can be explained by selection into different types
of communities or by the shortage of child-care slots in communities with existing facilities.
64Estimations results based on control group 2 provide similar results (see Appendix Table B.10).
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The difference is strongest if we measure earnings potential by the wife’s labor earnings relative
to her husband’s in the year prior to marriage. Wives who used to have well-paid jobs before
marriage are twice as likely to be employed after their husbands’ job loss than wives who had
no job or low earnings. Their participation elasticity is -0.07. Further, their earnings increase
significantly. However, even though wives with high earnings potential respond more strongly,
their earnings gain is small relative to their husbands’ earnings loss.
Table 2.7: Displacement effects by wife’s earnings potential, CG1
Low High
Outcome Husband Wife Husband Wife
Earnings P(employed) Earnings Earnings P(employed) Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Measure 1: Earnings
Displaced×Post −558.957 0.008 7.241 −649.244 0.017 20.328
(7.531) (0.003) (4.616) (15.287) (0.006) (11.338)
ηparticipation −0.035 −0.072
(0.014) (0.025)
Pre-event mean 2384.058 0.459 548.609 2711.692 0.580 1008.921
Households 68,925 20,959
B. Measure 2: Experience
Displaced×Post −562.861 0.008 2.656 −598.032 0.012 16.496
(9.725) (0.004) (6.365) (9.077) (0.004) (6.238)
ηparticipation −0.035 −0.049
(0.019) (0.017)
2424.419 0.464 593.651 2491.314 0.510 714.223
Households 44,013 45,800
C. Measure 3: Education
Displaced×Post −505.811 0.010 9.704 −659.886 0.015 16.063
(8.900) (0.004) (5.478) (12.267) (0.005) (9.059)
ηparticipation −0.045 −0.063
(0.020) (0.021)
Pre-event mean 2306.676 0.405 468.030 2700.320 0.502 699.960
Households 43,822 29,762
Notes: This table displays the impact of husband’s displacement on own earnings, spousal employment and
earnings by measures of wife’s earnings potential. Measure 1: High indicates that the wife earned more than
33% of the wage of husbands in the year before marriage. Measure 2: High indicates above median experience
compared to other wives in the year before marriage. Measure 3: High indicates that the completed education
of the wife is beyond compulsory schooling and apprenticeship education. Pre-marriage wage and experience
are only available for those married after 1974. Education is only available for women with children. Results
based on control group 2 are in Table B.10. Standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications, with clustering
at the household level) and reported in parentheses.
2.6.5.3 Heterogeneity by magnitude of the income shock
To investigate whether the wife’s labor supply response varies by the magnitude of the income
shock experienced by the household, we exploit variation in the average wage paid at the
husband’s pre-displacement firm. Card et al. (2013) document systematic differences in wage
levels across employers that are unrelated to the worker’s own productivity level. The idea is
that an individual who loses a job in a firm that pays high wages to their average workers should
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suffer a larger shock than an individual who loses a job in a firm that only pays moderate wages
(Lachowska et al., 2018).
We define firm types by estimating employer-specific fixed effects from an AKM type wage
decomposition (Abowd et al., 1999).65 In panel A of Table 2.8, we distinguish between two
groups of households where the husbands are displaced by firms with estimated fixed effects
below (columns 1 to 3) versus above the median (columns 4 to 6) fixed effect. Results are
shown for comparisons with control groups 1 and 2, respectively. As expected, husbands’
average earnings losses in the first five years after displacement are larger, if they lose a job in
a high-paying firm. Wives’ labor supply responses are also significantly stronger in this group.
A comparison of the wife’s employment gain relative to the husband’s earnings loss results in
participation elasticities that are also larger for the group of households that suffer the larger
income shock. The participation elasticity is -0.03 among households suffering a small shock
and varies between -0.04 and -0.06 in the group with a large shock, depending on the control
group.
2.6.5.4 Heterogeneity by local labor market conditions
The moderate female employment responses to the husband’s job displacement could be due
to correlated shocks affecting both partners. In a depressed labor market, every worker faces
difficulties finding jobs. Even if secondary earners are willing to enter the labor market, there
might be few job opportunities. To assess the potential impact of correlated shocks at the
household level, we investigate the correlation between female and male labor market outcomes
and present a heterogeneity analysis by predicted job opportunities for wives.
We start by investigating female and male local labor market conditions among the couples
in our sample. Overall, we find that labor markets are strongly segregated by gender. Only
8% of couples where both partners are employed before the husband’s displacement work in
the same 4-digit industry. For control groups 1 and 2, we find similar rates of 10% and 8%,
respectively. At the reference date, the correlation between occupation-specific male and female
unemployment rates in the same district is positive, but not very large at 0.5. Again, this result
is similar across displaced and control groups.
To evaluate the wife’s response to the husband’s displacement by local labor market condi-
tions, we split our sample by male unemployment rates (measured in the district of the pre-
displacement employer). Panel B of Table 2.8 summarizes estimation results of the effect
of displacement on husband’s earnings, and wife’s employment and earnings. The first three
columns refer to observations in districts with low unemployment, and the last three columns to
those with high unemployment. The upper panel uses control group 1, while the lower panel fo-
cuses on control group 2. Husbands’ average earnings losses are comparable across both types
of local labor markets. However, we consistently find that in depressed labor markets, with
male unemployment rates above the median, wives face indeed difficulties in entering the labor
market. Their employment responses are small and insignificant. In contrast, in local labor
65See Haller (2017) for documentation of the wage decompositions in the ASSD.
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Table 2.8: Displacement effects by plant wage level and unemployment rate at reference date
Below median Above median
Outcome Husband Wife Husband Wife
Earnings P(employed) Earnings Earnings P(employed) Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Subgroups by plant wage level at reference date
Control group 1
Displaced×Post −485.974 0.007 1.737 −767.597 0.015 19.703
(9.787) (0.004) (6.289) (10.888) (0.005) (6.653)
ηparticipation −0.032 −0.055
(0.018) (0.017)
Pre-event mean 2239.607 0.505 676.410 2785.463 0.515 711.476
Households 40,939 40,903
Control group 2
Displaced×Post −466.395 0.006 2.484 −693.665 0.010 13.905
(9.293) (0.004) (5.889) (10.852) (0.004) (5.966)
ηparticipation −0.028 −0.042
(0.018) (0.015)
Pre-event mean 2287.456 0.506 677.026 2796.831 0.507 692.800
Households 38,013 34,830
B. Subgroups by male unemployment rate at reference date
Control group 1
Displaced×Post −613.381 0.017 14.903 −587.012 0.006 9.024
(9.652) (0.004) (5.747) (8.486) (0.004) (5.245)
ηparticipation −0.067 −0.025
(0.016) (0.015)
Pre-event mean 2463.174 0.466 607.385 2457.220 0.511 702.639
Households 50,906 51,311
Control group 2
Displaced×Post −550.786 0.010 12.033 −540.268 0.006 6.975
(8.944) (0.003) (4.662) (8.183) (0.003) (5.086)
ηparticipation −0.048 −0.026
(0.016) (0.016)
Pre-event mean 2478.804 0.465 605.749 2494.340 0.505 689.418
Households 46,973 46,544
Notes: This table displays the impact of husband’s displacement on own earnings, spousal employment and
earnings for different subgroups. In panel A the wage level at plants are employer-specific fixed effects estimated
based on the AKM approach (Abowd et al., 1999), and provided by Haller (2017). These estimates are available
only after 1994. In panel B the male unemployment rate is measured at the husband’s employment district
in the year of the reference date. Standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications, with clustering at the
household level) and reported in parentheses.
markets with male unemployment rates below the median, female employment and earnings
respond positively.
2.6.6 Discussion and comparison to the literature
Our results for married couples hit by the husband’s job loss indicate positive, but small, labor
supply responses by wives predominantly at the extensive margin as wives enter the labor force
after the husband’s job loss. Among couples where the wife did not work when the husband
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lost his job, we estimate a participation elasticity of -0.07, while among couples where the
wife worked the response is zero. The heterogeneity analysis above identified certain groups
of households with stronger responses. However, even among those groups, the participation
elasticity of wives is around -0.07, and there is no group where the wife’s labor supply response
covers a significant share of the household’s income loss.
How do the Austrian findings compare to the literature? In Appendix Table B.1, we collect
elasticity estimates from three types of studies, categorized by the type of variation in the
husband’s earnings, which is used to identify the wife’s labor supply response. They cover
results from different countries, time periods, population groups, and they are based on both
administrative as well as survey data. Most reported elasticities refer to the aggregate hours or
earnings response, while some studies also distinguish between extensive and intensive margins.
Most estimated elasticities are negative, but a few studies find elasticities with the opposite sign
(Eliason, 2011; Hardoy and Schøne, 2014; Bredtmann et al., 2018). Interestingly, the studies
reporting positive elasticities identify household labor supply responses from income variation
due to a job displacement of the primary earner, taking an empirical approach similar to ours.
A potential explanation for the overall negative labor supply response at the household could be
correlated shocks or adverse labor market conditions for all household members, the so-called
discouraged worker effect.
The average elasticity estimate across all studies that find evidence for an added worker effect
is -0.4, which is an order of magnitude larger in absolute terms than our main estimates. Haan
and Prowse (2015) is the only other study that finds a negative elasticity with an absolute
value below -0.1. In a setup is similar to ours, Haan and Prowse (2015) estimate a structural
model exploiting income variation from husbands’ involuntary job loss based on data from
Germany.66 Blundell et al. (2018) report somewhat larger responses on the extensive than the
intensive margin, especially among households with children. We can confirm this result, but
what stands out in the Austrian case is the absence of evidence of intensive margin responses.
Wives who already participated in the labor force when the husband was displaced, do not
increase their labor earnings relative to the control groups. Given that most wives work part-
time, this is a surprising finding. We also fail to find earnings responses in the group of
women without children or children above the compulsory schooling age, who have the highest
employment rates at the reference date. This seems to indicate that gender roles within the
household are relatively fixed and even large shocks to husband’s income are not able to reverse
these patterns.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper investigates how different motives of marriage shape the labor market responses
to an income shock within the family. If the insurance motive dominates, we would expect
the second earner to increase her labor supply if the primary earner in the household loses his
66Unfortunately the paper does not report the earnings loss of the husband and we assume an earnings drop
of 20% to calculate the elasticity.
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job. If, however, other motives, such as child care or housework, are more important and the
roles within the family are clearly defined, the responses to an income shock should be more
moderate.
We test this hypothesis in a setup of married couples in Austria, where husbands lose their
job from mass layoffs or plant closures. The setup allows for precise timing of the shock to
the household and a clean quasi-experimental identification of the displacement effect. We
document that the husband’s job displacement leads to a large and persistent drop in his
earnings and employment. The wife’s employment responds positively, in line with the insurance
motive, but the additional earnings generated by the wife only cover a very small fraction of the
total income loss. Taxes and government transfers are far more important as insurance against
income shocks, at least in the initial period following job displacement.
To find explanations for the low insurance value of female labor supply within the household,
we investigate additional outcomes, such as job search, fertility, and divorce, and analyze the
heterogeneity in responses by household characteristics. Our results indicate that gender roles,
preferences for time spent with children, and availability of formal child care play a strong role
in the wives’ labor supply decisions. Wives and husbands are not willing to switch roles in the
care of small children in response to a shift in relative wages when parental leave benefits are
available, but child care outside the home is absent. Nor are wives without children, who are
already participating in the labor market prior to the husband’s income shock, willing to extend
their hours and increase their earnings. The most responsive group are mothers of children aged
3 and older, who are in the process of reentering the labor market after a maternity break. These
women are willing to bring the re-entry the labor market at higher rates.
In our heterogeneity analysis, we can identify certain groups of women who show stronger labor
market responses to the husband’s job loss. In particular, wives with higher earnings potential
are able to cover a larger share of the household income loss, wives of husbands who lost well-
paid jobs, and wives who face more favorable labor market conditions are more responsive.
Overall, we find that the intra-household insurance mechanism is muted in Austria, compared
to evidence from other countries. This may be explained by traditional gender norms that
determine the role of women in the household in line with evidence by Bertrand et al. (2016),
on the importance of the male breadwinner model, and by Kleven et al. (2018), on the impact
of gender inequality in Denmark.
Based on these findings, we identify different types of policies that might strengthen the intra-
household insurance channel. The first type of policies targets the re-entry of mothers into
the labor market after a maternity period, by strengthening the job guarantee after parental
leave (Lalive et al., 2014), expanding subsidized child care, and providing active labor market
programs for mothers after a maternity break. The second type of policies targets fathers’
involvement in child care at home, for example, by reserving part of parental leave benefits for
fathers (daddy months). Finally, policies targeting unemployed workers directly should take the
household situation into account and also extend job search counseling to wives of unemployed
married men.
Chapter 3
Free Mobility of Labor - How are
neighboring labor markets affected by
the EU Eastern enlargement of 2004?
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, there is growing public and political opposition against the principle of free
movement of labor within the European Union (EU). Concerns are particularly pronounced
toward the mobility of individuals from Central, Eastern, and Southeastern European member
states; among them the eight countries that joined the EU in 2004 (EU8).67,68 The accession to
the EU changed the migration perspectives of more than 70 million citizens of the EU8 countries
permanently. Because of the large migration potential and substantially lower earnings levels
in these countries, old EU member states feared a substantial increase in immigration with
potentially adverse effects for the labor market opportunities of their residents. These worries
were especially prominent in Austria due to its geographic proximity to the EU8 countries.
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, Austria shares more than half of its border with four of the eight
countries that joined the EU in 2004.
In this paper, we investigate how local labor markets are affected when receiving a large number
of immigrant workers. For this purpose, we examine the effects of increased immigration to the
Austrian eastern border region resulting from the EU enlargement of 2004.69 We focus on the
67Some exemplary extracts from the Austrian press illustrate these discussions: http://derstandard.
at/2000065798708/Lohndumping-Zuwanderung-aus-Osteuropa-massiv-gestiegen and http://wien.orf.at/news/
stories/2757310/, last access 05/2019.
68The EU8 countries are Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
Central, Eastern, and Southeastern European EU member countries further include Bulgaria and Romania
(EU2) that followed in 2007 and Croatia that joined in 2013.
69According to our definition, the border region comprises the federal states that are neighbor at least one
of the EU8 countries.
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Figure 3.1: Austria and neighboring countries
Notes: Own illustration.
labor market outcomes of resident workers across municipalities and follow their employment
and average earnings over time. In addition, we look at the labor demand side by investigating
whether firms enter or exit regions that receive many immigrants.
By exploiting temporal and spatial variation across municipalities, we disentangle the effects of
immigration from the general economic impacts of the EU enlargement. National governments
of the old member states had the option of temporarily restricting access to their labor markets
for citizens from the EU8 countries. As a result, the Austrian government opted for a seven-year
transition period with limited labor market access. In our analysis, we take advantage of the
fact that the accession of the EU8 countries and their entitlement to free access to the Austrian
labor market happened at different points in time. We further exploit that within the Austrian
border region, immigrants tend to enter the labor markets in municipalities that are close to
their home country. Hereby, they can profit most from commuting, which is attractive given
the substantial differences in earnings and the cost of living between the countries.
In our empirical design, we compare differences in outcomes in municipalities across three groups
that differ in their commuting distance to the closest EU8 border over time and contrast them
to the corresponding differences in the year before the EU Eastern enlargement. We distinguish
between three time periods: the period before EU8 countries entered the EU (May 1997 to April
2004), the transition period with restricted labor market access to Austria (May 2004 to April
2011), and the period after the introduction of free entry to the Austrian labor market (May
2011 to April 2016).
Our analysis is based on Austrian social security data, which provides us with information on
the universe of private sector employment in Austria. Based on this data, we create a balanced
yearly panel of municipalities between May 1997 and April 2016. For each municipality and
92 3. How are neighboring labor markets affected by the EU Eastern enlargement of 2004?
year, we measure the labor market outcomes for different groups of workers. Based on their
citizenship, we distinguish between Austrians, immigrants from EU8 countries, and immigrants
from other foreign countries (non-EU8 foreigners) and within these groups by gender, occupation
(blue- and white-collar), and age (below 30, between 30 and 45, above 45). On the employer
side, we measure the number of firms with more than 5 employees. In addition, we measure
the number of firms that predominantly employ workers with either Austrian, EU8, or other
foreign citizenship.
First, we document that the employment of EU8 nationals in the Austrian border region grew
moderately before accession and during the transition period. With free labor market access,
the trend changed markedly, and growth in EU8 employment picked up. Over the period
from 1997 to 2015, the employment share of EU8 nationals in the Austrian border region
increased from 2.2% to 9.3%. Comparing workers across the three nationality groups, we
show that EU8 workers tend to be similar to other non-Austrian workers in terms of their
age, sex, and type of occupation. Notably, approximately 70% of EU8 workers are males, and
almost all are employed in blue-collar occupations, which is well above the percentages among
Austrian workers. Moreover, Austrian nationals receive the highest remuneration, which is
well above that for non-EU8 foreign workers, which is in turn higher than for EU8 workers.
With free access to the Austrian labor market, the composition of EU8 employees in Austria
changed discontinuously toward younger, male, and lower-paid workers. EU8 employees are
most represented in seasonal industries such as agriculture, tourism, and construction, which
points to an important potential role for temporary and seasonal migration. The tourism and
construction sectors experienced the largest increase in their EU8 worker share from 1997 to
2015.
Second, comparing municipalities within the Austrian border region, we show that the increase
in EU8 employment after 2004 is larger in municipalities within 0 to 20 minutes distance to the
closest EU8 border than within 20 to 60 minutes, which is again larger than in those with more
than one hour distance. This increase is almost entirely driven by an increase in blue-collar
employment in the age group 30 to 45. For Austrian nationals, we do not find that employment
evolved differently, on average, in municipalities that are within 0 to 20 minutes travel distance
to the border compared to those further away. In contrast, municipalities that are within 20
to 60 minutes travel distance to the border experience a significant increase in the employment
of Austrians, which is driven by an increasing number of white-collar workers. For non-EU8
foreign workers, average employment decreases significantly and steadily in municipalities that
are within 0 to 20 minutes to the border after 2004. These decreases are larger for blue-collar
and male employees.
Further, we find that real monthly earnings of Austrian and non-EU8 foreign workers change in
opposite directions in municipalities within a one hour distance to the EU8 border after 2004.
While Austrians experience an increase of approximately 2% in their earnings, non-EU8 foreign
workers face substantial decreases of almost 5% from 2003 to 2015 relative to the reference
group. In contrast to employment, these effects are very similar across municipalities in 0 to
20 minutes and 20 to 60 minutes border distance.
3.1. Introduction 93
Third, turning to the labor demand side in municipalities within 0 to 20 minutes distance to the
border, we show that the number of firms increases before 2004, but not during the transition
period. After 2011, there is an, albeit not significant, increase in the total number of firms.
Regarding the number of firms with a mainly EU8 workforce, we observe a large and significant
increase before 2004, during the transition period and, in particular, after 2011. By 2015, there
is, on average, one more firm with a predominantly EU8 workforce in municipalities very close
to the border relative to those further away. For municipalities within 20 to 60 minutes travel
distance from the border, we observe a positive effect of the EU Eastern enlargement on the
total number of firms. This increase is mainly due to a rise in firms with a predominantly
blue-collar workforce and to a minor part due to firms with a mainly EU8 workforce.
A large literature on the effect of immigration on native labor market outcomes documents
mixed results. These differences arise partly because of different empirical specifications (Dust-
mann et al., 2016) and distinct empirical identification approaches. Our study is related to an
increasing number of studies that exploit the design of migration policies or policy changes in
order to identify the labor market impacts of immigrants.70 Most closely related to this study,
two papers exploit the regional variation in immigration by distance to a border in combination
with changes in migration policies in other European countries. Dustmann et al. (2017) ana-
lyze the temporary opening of parts of the German labor market to Czech commuters in the
early 1990s. They find that the inflow of immigrant workers had a substantial negative effect
on natives’ employment through reductions in inflows into local labor markets and moderate
negative wage effects. Beerli et al. (2018) find positive employment effects when Switzerland
opened its labor market to European cross-border workers in the 2000s. The comparison of
these two studies already points to the potential importance of context-specific factors. Our
study contributes to this literature by furthering our understanding of the relationship between
immigration and labor market outcomes in a unique context. The EU Eastern enlargement and
the implied suspension of immigration restrictions between old and new member countries were
anticipated and permanent. In the Austrian case, there was even a 7-year transition period that
provided substantial time for workers and firms to adapt their behavior. We can investigate
this unique setting with an extraordinary administrative data set, which allows us to observe
the universe of private-sector employers and their employees in Austria.71
Our paper contributes to the understanding of the role of the labor demand side in the effects
of immigration by investigating whether firms enter markets that receive many immigrants.
Firms might find it attractive to enter the labor market by relocating or by creating new
70Among these studies are Glitz (2012) and Foged and Peri (2016), who exploit the quasi-experimental nature
of dispersal policies for immigrants to Germany and Denmark, respectively. Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2014) study
an unexpected rise in migration from East to West Germany resulting from the German reunification. Monras
et al. (2018) analyze the impact of the unexpected legalization of 600,000 immigrants on the employment of low-
and high-skilled workers in Spain.
71We further highlight that the impact of immigration differs substantially between the group of Austrians
and the group of other foreign workers and can even go in opposite directions. The latter group is on average
similar to the EU8 migrant workers in terms of their observable characteristics and therefore more vulnerable
to substitution. In addition, our results rather point to a complementary relationship between the group of
EU8 and Austrian employees. Heterogeneities in the effect of immigration on workers across education and skill
groups are established, for example, by Ottaviano and Peri (2012), Dustmann et al. (2017), Beerli et al. (2018),
and Monras et al. (2018)).
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establishments when there is an increase in the supply of labor. As a result of this, they might
alleviate the pressure on residents’ employment and wages. Firms’ responses to changes in
immigration policies are relatively underexplored so far. Olney (2013) applies a shift-share
approach and finds that low-skilled immigration to US cities leads to a significant increase in
the number of establishments. Also relying on a shift-share approach, Dustmann and Glitz
(2015) show that large immigrant inflows to West Germany cause within-firm changes in factor
intensity and a net creation of new firms. Jahn and Steinhardt (2018) find that the inflow of
ethnic Germans positively affects overall regional net firm formation by exploiting a placement
policy in post-unification Germany. Finally, Beerli et al. (2018) show that the inflow of skilled
workers stimulates firm and productivity growth of incumbents, increases innovations, and leads
to the entry of new firms. In contrast to these studies, we analyze the labor market outcomes of
workers and firms simultaneously using matched employer-employee data. This contrasts with
Beerli et al. (2018), who rely on different surveys when analyzing workers’ and firms’ outcomes.
Last, but not least, understanding the labor market effects from the EU Eastern enlargement
and the opening of a national labor market is important and interesting per se; in particular,
in consideration of the aforementioned public and political debate. There is some research on
the economic effects of the EU Eastern enlargement. Dustmann et al. (2010) and Dustmann
and Frattini (2014) find that EU8 immigrants who came to the UK after 2004 made a positive
contribution to the public finances. Caliendo et al. (2017) quantify the economic effects of the
trade and labor market integration of the EU Eastern enlargement of 2004 in a dynamic general
equilibrium model and find that welfare for all EU countries, especially for the new member
states, increased. Walterskirchen and Dietz (1998), Huber and Bru¨cker (2003), and Prettner
and Stiglbauer (2007) are ex-ante studies predicting the potential impact of the EU Eastern
enlargement on the Austrian labor market. Huber and Bo¨hs (2012) examine the inflows of
EU8 immigrants to Austria immediately after full labor market liberalization. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first research paper that intends to establish the causal effect of
immigration induced by the EU Eastern enlargement on natives’ labor market outcomes and
on firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses relevant aspects of
the institutional setting. More precisely, we discuss how the EU enlargement affected the labor
market access of individuals in the new EU member countries. Section 3.3 introduces our data
source. Section 3.4 provides a descriptive analysis of the EU8 employment in Austrian border
states with a focus on the period around EU entry and free labor market access. Section 3.5 out-
lines our empirical strategy. Section 3.6 shows how labor market outcomes of workers changed
across regions that were exposed differentially to EU8 immigration. Section 3.7 presents firms’
responses. The final Section 3.8 concludes the paper and discusses potential extensions for
future research.
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3.2 The EU Eastern enlargement of 2004
In this section, we describe the institutional background in the period around the EU Eastern
enlargement of 2004 with a focus on changes in the legal rules that govern the access of workers
from the joining countries to the Austrian labor market.
On May 1, 2004, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia
(EU8) joined the European Union.72 By entering the EU, these countries became members
of the European Single Market that guarantees the free movement of goods, services, capital,
and labor within the EU. However, the old EU Member States73 had the option of temporarily
restricting access to their labor markets for citizens from the EU8 countries. While some
countries opened their labor market immediately (the UK, Ireland, and Sweden), the Austrian
government opted for a maximum period with restricted access of 7 years.74 The right to work
as self-employed and the posting of workers fall within the scope of the freedom to provide
services and, in general, were not restricted during that period.75,76
The EU Eastern enlargement had the following implications for the labor market access of EU8
citizens to Austria. Before May 2004, an EU8 national required a work permit in order to
be employed in Austria for which the potential employer had to apply. To receive a permit,
the Public Employment Service had to confirm that no equally qualified worker from Austria
or another country within the European Economic Area was available for this job. There
were simplified procedures for specific groups in place, namely for highly qualified workers,
skilled workers in certain occupations, qualified health care personnel, individuals graduating
from Austrian institutions of higher education, and seasonal workers in tourism and agriculture
(Chaloupek and Peyrl, 2009).
During the period from May 2004 to April 2011, the Austrian government gradually opened
its labor market for highly-educated individuals from EU8 countries. Work permits were still
required for the low-educated, but they were now given priority over workers from non-EU
countries (Chaloupek and Peyrl, 2009).
Since May 2011, EU8 nationals have unrestricted access to the Austrian labor market. Based
on the fundamental principle of free movement of labor, as defined in Article 45 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union, they are entitled to look for a job in Austria, work
and reside there without a work permit, stay there after employment has finished, and enjoy
equal treatment with nationals regarding employment, remuneration, and other conditions of
work and employment. These rights do not apply to employment in the public service.77
72Cyprus and Malta also joined on May 1, 2004. However, this study focuses only on the EU8 countries,
since citizens from Cyprus and Malta faced different employment rules in Austria.
73The old member states (EU15) in this context are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
74See Table C.1 for a timeline on the introduction of free movement from EU8 across EU15 countries.
75http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/40/freedom-of-establishment-and-freedom-to-
provide-services, last access 05/2019.
76However, the posting of workers was restricted for a limited number of sectors that were considered to be
vulnerable to disturbances. These sectors include gardening/horticulture, stone processing, manufacturing of
metal structures, construction, security activities, industrial cleaning, home nursing, and social work (Chaloupek
and Peyrl, 2009).
77http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu 2008/art 45/oj, last access 05/2019.
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3.3 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on Austrian social security data, which covers the universe of
private sector employment, that is workers who pay contributions to the social security system
in Austria (Zweimu¨ller et al., 2009). Self-employed persons and workers posted in Austria on
a temporary basis by an employer from another EU Member State are not included in the
data. The data record individual employment spells on a daily basis along with an employer
identifier. We have information on employers (industry, location, and workforce composition)
and on individual demographic characteristics such as date of birth, gender, and nationality.78
From the raw data, we first create a data set of all blue- and white-collar employees aged
between 18 and 55 in a given year.79 Each year y refers to the period between May y and April
y+ 1. For each employed individual, we have information on the municipality (“Gemeinde”) of
the employer. Since the municipalities were subject to substantial changes over time, we use the
territorial boundaries as of 2017.80 We exclude employees who work in public administration,
defense, compulsory social security, or in activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies
since the right to free movement of labor within the EU does not apply to these sectors. We
also exclude very large firms with more than 5,000 employees, since we cannot rule out that
part of their workforce is employed at branches in different municipalities.
We then aggregate the individual data at the municipality level and create a balanced yearly
panel of municipalities between May 1997 and April 2016. For each municipality and year, we
measure the labor market outcomes of different subgroups of workers. We distinguish between
EU8 nationals, Austrian nationals, and non-EU8 foreigners and within these groups by gender,
occupation (blue- and white-collar), and age (below 30, between 30 and 45, above 45). Non-
EU8 foreigners are individuals that have neither the Austrian nor the nationality of one of
the EU8 countries. We measure the employment of each group by summing up the number of
days employed by individuals in the respective group. This measure is preferred over counting
workers who are employed on a certain reference date in the year, since temporary migration
and seasonal work is prevalent among workers, especially among migrant workers in Austria
(Schmieder and Weber, 2018). We standardize the measure by dividing by 365.25, the average
number of days per calendar year. Hence, a person who works the full year counts as 1 and
employees who work only part of the year count accordingly less. We are further interested in
average monthly earnings (real, in 2000 prices). On the employer side, we measure the number
of firms with more than 5 employees. Additionally, we count the number of firms that have a
predominantly EU8 workforce, which we define as firms in which more than 70% of all employees
have the EU8 nationality. The same cutoff is applied to define Austrian and non-EU8 foreign
78Austrian citizenship is based primarily on the principle of jus sanguinis meaning that citi-
zenship is not determined by place of birth, but by having one or both parents who are citi-
zens of the state (Source: https://www.migration.gv.at/en/living-and-working-in-austria/integration-and-
citizenship/citizenship/, last access 05/2019).
79Blue- and white-collar employee refer to the terms “ArbeiterIn” and “Angestellte”, respectively, which are
defined by the Austrian Employment Law. According to the latter, a white-collar employee is a person who
performs “kaufma¨nnische oder ho¨here, nicht-kaufma¨nnische Dienste oder Kanzleiarbeiten”. We do not consider
apprentices and marginally employed individuals.
80We retrieved the municipality register and the boundaries as of January 2017 from Statistics Austria,
http://data.statistik.gv.at/web/meta.jsp?dataset=OGDEXT GEM 1, last access 05/2019.
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firms.
Table 3.1: Municipality characteristics in 2003
All municipalities Sample
Mean Med SD Mean Med SD
I. Workforce
Employment 959 189 4,730 310 178 358
Share Austrian 0.89 0.91 0.09 0.90 0.92 0.09
Share Non-EU8 foreign 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05
Share EU8 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.07
Share blue-collar 0.62 0.64 0.14 0.63 0.65 0.12
Share male 0.58 0.59 0.14 0.59 0.60 0.13
Share aged below 30 0.29 0.29 0.08 0.28 0.28 0.07
Share aged 30-45 0.50 0.49 0.07 0.50 0.50 0.06
Mean monthly real earnings 1,653 1,647 276 1,631 1,617 255
Employment growth 0.13 0.07 0.55 0.13 0.07 0.49
Earnings growth 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.09
II. Firms
Number of firms 34.8 11.0 130.7 14.1 9.0 13.8
Share in agriculture 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.11
Share in manufacturing 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.21 0.20
Share in construction 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17
Share in trade 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.16
Share in hotels & restaurants 0.15 0.07 0.21 0.11 0.04 0.16
Share in transport 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.13
Share in services 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.16
Growth in number of firms 0.14 0.04 0.51 0.16 0.05 0.55
Municipalities 2,095 1,406
Notes: The statistics in the panel to the left refer to all municipalities in Austria and in the panel to the right
to all municipalities in the sample with restrictions as outlined in Section 3.3. All variables are measured in the
reference year 2003, which is the year from May 2003 to April 2004. Employment is measured as described in
Section 3.3. Growth rates refer to the 5-year growth rates from 1998 to 2003.
In our sample, we focus on municipalities in the Austrian border region that are within com-
muting distance to the EU8 countries; that is, municipalities that belong to one of the five
states that share a border with at least one of the EU8 countries (Burgenland, Styria, Upper
and Lower Austria, and Carinthia). We exclude very large and very small municipalities with
total employment below the 5th or above the 94th percentile in the distribution of 2003. In
Austria, municipalities are very heterogeneous with respect to the size of their workforce. In
2003, the smallest municipality had one worker, while Vienna, the largest municipality, had
around 550,000 workers.81 Since it is difficult to incorporate these municipalities in the later
empirical analysis, we decide to drop them. We will come back to this point in Section 3.5.
Table 3.1 presents the main descriptive characteristics of the municipalities in all Austria and
in our sample measured in the reference year 2003. In the upper panel, we describe the mu-
nicipalities’ workforce. The average employment in municipalities in all Austria is with 959
substantially above the one in our sample, which is 310. At the same time, the median employ-
ment is quite comparable between the two groups. As described earlier, we can see that the
81These numbers refer to all workers according to the restrictions as outlined earlier, i.e. only blue- and
white-collar workers aged 18-55 and excluding certain industries and large firms.
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variation in employment is very substantial across all Austrian municipalities. By excluding
the very large and very small municipalities, we move to a much more homogeneous group of
municipalities. Except for the size, the two groups are very similar in terms of their other work-
force characteristics. Roughly 90% of all employees have the Austrian and 3 to 4% have an EU8
country nationality. Approximately 60% are blue-collar workers. A similar share of workers
is male. On average, the mean real wage in municipalities is around 1,650 Euro per month
with a five-year increase by around 3% from 1998 to 2003. In line with the differences in mean
employment, we observe that the mean number of firms is larger in overall Austria compared
to our sample, while the median is very similar. The distribution of firms over industries is
very similar, except for a slightly higher percentage of firms in the hotel and restaurant sectors
in all of Austria compared to the sample municipalities.
3.4 EU8 workers in the Austrian border region
In this section, we first analyze how the employment of workers from EU8 countries in the
Austrian border region developed between 1997 and 2015. Second, we examine how the com-
position of EU8 workers evolved, and we compare it to the average characteristics of workers
with an Austrian or a non-EU8 nationality. Third, the distribution of EU8 workers over regions
and industries is discussed. In all of the following figures, the vertical line to the left marks the
date of the EU accession in 2004 and to the right the free labor market access to Austria from
the EU8 countries in 2011.
Figure 3.2: Employment of EU8 workers over time
Notes: This figure shows the yearly employment shares of workers from EU8 countries in our sample. Year y
refers to the period between May y and April y + 1.
Figure 3.2 shows the employment by EU8 nationals in Austrian border regions over time. Em-
ployment from the EU8 countries grew moderately before accession and during the transition
period. With free labor market access, the trend changed markedly and growth in EU8 em-
ployment picked up persistently. Over the period from 1997 to 2015, the employment share
of EU8 nationals increased from 2.2% to 9.3%. Appendix Figure C.1 indicates that among
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EU8 workers in Austrian border regions after 2011, Hungarians were by far the largest group,
followed by Slovaks, Slovenes, and Poles.
To provide a detailed picture of compositional shifts among EU8 migrant workers and to com-
pare them with the rest of the workforce, Figure 3.3 shows the evolution of mean characteristics
of employees from EU8, other foreign countries, and Austria over time. While the average age
of Austrian employees in our sample is steadily increasing (Figure 3.3a), the mean age of work-
ers from the EU8 and from other foreign countries remains relatively stable over time. An
exception is the time around free labor market access for the EU8 countries during which we
observe a substantial drop in the mean age of EU8 workers by about one year. Non-EU8 foreign
and EU8 workers are, on average older, than Austrian workers until around 2011, then younger
thereafter.
Figure 3.3: Average characteristics of EU8, Austrian, and non-EU8 foreign workers
(a) Age (b) Male
(c) Blue-collar (d) Monthly wage
Notes: These graphs show the average characteristics of individuals from different nationality groups employed
in year y (period between May y and April y + 1) in our sample.
Panel 3.3b shows that a very large share of workers with a non-Austrian background is male.
These proportions are substantially above that of Austrians. The share of males is higher
among those with an EU8 (78% in 1997) compared to those with foreign non-EU8 citizenship
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(75% in 1997) until the mid-2000s and very similar thereafter. For all three nationality groups,
the male shares decline substantially over time. However, around 2011 there is a small increase
in the relative number of males among EU8 workers.
We further see in Figure 3.3c that the vast majority of EU8 workers are in blue-collar jobs with
a decreasing share from about 95% in 1997 to 90% in 2015. Foreign workers from non-EU8
countries are also mainly found in blue-collar jobs. However, this share is lower compared to
that of EU8 workers, and it decreases faster over time. In contrast, around 62% of Austrian
workers have a blue-collar job in 1997 and this number shrinks to 53% in 2015.
The mean of real monthly earnings of Austrian workers is well above that of foreigners and it
increases from around 1,750 Euro in 1997 to more than 1,900 Euro in 2015. Non-EU8 foreigners
earn an average of 1,600 Euro per month and experience little increases over the same period.
The mean of EU8 workers’ earnings is, at 1,400 Euro, even lower and it tends to decrease
between 1997 and 2004. The subsequent increase is interrupted by a discontinuous drop in
earnings around 2011. By 2015, EU8 workers have average mean monthly earnings of slightly
more than 1,400 Euro.
To sum up, Figure 3.3 suggests that the composition of EU8 employees in Austria changed
discontinuously with free access to the Austrian labor market. Moreover, it illustrates that
EU8 workers are much more similar in terms of their observed characteristics to other foreigners
than to Austrian workers.
Figure 3.4: Percentage of EU8 workers across industries
Notes: This figure shows the employment of EU8 nationals across industries relative to the employment of all
workers in the corresponding year and industry. We only consider workers in our sample municipalities. Year y
refers to the period between May y and April y + 1.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the employment shares of EU8 workers across industries relative to all
workers in the corresponding year and industry. EU8 nationals are most represented in agricul-
ture and mining. Their employment share in these two sectors increases from 16% in 1997 to
around 32% in 2006. The decreasing and then stagnating share of EU8 workers in agriculture
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and mining after 2007 is related to the EU Eastern enlargement of 2007 and the resulting in-
creased number of workers from Bulgaria and Romania in these sectors.82 The representation
of EU8 nationals in the tourism sector (hotels and restaurants) experienced the largest increase
from 5% in 1997 to more than 20% in 2015. In the construction sector, the rise in the relative
number of EU8 workers from 4% in 1997 to 10% in 2015 was also substantial. In all of the
three aforementioned sectors employment varies substantially over the calendar year because
of seasonal demand fluctuations (Schmieder and Weber, 2018). The high representation of
EU8 workers in these industries suggests that temporary and seasonal migration is potentially
important, which makes it less likely that EU8 workers in these industries resettle with their
families in Austria. The transport sector experienced a similar increase in the relative EU8 em-
ployment to the construction sector. The remaining sectors, manufacturing, trade, and services
also experienced an, albeit smaller, increase in the share of EU8 workers after 2011. Still, the
proportion of EU8 workers in each of these sectors amounts to between 7% and 13% in 2015.
Figure 3.5: Spatial distribution of employment by EU8 nationals
(a) May 2000 to April 2004 (b) May 2004 to April 2011 (transition period)
(c) May 2011 to April 2016 (free labor movement) (d) Change between 2003 and 2015
Notes: Panels (3.5a) to (3.5c) illustrate the employment shares of EU8 nationals across Austrian municipalities
in the sample for three time periods. The upper bounds of the categories are the same for all periods and
correspond to the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, and top percentile of the distribution of the EU8 employment
share over all periods. Panel (3.5d) shows the change in this variable between 2003 and 2015.
The panels 3.5a to 3.5c illustrate the regional distribution of migrant workers from EU8 countries
in the Austrian border region for three different periods: before accession in May 2004, during
the transition period from May 2004 to April 2011, and after May 2011. We plot the number of
days employed by workers from EU8 countries relative to the days employed by all workers across
Austrian municipalities. Darker areas on the map indicate groups with a higher concentration
82See Appendix Figure C.2 for the percentage of EU2 workers across industries.
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of EU8 employment. Figure 3.5d plots the change in the EU8 employment shares between
2003 and 2015. Even before the EU Eastern enlargement of 2004, EU8 workers tended to
cluster in the eastern border region of Austria. This is sustained in the transition period
during which we observe a slight increase in the overall employment of EU8 workers. With the
introduction of unrestricted labor market access in 2011, EU8 migrants’ employment increases
in most municipalities, especially in areas close to Austria’s border with the neighboring EU8
countries.
Figure 3.6: Spatial distribution of employment by nationality after May 2011
(a) Czechia (b) Slovakia
(c) Hungary (d) Slovenia
Notes: Similar to Figure 3.5, these panels illustrate the relative employment shares of workers from Czechia,
Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia across Austrian municipalities in the sample for the time period between May
2011 and April 2016. The upper bounds of the categories correspond to the 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 95th, and
the top percentile of the distribution of the nationality-specific non-zero employment shares from May 2011 to
April 2016.
In Figure 3.6 we show the employment shares after May 2011 separately by workers’ nationality.
We distinguish between workers from the 4 neighboring EU8 countries of Czechia, Slovakia,
Hungary, and Slovenia. The maps highlight that workers from the neighboring countries have
a strong tendency to locate in municipalities in Austria that are closest to their home country.
This again suggests that workers are likely to commute between their home country and their
Austrian workplace.
3.5 Empirical strategy
We saw in the previous section that the number of workers in Austria from EU8 countries
increased substantially between 1997 and 2015. In this section, we outline our empirical strategy
to estimate the effect of an increase in the number of EU8 workers on the labor market outcomes
3.5. Empirical strategy 103
of Austrian and non-EU8 foreign nationals and on the number of firms in a municipality.
We exploit variation in the exposure to EU8 workers across municipalities over time and distance
to the closest EU8 border.83 The idea is that differences in wages and costs of living provide
incentives for workers from EU8 countries to commute between their home country and Austria.
Appendix Figure C.3 illustrates that earnings and prices in all of the EU8 countries were
substantially below those in Austria from 2000 through 2015. In 2000, the mean annual net
earnings of a single person without children in an EU8 country were only between 10% and 30%
of those in Austria, while price levels (except Slovenian) were between a third and a half. These
measures were converging towards the Austrian levels up to 2008 but were constant relative to
them thereafter. Except for Slovenia, annual earnings were about 30% to 50%, and price levels
were about 40% to 60% of the Austrian level in the period from 2008 to 2015.
Since commuting costs increase with distance to the border, municipalities closer to the border
are expected to be more exposed to inflows of EU8 workers over time than those further away.
Combining Austrian social security data with information on the place of residence, Huber and
Bo¨hs (2012) confirm that a substantial number of EU8 workers in Austrian border states, who
first came to Austria between 2011 and 2012, were indeed commuters.84 Moreover Figure 3.6 in
the previous section shows that workers from the 4 neighboring EU8 countries are more likely
to locate in municipalities close to their home country, which also supports the assumption that
they tend to commute.
Figure 3.7: Municipality groups by distance to the closest EU8 border
Notes: This figure shows the categorization of Austrian municipalities in our sample into three different groups
that differ in their travel duration to the closest EU8 border. The black lines highlight the NUTS-II region
borders. Source: Open Street Map, own illustrations.
We define the distance to the closest EU8 border as the travel duration by car from the munic-
ipality center to the closest EU8 border crossing. The center of each municipality is defined as
the center of its largest town; EU8 border crossings are roads that cross the border to one of the
83The variation in exposure to migrants by distance to a border in combination with a change in migration
policy is previously exploited in Dustmann et al. (2017) and Beerli et al. (2018).
84The exact numbers are 91% for Burgenland, 65% for Styria, 43% for Upper Austria, 12% for Lower Austria,
and 9% for Carinthia.
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EU8 neighboring countries of Czechia, Hungary, Slovenia, or Slovakia.85 Based on their travel
distance to the closest EU8 border, we group the municipalities in our sample into three groups,
as illustrated in Figure 3.7. Municipalities in group 1 (group 2) are within a travel distance of
0 to 20 minutes (20 to 60 minutes) to the closest EU8 border crossing. For municipalities in
group 3, the nearest EU8 border crossing can be reached by driving more than one hour.86,87
Table 3.2: Municipality characteristics across distance groups in 2003
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Mean Med SD Mean Med SD Mean Med SD
I. Workforce
Employment 273 132 344 323 189 370 314 189 349
Share Austrian 0.85 0.88 0.11 0.90 0.92 0.09 0.92 0.93 0.06
Share Non-EU8 Foreign 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05
Share EU8 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02
Share blue-collar 0.65 0.66 0.11 0.62 0.63 0.12 0.64 0.65 0.11
Share male 0.59 0.60 0.13 0.59 0.59 0.13 0.60 0.61 0.12
Share aged below 30 0.27 0.26 0.07 0.28 0.28 0.06 0.30 0.29 0.07
Share aged 30-45 0.50 0.50 0.06 0.50 0.50 0.05 0.49 0.49 0.05
Mean monthly real earnings 1,559 1,561 230 1,631 1,609 261 1,674 1,670 252
Employment growth 0.12 0.06 0.38 0.16 0.07 0.61 0.10 0.05 0.32
Earnings growth 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.08
II. Firms
Number of firms 13.1 8.0 13.5 15.0 10.0 14.9 13.6 10.0 12.3
Share in agriculture 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.11
Share in manufacturing 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.27 0.25 0.19
Share in construction 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.16
Share in trade 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.15
Share in hotels & restaurants 0.09 0.00 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.18
Share in transport 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.13
Share in services 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.14
Growth in number of firms 0.22 0.09 0.63 0.16 0.05 0.54 0.12 0.00 0.49
Municipalities 277 648 481
Notes: The statistics in the panel to the left refer to all municipalities in Austrian border states within a travel
distance of 0 to 20 minutes to the next EU8 border (group 1). In the middle panel they refer to all municipalities
in Austrian border states within a travel distance of 20 to 60 minutes to the next EU8 border (group 2) and in
the right panel they refer to all municipalities in Austrian border states with a travel distance of more than 60
minutes to the next EU8 border (group 3). All variables are measured in the reference year 2003, which is the
year from May 2003 to April 2004. Employment is measured as described in the text. The growth rates refer
to the 5-year growth rates from 1998 to 2003. The sample restrictions are as outlined in Section 3.3.
85See Appendix Figure C.4 for a map of Austria with its main roads and the identified border crossing points.
86We already explained in Section 3.3 that we exclude very small and very large municipalities in the Austrian
border region from our sample. Appendix Figure C.5 plots the workforce size of 2003 of all municipalities in
the border region against their travel distance to the closest EU8 border. We immediately see that there are
a few, exceptionally large municipalities that are mainly within 20 to 60 minutes travel distance to the closest
border. For these municipalities, it is not possible to create a reasonable counterfactual scenario in our empirical
strategy.
87Appendix Figure C.6 plots the employment shares of EU8 nationals against the travel duration to the
closest EU8 border for the period before EU8 accession, the transition period, and the period after May 2011. It
motivates the choice of our three groups by showing that municipalities within a 0 to 20 minutes travel duration
experienced a large increase in EU8 employment shares between the three periods. Municipalities within 20 to
60 minutes received a smaller, but still substantial relative increase in EU8 employment. In contrast, the rise
in EU8 employment was smaller and relatively homogeneous among municipalities that are more than one hour
away from the border.
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To get an impression on how municipalities in the three different distance groups compare to
each other, we show descriptive statistics on workforce and firm characteristics in each group
in Table 3.2. Turning to the upper panel, municipalities in group 1 have on average a lower
employment level compared to those in group 3, which is in turn smaller than in group 2. This
difference is more pronounced in the median employment levels. The employment share of
Austrians (EU8 nationals) is 90% (3%) and 92% (1%) in group 3 and group 2, respectively.
In contrast, the percentage of Austrians in group 1 is lower (85%), while it is larger for EU8
nationals (5%). The share of blue-collar and male workers as well as the distribution over
age is similar across groups. Average monthly earnings are increasing from group 1 to 2 and
from group 2 to 3. There is some variation in the average number of firms across groups that
mirrors the differences in mean employment. While the industry composition is comparable
across groups, the growth in the number of firms before 2004 tends to be larger the closer the
municipalities are to the EU8 border. Having these differences across municipality groups in
mind, we are now describing our empirical strategy.
Intuitively, we want to compare the differences in outcomes in municipalities in groups 1 and
2 to those in group 3 for each year from 1997 to 2015 and contrast them to the corresponding
differences in the reference year 2003, which is the year before the EU Eastern enlargement.
We denote the outcome of municipality m in year t as the variable Ymt. We analyze the
employment of EU8, Austrian, and foreign non-EU8 workers. We further look at the logarithm
of mean monthly earnings in Euro in a municipality and the number of firms. We estimate the
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m are indicators equal to 1 if municipality m is within 0 and
20 and 20 and 60, respectively, minutes driving distance from the next EU8 border, and I{.} is
the indicator function. The variable θm captures time-constant municipality fixed effects. λt,g
are year-by-regions g fixed effects.88 υmt is the error term.
Hence, δ
[0−20]
y captures the (conditional) difference in outcomes in year y between municipalities
within 0 and 20 minutes and municipalities with more than 60 minutes travel distance from the
next EU8 border relative to the difference in 2003. Similarly, δ
[20−60]
y measure the (conditional)
difference between municipalities within 20 and 60 minutes and municipalities with more than
60 minutes travel distance from the next EU8 border relative to the difference in the reference
year 2003. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
For the presentation of our quantitative estimation results, we average the difference in the out-
comes between the groups relative to the difference in 2003 over the years in the pre-accession,
in the transition, and in the period with free access of EU8 nationals to the Austrian labor
market. The model is given by
88For our region fixed effects, we mainly rely on the NUTS-II definition of the EU. However, since Burgenland,
which is the region in southeast Austria, only contains municipalities in the distance groups 1 and 2, with none
in 3, we define Burgenland and its neighbor region to the west, Styria, as one region.















m ∗ freet + δ[20−60]free D
[20−60]
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+ θm + λt,g + υmt,
where pre is an indicator equal to 1 if t is between 1997 and 2002, trans is an indicator equal
to 1 if t is between 2004 and 2010, and free is an indicator equal to 1 if t is between 2011 and
2015.
In order to interpret the coefficients δ as the effects of the EU Eastern enlargement on our
outcome variables, we must impose the following assumptions. First, we have to assume that
if there had not been the enlargement, then labor market outcomes in the 3 groups would have
evolved in a parallel way. By including region-specific time trends λt,g, we take into account
that municipalities might have different time trends across regions. We further need to rule
out that there were simultaneous policies that affected the groups differently around 2004. One
candidate is the subsequent EU enlargement in 2007. Bulgaria and Romania joined the union in
that year and gained free access to the Austrian labor market in 2014. In Appendix Figure C.7,
we show that the employment of Bulgarians and Romanians in a municipality is not related
to its distance to the closest EU8 border. We further provide a robustness check in which
we control for differential time trends due to differences in the pre-existing industry structure
across municipalities as in Beerli et al. (2018).89 Given the long time horizon of our data, we
can later additionally check for differential trends across the groups before 2004 to support the
plausibility of our assumptions.
Second, we must rule out that there are spillovers of the enlargement between the groups. One
potential concern is that residents may avoid labor markets that are very exposed to immigrants
by moving from municipalities closer to the border to those further away after the EU Eastern
enlargement (see for example Borjas (2003)). Since we can follow individuals in our data over
time, we can investigate changes in worker flows between labor markets and learn about their
magnitude relative to the size of these markets.90
To relate the effects of the EU Eastern enlargement on labor market outcomes of Austrian and
of other foreign workers and on firms to the differential exposure to EU8 workers, we further
have to assume that the EU Eastern enlargement affected the distance groups differently only
through the differential inflow of EU8 workers. For this assumption to hold, we have to rule
out that Austrian municipalities closer to the border were differently affected by other freedoms
granted to the new EU Member States by joining the EU. One concern is that the enlargement
induced an increase in trade between Austria and the neighboring EU8 countries that affected
89For the construction of the Bartik (1991)-type control measure, which predicts the change in employment
and wages based on national-and-industry-specific employment and wage changes, we apply the definition of
Beerli et al. (2018). The variable is generated at the municipality level. The base year that determines the
industry shares of municipalities is 1997.
90This is work in progress.
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municipalities closer to the border differently than those further away (Redding and Sturm,
2008; Bru¨lhart et al., 2012). Appendix Figure C.8 shows that import shares from and export
shares to EU8 countries are relatively constant over the time period from 1997 to 2015. In
particular, there are no changes around important dates related to the EU Eastern enlargement
of 2004. Furthermore, we can exploit that changes related to the EU enlargement started earlier
and proceeded more gradually because the accession of the EU8 countries and their entitlement
to free access to the Austrian labor market happened at different points in time.
3.6 How did immigration impact workers in neighboring
labor markets?
3.6.1 Employment
First, we are interested in whether the EU Eastern enlargement actually affects the trends in
EU8 employment differently in municipalities closer to the border compared to those further
away. Panel (a) in Figure 3.8 shows the estimated coefficients δ̂0−20y and their corresponding 95%
confidence intervals from equation (3.1) annually from 1997 to 2015, with 2003 as the reference




y and their corresponding 95%
confidence intervals. The dependent variable is the employment of EU8 nationals as defined in
Section 3.3. The vertical line to the left marks the date of the EU accession in 2004 and to the
right the free labor market access to Austria from the EU8 countries in 2011.
Figure 3.8: Effects of the EU Eastern enlargement on the employment of EU8 nationals
(a) Group 1 (b) Group 2








y (red) over time with the corre-
sponding 95% confidence intervals based on estimation equation (3.1), which includes municipality and year-
by-regions fixed effects. Group 1 (group 2) refers to municipalities within 0 to 20 (20 to 60) minutes driving
distance to the closest EU8 border. The outcome variable Ymt is the employment of EU8 workers, which is the
sum over the number of days employed by EU8 nationals, standardized by dividing by 365.25. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level.
In panel (a) we observe that the employment of EU8 nationals increases significantly more in
municipalities that are within 0 to 20 minutes compared to those that are more than one hour
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away from the closest EU8 border after 2004. The difference in EU8 employment between
these two groups continually increases over the subsequent years. Following the introduction
of free access to the Austrian labor market, the relative rise in the number of EU8 workers
in group 1 accelerates. In 2015 the estimated relative increase in the number of EU8 workers
amounts to approximately 20. The time pattern for municipalities in group 2 is very similar
than in group 1; the effects are around half of the size. Hence, the increase in EU8 employment
over time is larger in municipalities in distance group 1 than in group 2, which is again larger
than in group 3. Thereby, Figure 3.8 confirms our assumption that municipalities closer to the
border are more exposed to an increasing number of EU8 employees over time compared to
those further away. We should note, however, that already before the EU enlargement of 2004,
EU8 employment increases slightly faster, the closer the municipalities are to the EU8 border.
Figure 3.9: Effects of the EU Eastern enlargement on the employment of other workers
(a) Austrian - Group 1 (b) Austrian - Group 2
(c) Non-EU8 foreigner - Group 1 (d) Non-EU8 foreigner - Group 2








y (red) over time with the corre-
sponding 95% confidence intervals based on estimation equation (3.1), which includes municipality and year-by-
regions fixed effects. The outcome variable Ymt in the upper (bottom) graphs is the employment of Austrian
(non-EU8 foreign) workers, which is the sum over the number of days employed by Austrian (non-EU8 foreign)
nationals, standardized by dividing by 365.25. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
In Figure 3.9, we turn to the employment of Austrians in panels (a) and (b) and of non-EU8
foreigners in panels (c) and (d). As before, the left panels refer to the effects of the EU Eastern
enlargement on municipalities within 0 to 20 minutes and the right panels to the effects on those
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within 20 to 60 minutes travel distance to the closest border. In panel (a), we have very wide
confidence intervals and we do not find that the employment of Austrians evolves differently, on
average, in municipalities that are within 0 to 20 minutes travel distance to the border compared
to those further away. In contrast, panel (b) indicates a statistically significant relative increase
in the employment of Austrians over time in municipalities that are within 20 to 60 minutes
travel distance to the border. However, an increasing trend in the employment of Austrians for
group 2 (and to a lesser extent for group 1) can already be observed before 2004.
For non-EU8 foreign workers, we observe in panel (c) that their average employment decreases
significantly and steadily in municipalities in group 1 relative to the reference group after 2004.
In contrast, panel (d) points to a relative, albeit not statistically significant, increase in the
number of workers from non-EU8 countries over time for municipalities within 20 to 60 minutes
driving distance to the border. There are no differences in the non-EU8 foreign employment
trends between municipalities in group 1 and in group 2 relative to group 3 prior to the EU
Eastern enlargement in 2004.
Table 3.3: Effects of the EU Eastern enlargement on employment
All EU8 Austrians Non-EU8
foreigners
(1) (2) (3) (4)
δ
[0−20]
pre -9.32 -3.04 -6.97 0.67
(4.70) (0.57) (4.26) (0.56)
δ
[0−20]
trans -1.77 3.94 -3.74 -1.96
(6.70) (1.09) (5.68) (0.99)
δ
[0−20]
free 11.95 19.55 -3.43 -4.17
(12.07) (3.66) (9.25) (1.97)
δ
[20−60]
pre -7.35 -1.10 -5.65 -0.60
(4.09) (0.22) (3.73) (0.57)
δ
[20−60]
trans 13.68 1.62 10.72 1.34
(6.11) (0.38) (5.33) (1.04)
δ
[20−60]
free 27.73 9.04 15.39 3.29
(10.29) (1.46) (8.22) (2.18)
Mean in 2003 310.27 8.65 279.93 21.71
Observations 26,695
Municipalities 1,405
Notes: This table displays the impact of the EU Eastern enlargement on employment based on equation (3.2),
which includes municipality and year-by-regions fixed effects. The upper (lower) panel focuses on δ[0−20]
(δ[20−60]), which capture the difference in outcomes in the corresponding year between municipalities within 0
to 20 (20 to 60) minutes and municipalities with a driving distance ≥ 60 minutes from the next EU8 border.
This difference is standardized to 0 in 2003. Pre refers to the period May 1997 to April 2003, trans to the
period May 2004 to April 2011, and free to the period May 2011 to April 2016. The dependent variable is the
employment of all workers in column (1), EU8 workers in (2), Austrian workers in (3), and non-EU8 workers
in (4). Employment is measured as the sum over the number of days employed by the corresponding group,
standardized by dividing by 365.25. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
In Table 3.3, we show the employment effects averaged over the years in the period before 2004
(pre), in the transition period between 2004 and 2010 (trans), and in the period with free
movement of labor (free) based on equation (3.2). The coefficients in the upper part of the
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table refer to the effects in municipalities within 0 to 20 minutes travel distance to the closest
EU8 border and in the lower part to municipalities within 20 to 60 minutes, respectively. The
dependent variable is the employment of all workers in column (1), EU8 workers in (2), Austrian
workers in (3), and non-EU8 foreign workers in (4). The estimated coefficients in column (1)
suggest that the total employment in municipalities within 0 to 20 and 20 to 60 minutes driving
distance to the border increases over time relative to municipalities that are more than 60
minutes away from the border; even before 2004. The coefficients are not statistically different
from 0 for group 1. For group 2, there is a statistically significant increase by an average
of 14 full-year employees in the transition period and by an average of 28 employees in the
free movement period. Relative to the average employment level in 2003, this amounts to an
increase of about 5% and 9%, respectively.
We then partition the total employment response into the effects on the three nationality groups.
For municipalities that are within a 20 minutes driving distance to the EU8 border, we estimate
a substantial and significant increase by, on average, 4 EU8 employees in the transition period
and by 20 EU8 full-year employees in the free movement period relative to 2003. This increase
compares with a significant decrease by about 2 non-EU8 foreign employees in the transition
period and by 4 employees in the period after 2011. The coefficients on the employment
response by Austrian nationals are negative, but not statistically significantly different from 0.
For municipalities within 20 to 60 minutes driving distance to the border, we estimate that the
increase in total employment is mainly due to an increase in the employment of Austrians and,
in particular after 2011, also of EU8 nationals.
In Table 3.4, we zoom further into the employment effects on EU8 nationals by investigating
different subgroups. Column (1) provides the effect on overall employment by EU8 nationals.
The dependent variable in column (2) is the EU8 employment in blue-collar occupations. Con-
trasting the effects in columns (1) and (2) shows that the increase in EU8 employment during
the transition and the free movement period is almost entirely driven by an increase in blue-
collar employment. This is true for both distance groups 1 and 2. In group 1 approximately
60% and in group 2 roughly 70% of the relative increase in EU8 employment is via men as
shown in column (3). Columns (4) to (6) further highlight that most of the increase in EU8
employment occurred in the age group 30 to 45.
In Table 3.5, we examine the effect of the EU Eastern enlargement for subgroups of Austrian
employees. As explained before, we see in column (1) that we cannot detect a statistically
significant effect on overall employment by Austrians in distance group 1, but we observe a
positive effect in group 2. Focusing on the municipalities within 0 to 20 minutes travel distance
to the border, the estimated coefficients point to negative effects for blue-collar employees in
column (2) as well as for young and old Austrian employees in columns (4) and (6). However,
these coefficients are not statistically significant at common significance levels. In distance
group 2, the effect on blue-collar employment is small and not different from 0. Hence, the
overall positive employment effect on Austrians appears to be rather driven by an increasing
number of white-collar workers. Furthermore, this increase seems to occur across age groups,
as illustrated in columns (4) to (6).
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Table 3.4: Heterogeneous effects on the employment of EU8 nationals
Age group
All Blue Male ≤ 30 30− 45 45 <
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δ
[0−20]
pre -3.04 -2.76 -2.17 -0.56 -0.84 -1.64
(0.57) (0.55) (0.47) (0.20) (0.29) (0.22)
δ
[0−20]
trans 3.94 3.54 2.39 0.63 2.47 0.84
(1.09) (0.99) (0.84) (0.29) (0.69) (0.22)
δ
[0−20]
free 19.53 16.49 11.42 3.16 13.16 3.21
(3.66) (2.94) (2.26) (0.92) (2.25) (0.64)
δ
[20−60]
pre -1.09 -0.96 -0.73 -0.36 -0.29 -0.44
(0.22) (0.21) (0.19) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10)
δ
[20−60]
trans 1.61 1.31 1.04 0.29 0.92 0.40
(0.38) (0.35) (0.31) (0.11) (0.23) (0.11)
δ
[20−60]
free 9.04 7.79 6.60 1.60 5.82 1.62
(1.46) (1.34) (1.07) (0.40) (0.85) (0.29)
Mean in 2003 8.65 7.96 6.69 1.87 4.30 2.48
Observations 26,695
Municipalities 1,405
Notes: This table displays the impact of the EU Eastern enlargement on employment by EU8 workers in Austrian
border regions based on equation (3.2), which includes municipality and year-by-regions fixed effects. The upper
(lower) panel focuses on δ[0−20] (δ[20−60]), which capture the difference in outcomes in the corresponding year
between municipalities within 0 to 20 (20 to 60) minutes and municipalities with a driving distance of more
than 60 minutes from the next EU8 border. This difference is standardized to 0 in 2003. Pre refers to the
period May 1997 to April 2003, trans to the period May 2004 to April 2011, and free to the period May 2011
to April 2016. The dependent variable in column (1) is the employment of EU8 workers and in columns (2) to
(6) the employment of EU8 workers in the corresponding subgroup. Employment is measured as the sum over
the number of days employed by the corresponding group, standardized by dividing by 365.25. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level.
Finally, the effects for subgroups of employees with neither an Austrian nor an EU8 nationality
is presented in Table 3.6. Recapping our earlier findings, we observe an overall decrease in
employment in municipalities in group 1 after 2004. Columns (2) and (3) show that it is the
employment in blue-collar occupations and by males that fall most over time. Comparing the
negative employment effects across age groups in columns (4) to (6), there is no group that
stands out with a particularly large negative effect. Contrasting these effects to those on EU8
employment in Table 3.8, we can see that the increase in EU8 employment over time is larger for
the blue-collar and male subgroup. At the same time, these are the subgroups that experience
a larger decrease in the employment of non-EU8 foreign workers. The results are very similar
when we additionally control for differential time trends in employment due to differences in
the pre-existing industry structure across municipalities in columns (1) to (4) in Appendix
Table C.4.
Taken together, the effects so far suggest that the large increase in EU8 employment in munic-
ipalities close to the border does not lead to a decline in the employment of Austrian nationals.
If at all, they rather point to a complementary relationship between the group of (mainly blue-
collar) EU8 and white-collar Austrian employees. At the same time, other foreign employees
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Table 3.5: Heterogeneous effects on the employment of Austrians
Age group
All Blue Male ≤ 30 30− 45 45 <
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δ
[0−20]
pre -6.95 -4.95 -2.52 -4.19 -2.78 0.01
(4.25) (2.78) (2.85) (1.75) (2.21) (1.39)
δ
[0−20]
trans -3.74 -3.31 -1.28 -3.38 1.00 -1.36
(5.68) (3.10) (3.71) (1.75) (2.95) (1.90)
δ
[0−20]
free -3.42 -4.43 0.75 -3.36 4.73 -4.79
(9.25) (5.33) (6.02) (2.88) (4.72) (3.88)
δ
[20−60]
pre -5.64 -2.36 -1.22 -1.75 -4.81 0.92
(3.72) (2.26) (2.53) (1.73) (1.81) (0.97)
δ
[20−60]
trans 10.71 2.56 6.20 2.01 5.30 3.40
(5.32) (2.54) (3.51) (1.70) (2.76) (1.53)
δ
[20−60]
free 15.38 2.68 9.24 3.01 5.50 6.87
(8.22) (4.10) (5.46) (2.60) (4.10) (3.18)
Mean in 2003 279.93 160.24 166.34 80.74 138.49 60.70
Observations 26,695
Municipalities 1,405
Notes: Similar to Table 3.4, this table displays the impact of the EU Eastern enlargement on employment by
Austrians based on equation (3.2). The dependent variable in column (1) is the employment of Austrian workers
and in columns (2) to (6) the employment of Austrian workers in the corresponding subgroup. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level.
appear to be substitutable with employees from EU8 countries. As shown in Section 3.4, this
seems plausible given that EU8 and non-EU8 foreign workers in Austria have on average very
similar observable characteristics that differentiate them from the average Austrian worker.
Still, we have to be cautious in the interpretation of the effects given that we detect some
pre-trends in the employment of Austrian nationals.
3.6.2 Monthly earnings
In this section, we investigate how the mean monthly earnings in municipalities evolve over
the period around the EU Eastern enlargement depending on their distance to the closest EU8
border. In Figure 3.10 the panels to the left (right) show the difference in log mean earnings
between municipalities within 0 to 20 (20 to 60) minutes and municipalities with a travel
distance of more than 60 minutes from the next EU8 border. The difference is standardized to
0 in 2003.
Turning to the effects on Austrians in the upper panels, we observe that their average monthly
earnings tend to increase after 2004 in group 1 and group 2 relative to the reference group. The
difference is relatively constant over the years from 2005 to 2007 and then grows larger over
time. By 2015, the mean earnings of Austrians in distance group 1 increases on average by
more than 2% relative to the reference group. The increase is with 1 to 2% slightly smaller for
group 2. In contrast, we estimate a relative decrease in the mean earnings of non-EU8 foreigners
after approximately 2007. This effect is substantial and amounts to about 5% lower monthly
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Table 3.6: Heterogeneous effects on the employment of non-EU8 foreigners
Age group
All Blue Male ≤ 30 30− 45 45 <
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δ
[0−20]
pre 0.67 0.65 0.70 0.17 0.21 0.30
(0.56) (0.51) (0.46) (0.21) (0.33) (0.18)
δ
[0−20]
trans -1.96 -1.69 -1.70 -0.49 -1.10 -0.38
(0.99) (0.84) (0.74) (0.34) (0.50) (0.29)
δ
[0−20]
free -4.17 -3.73 -3.48 -0.87 -2.35 -0.95
(1.97) (1.59) (1.39) (0.67) (0.92) (0.56)
δ
[20−60]
pre -0.59 -0.38 -0.22 -0.24 -0.46 0.11
(0.57) (0.52) (0.46) (0.22) (0.33) (0.18)
δ
[20−60]
trans 1.34 0.69 0.83 0.51 0.68 0.15
(1.04) (0.84) (0.80) (0.37) (0.51) (0.27)
δ
[20−60]
free 3.29 1.71 2.11 0.93 1.50 0.86
(2.18) (1.59) (1.55) (0.71) (1.04) (0.58)
Mean in 2003 21.71 18.81 15.84 4.86 11.87 4.98
Observations 26,695
Municipalities 1,405
Notes: Similar to Table 3.4, this table displays the impact of the EU Eastern enlargement on employment by
non-EU8 foreigners based on equation (3.2). The dependent variable in column (1) is the employment of non-
EU8 foreigners and in columns (2) to (6) the employment of non-EU8 foreigners in the corresponding subgroup.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
earnings in 2015. The estimated coefficients for the period before 2004 are not statistically
different from 0 in all four panels in Figure 3.10. Hence, municipalities in all three groups were
not experiencing diverging trends in their mean earnings before the EU Eastern enlargement
in 2004. In columns (5) and (6) in Appendix Table C.4, we show that the effects on average
earnings are robust when controlling for earnings trends over time related to the differential
representation of industries across municipalities.
In Appendix Table C.2 and C.3, we decompose the effects on average earnings of Austrian and
non-EU8 foreign workers, respectively, for different subgroups. For Austrian employees in group
1, we find the positive effects on average earnings to be larger for the age group 30 to 45. There
is no effect on the earnings of male employees, suggesting that an increase in the earnings of
women causes the estimated increase in average earnings. Notably, we find positive earnings
effects for blue-collar workers. For Austrians in group 2, the patterns across subgroups are very
similar to those described for group 1. For non-EU8 foreign workers in municipalities close to
the border, we observe negative earnings effects across the subgroups except for workers older
than 45 years. In municipalities in 20 to 60 minutes travel distance to the border, individuals
experiencing no significant negative earnings impacts are those younger than 30 and older than
45 years.
Taken together, we find that monthly earnings of Austrian and non-EU8 foreign workers in
municipalities in the Austrian border region change in opposite directions after 2004. While
Austrians experience an increase of approximately 2% in their earnings, non-EU8 foreign work-
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Figure 3.10: Effects of the EU Eastern enlargement on earnings
(a) Austrian - Group 1 (b) Austrian - Group 2
(c) Non-EU8 foreigner - Group 1 (d) Non-EU8 foreigner - Group 2








y (red) over time with the corre-
sponding 95% confidence intervals based on estimation equation (3.1), which includes municipality and year-
by-regions fixed effects. The outcome variable Ymt in the upper (bottom) graphs is equal to the log average
monthly earnings (real, 2000 prices) of Austrian (non-EU8 foreign) workers. Standard errors are clustered at
the municipality level.
ers face substantial decreases of almost 5% in 2015. In contrast to the employment effects,
these effects are very similar across municipalities in distance groups 1 and 2. These observed
earnings changes can be driven both by effects for those who remain employed and by compo-
sitional effects. The latter might occur if individuals selectively leave or enter employment in
municipalities that are closer to the border after the EU Eastern enlargement (see for example
Borjas (2006) and Bratsberg and Raaum (2012)).
3.7 Effects on firms
The previous section illustrates that municipalities within one hour distance to the closest EU8
border experience large increases in the employment of EU8 nationals after the EU enlarge-
ment of 2004 compared to municipalities further away. We now want to examine whether and
how the additional labor supply of EU8 migrant workers changes the number of firms in the
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affected regions. Furthermore, we want to investigate which types of firms employ these EU8
workers. Do they rather enter established firms with mainly Austrian or other foreign workers?
Alternatively, is there selection of EU8 workers into specific firms?
Figure 3.11: Effects of the EU Eastern enlargement on the number of firms
(a) Number of all firms - Group 1 (b) Number of all firms - Group 2
(c) Number of firms with > 70% EU8 workers -
Group 1
(d) Number of firms with > 70% EU8 workers -
Group 2








y (red) over time with the
corresponding 95% confidence intervals based on estimation equation (3.1), which includes municipality and
year-by-regions fixed effects. The outcome variable Ymt in the upper panels is the number of all firms with more
than 5 employees. In the bottom panels, Ymt is the number of firms with more than 70% of their workforce
being EU8 workers. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
In Figure 3.11 we show the yearly effects of the EU Eastern enlargement on the number of firms
in municipalities within 0 to 20 (20 to 60 minutes) minutes travel distance to the closest EU8
border in the left (right) panels. In the upper panels, we look at the number of all firms. Before
2004, the number of firms in group 1 increases on average faster than in the reference group. In
contrast, the number of firms in the two groups changes similarly during the transition period.
After 2011, there is a relative increase in the total number of firms in group 1, but it is not
statistically significantly different from 0. For municipalities in group 2, we observe a relative
increase in the number of firms after 2004. This increase gets larger after EU8 nationals gained
access to the Austrian labor market in 2011. In the lower part of Figure 3.11 we focus on the
number of firms that have a predominantly EU8 workforce. These are firms in which more
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than 70% of all employees have an EU8 nationality. In municipalities within 0 to 20 minutes
distance to the border, we observe a large and significant increase in the number of this type of
firms before 2004, during the transition period and in particular after 2011. By 2015, there is,
on average, one more firm with a predominantly EU8 workforce in municipalities very close to
the border relative to those further away. This effect is large given that there are, on average,
14 firms per municipality in 2003. For municipalities within 20 to 60 minutes travel distance
from the border, we observe a positive effect on the average number of firms with a mainly EU8
workforce immediately after 2004 and throughout the period after 2012.
Table 3.7: Effects of the EU Eastern enlargement on the number of firms
> 70% employees
All Blue Austrian Non-EU8 EU8
collar foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
δ
[0−20]
pre -0.56 -0.41 -0.32 0.03 -0.10
(0.20) (0.15) (0.19) (0.02) (0.04)
δ
[0−20]
trans -0.06 -0.05 -0.24 -0.04 0.18
(0.24) (0.17) (0.20) (0.03) (0.04)
δ
[0−20]
free 0.47 0.46 -0.69 -0.03 0.76
(0.37) (0.25) (0.29) (0.04) (0.11)
δ
[20−60]
pre -0.19 -0.12 -0.06 0.02 -0.04
(0.16) (0.12) (0.16) (0.02) (0.02)
δ
[20−60]
trans 0.31 0.13 0.12 0.03 0.04
(0.19) (0.13) (0.18) (0.02) (0.02)
δ
[20−60]
free 0.88 0.56 0.05 0.16 0.10
(0.29) (0.18) (0.25) (0.04) (0.04)
Mean in 2003 14.14 8.19 12.26 0.11 0.16
Observations 26,695
Municipalities 1,405
Notes: Similar to Table 3.4, this table displays the impact of the EU Eastern enlargement on the number of
firms based on equation (3.2). In column (1) the dependent variable is the number of all firms with more than
five employees. In columns (2) to (5) the dependent variable is the number of all firms with more than 70% of
all employees being blue-collar, Austrian, non-EU8 foreign and EU8 employees, respectively. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level.
In Table 3.7 we show the average effects on the number of firms across the three periods. In
column (1), we find a relative increase in the number of firms comparing municipalities within
0 to 20 minutes travel distance to the border to those in the reference group. However, this
relative rise in the number of firms begins already before the EU Eastern enlargement. The
same pattern occurs if we only look at the number of firms with a predominantly blue-collar
or Austrian workforce in columns (2) and (3). Turning to the effects on firms with mainly
EU8 workers, we again estimate that there is a significant difference between the two distance
groups already in the pre-period. This difference expands, and by 2015, municipalities in group
1 experience an average increase of 0.8 firms with a predominantly EU8 workforce relative to
the reference group. The average number of firms in municipalities in group 2 evolves similarly
to the reference group before 2004. This is also the case if we focus on subgroups of firms in
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columns (2) to (5). After the EU Eastern enlargement, we see a relative increase in the number
of firms in group 2. This increase is mainly due to a rising number of firms with a predominantly
blue-collar workforce. Roughly 10% of the extra firms have a predominantly EU8 workforce.
To sum up, we find that the EU Eastern enlargement tends to increase the total number of firms
in labor markets close to the EU8 border. This is in line with the relatively few existing papers
that examine the labor demand side effects of immigration. In particular, we find that the
number of firms with a predominantly EU8 workforce increases substantially in municipalities
within 0 to 20 minutes commuting distance to the border. This can be seen as suggestive
evidence that EU8 workers do not mainly compete with other workers for positions in already
existing firms. They rather provoke the entry of new firms that build up their workforce by
hiring them.
3.8 Conclusions and outlook
In this paper, we study how local labor markets are affected when receiving a large number of
workers by examining the increased immigration to the Austrian eastern border region after
the EU enlargement of 2004. We combine the temporal variation in immigration resulting from
this policy change with the spatial variation that comes from the tendency of immigrants to go
to municipalities that are close to their home country, thus identifying the effect of immigration
on the employment and earnings of different subgroups of workers and on firms. Our analysis
is based on Austrian social security data, which provides us with detailed information on the
universe of employees and employers in Austria over several years.
We find that the EU Eastern enlargement led to significant changes in Austrian local labor
markets, with a pronounced immigration pattern of EU8 workers following the lifting of restric-
tions to their labor market access. Over the period from 1997 to 2015, the employment share
of EU8 nationals in the Austrian border region increased from 2.2% to 9.3%. The increase
after the enlargement of 2004 is larger in municipalities that are located closer to the border to
an EU8 country and is almost entirely driven by an increase in blue-collar employment. The
responses of other workers differ substantially between Austrian and other immigrant workers:
There is no decline in the employment of Austrian nationals in municipalities close to the bor-
der. For non-EU8 foreign workers, average employment decreases significantly and steadily in
municipalities that are within 0 to 20 minutes to the border after 2004. Moreover, Austrians
experience an increase of approximately 2% in their earnings, non-EU8 foreign workers face
substantial decreases of almost 5% by 2015. Finally, we find that immigration leads to an
increase in the number of firms. This increase is mainly due to a rise in the number of firms
with a predominantly blue-collar workforce and to a minor part due to firms with a mainly
EU8 workforce.
We should note, however, that we observe differential trends in some outcome variables between
municipalities that are within 0 to 20 or 20 to 60 minutes travel distance to the EU8 border
compared to those further away already before the EU enlargement of 2004. This gives rise
to further research, in which we can further develop our empirical strategy and also apply
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alternative strategies to see whether the results are robust.
The results suggest further interesting research in various directions. We have very rich longi-
tudinal data in which we can follow individuals over time. Hence, we can analyze individual
mobility and responses across municipalities. With this, we can examine the plausibility of our
identification assumptions that rule out significant spillovers between different regions. We can
further decompose the employment responses to immigration into inflows and outflows from and
into employment in other regions and nonemployment (Dustmann et al., 2016). Finally, we can
take into account the selection into employment when analyzing the effects of immigration on
average earnings across regions over time.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Additional figures
Figure A.1: Distributional impact of fertility on mother’s hours worked per week
Notes: This graph illustrates the estimated quantiles for the potential outcome distributions of mother’s total
weekly working hours. The solid blue and the dashed red lines show the estimated quantiles of working hours
for compliers with more than two children, Qˆτ
Y1|c, and with only two children, Qˆ
τ
Y0|c, respectively. The model
includes the control variables that are listed in Table 1.3.
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Notes: This figure illustrates point estimates and estimated bounds for the (marginal) treated outcomes
(MTO), untreated outcomes (MUO), and treatment effects (MTE) as functions of the unobserved resistance
toward having more than two children, U . The left panel assumes weak monotonicity, whereas the right panel
assumes linearity in the marginal treated and untreated outcome.
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A.2 Additional tables
Table A.1: Sample compared to a broader group of Mexican women
Women aged Women aged Women in
[21–50] yrs. [21–35] yrs. sample
Age (yrs) 34.11 (8.50) 27.74 (4.33) 29.39 (3.83)
Age at first birth (yrs) 22.341 (5.100) 20.471 (4.015) 19.762 (3.080)
Married or cohabiting 0.72 (0.45) 0.68 (0.47) 0.91 (0.29)
Primary completed 0.25 (0.43) 0.18 (0.39) 0.62 (0.48)
Secondary completed 0.51 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 0.12 (0.32)
University completed 0.17 (0.37) 0.20 (0.40) 0.03 (0.17)
Children in household 1.94 (1.64) 1.62 (1.50) 2.84 (1.05)
At least 2 children 0.58 (0.49) 0.49 (0.50) 1.00 (0.00)
More than 2 children 0.32 (0.47) 0.25 (0.44) 0.53 (0.50)
Employed 0.36 (0.48) 0.34 (0.47) 0.25 (0.43)
Labor market outcomes for employed
Informal employment 0.37 (0.48) 0.32 (0.47) 0.44 (0.50)
Hours worked per week 39.53 (19.69) 40.04 (19.30) 37.19 (20.78)
Monthly income (Pesos) 3778.94 (3434.82) 3655.94 (3174.08) 2958.68 (2507.40)
Observations 2,411,685 1,372,126 505,569
Notes: Statistics depicted are means with standard deviations in parentheses. All variables are measured at












Table A.2: Local quantile treatment effects of maternal working hours
τ .02 ... 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.78 .80 .82 .84 .86 .88 .90 .92 .94 .96 .98
Hours worked per week
MˆτIV 0 ... 0 1 12 14 12 10 10 6 10 4 0 0 8 12
(0.30) ... (0.13) (15.2) (37.8) (1.26) (6.40) (5.72) (5.26) (5.84) (13.12) (4.91) (6.80) (2.03) (9.93) (6.82)
Qˆτ
Y0|c 0 ... 0 0 0 0 0 7 13 19 23 29 35 44 47 49 53
Hours worked per week, formal
MˆτIV 0 ... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 10 15 0 0 -2
(0.37) ... (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (74.44) (7.81) (3.91) (11.85) (3.20) (2.52)
Qˆτ
Y0|c 0 ... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 19 24 39 47 49
Hours worked per week, informal
τ 0 ... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 15 14 13 3 12
(0.34) ... (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (3.12) (3.32) (6.03) (15.04) (12.66) (7.15)
MˆτIV 0 ... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 14 35 47
Notes: The table reports the results of the local quantile treatment effects estimation as proposed in Fro¨lich and Melly (2013). MˆτIV gives the quantile treatment effect
estimate for compliers at quantile τ with estimated asymptotic standard errors reported in parenthesis below the corresponding estimates. Qˆτ
Y0|c denotes the estimated
τ quantile of Y0|c. In the columns (quantiles 0.04 to 0.70) that are left out, MˆτIV and QˆτY0|c are (as in the neighboring quantiles) equal to 0 (see also Appendix Figure A.1
and Figure 1.2). Control variables are as in Table 1.3.
134 A. Appendix to Chapter 1
Table A.3: Outcomes by compliance type
Formal Empl. Informal Empl. Weekly Hours
Di 1 0 1 0 1 0
Type
Always-taker 0.105 . 0.103 . 7.52 .
Complier 0.128 0.125 0.131 0.095 9.36 7.541
Never-taker . 0.187 . 0.107 . 11.20
Note: This table shows the estimated average potential outcomes of the compliance types with and without
treatment. The outcome variable in the left (central) panel is an indicator equal to 1 if a mother is formally
(informally) employed. The outcome variable in the right panel is equal to the maternal working hours per
week.
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B.1 Additional figures
Figure B.1: Social norms regarding working mothers in selected countries
Notes: This figure is based on data from the European and World Values Surveys and include female (male)
respondents between 25 and (55) years of age. The original survey questions is as follows ‘A pre-school child
is likely to suffer if his or her mother works’. Respondents evaluate this statement on an ordered scale from
‘Agree strongly’ (1), ‘Agree’ (2), ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ (3), ‘Disagree’ (4), to ‘Strongly disagree’ (5). In
the case of some country-years the respondents where given a 4-point scale to answer, which does not include
the answer possibility (3). The graph shows the share or respondents (by country), which strongly agrees with
this statement. The data comprises for each country observations from at least two points in time (between
1990 and 1999). The total number of observations is 11, 574.
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Figure B.2: Female labor force participation by family status, number of children, and year
Notes: This figure shows the female labor force participation (for women between 25 and 54 years of age)
by family status and year (left graph), and by the number of children and year (right graph). The figures are
based on Austrian census data from the years 1981, 1991, and 2001.
Figure B.3: Number of displaced workers over time
Notes: This figure shows the number of displaced workers for each quarter from 1990 Q1 to 2007 Q4. Workers
are displaced through a firm closure or mass layoff event.
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Figure B.4: Marriage duration at the reference quarter
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of marriage durations at the reference date in years.
Figure B.5: Wives’ employment by the age of the youngest child
Notes: This figure shows the mean employment probability for subsamples of wives of displaced husbands with
different ages of their youngest child at the reference date.
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Figure B.6: Employment of displaced husbands and their wives controlling for marriage duration
and quarter fixed effects
(a) Husband (b) Wife
Notes: Panel (a) and (b) plot the probability that a displaced husband and his wife, respectively, is employed
relative to the reference date holding constant the marriage duration and quarter of observation. We obtain the
former by regressing an indicator of husband/wife being employed on indicators for the quarterly distance to
the reference quarter, indicators for the marriage duration, and indicators for the quarter of observation.
Figure B.7: Employment and wages of firms around the reference date
Notes: This figure plots the median number of employees and the average median monthly wage (in Euro,
2000 prices) over time for the employers in our sample. Plant Closure refers to firms that close down the
quarter following the reference date. Mass Layoff refers to firms that reduce employment by at least 5% of
their workforce the quarter after the reference date. No Event firms have neither a mass layoff nor closure the
quarter following the reference date. For each quarter around the reference date, we include one observation
per existing firm. We include any firm that employs at least one husband of our sample.
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Figure B.8: Marriage duration at the reference date by treatment status
Notes: These graphs shows the distribution of marriage durations at the reference date. The graphs display the
distribution for the sample of households experiencing a displacement at the reference date (green). The graph
to the left adds the distribution of those with no firm event at the reference date (transparent); the graph to
the right adds households with husbands working in mass layoff firms who keep their jobs (transparent). We
include one observation per household event.
Figure B.9: Distance between marriage and first birth by treatment status
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the distance from marriage to the birth of the first child in months.
The graphs display the distribution for the sample of households experiencing a displacement at the reference
date (green). The graph to the left adds the distribution of those with no firm event (transparent); the graph
to the right adds households with husbands working in mass layoff firms who keep their jobs (transparent). We
include one observation per household event.
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Figure B.10: Propensity score distributions
(a) CG1: No firm event (b) CG2: Non-displaced mass layoff
Notes: This figure shows the density distribution of the propensity score in the displaced and control groups.
Panel (a) refers to the group of displaced and the group of households with husbands with no firm event.
Panel (b) refers to the group of displaced and the group of households with husbands that have a mass layoff
at the reference date, but are not displaced.
Figure B.11: Self-employment of displaced husbands and their wives, CG1
(a) Probability that husband is self-employed (b) Probability that wife is self-employed
Notes: Figure (a) compares the probability of being self-employed of displaced husbands (blue, square) to
husbands without firm event at the reference date (red, x). Figure (b) compares the probability of being self-
employed of wives with displaced husbands (blue, square) to those with husbands without firm event at the
reference date (red, x). This figure is constructed in the same way as Figure 2.4.
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Figure B.12: Social benefits around displacement, CG2
(a) Probability that household receives
unemployment insurance benefits (UB)
(b) Probability that household receives
unemployment assistance (UA)
Notes: Comparison of the probability of receiving benefits of households with displaced husbands (blue, square)
to those with non-displaced husbands working at mass layoff employers at the reference date (red, x). The
control group is reweighted to resemble the displaced group within each subgroup as explained in Figure 2.4.
The employment probability of the control group is adjusted by its mean difference relative to the displaced
group. With some exceptions, job losers can receive UB for up to 30 weeks. After exhausting UB, job losers
can obtain means-tested income support, UA, that pays a lower level of benefits indefinitely.
Figure B.13: Displacement effect on household income, CG2
Notes: This figure shows the effect of husband’s displacement on monthly household income measures (in
Euro, 2000 prices). The effect is given by the difference between households that experience a displacement
and reweighted and mean-adjusted households with non-displaced husbands who work at mass layoff employers
at the reference date. Household Gross Earnings is the sum of husband’s and wife’s labor earnings in each
quarter according to tax data. Household Net Earnings subtracts social security contributions and payroll
taxes from the former. Household Net Earnings + benefits adds benefits from unemployment insurance and
unemployment assistance.
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Figure B.14: Employment of displaced husbands’ wives by the age of the youngest child, CG2
(a) 0-2 yrs. (b) 3-9 yrs.
(c) 10-15 yrs. (d) No children aged 16 yrs. or younger
Notes: Comparison of the probability to be employed of wives with displaced husbands (blue, square) to those
with non-displaced husbands working at a mass layoff firm at the reference date (red, x) for subgroups defined
by the age of the youngest child at the reference date. The control group is reweighted to resemble the displaced
group within each subgroup as explained in Figure 2.4. The employment probability of the control group is
adjusted by its mean difference relative to the displaced group.
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Figure B.15: Employment of displaced husbands’ wives by the age of the youngest child, CG3
(a) 0-2 yrs. (b) 3-9 yrs.
(c) 10-15 yrs. (d) No children aged 16 yrs. or younger
Notes: Comparison of the probability to be employed of wives with displaced husbands (blue, square) to those
with husbands displaced 16 quarters after the reference date (red, x) for subgroups defined by the age of the
youngest child at the reference date. The employment probability of the control group is adjusted by its mean
difference relative to the displaced group.
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B.2 Additional tables
Table B.1: Wife’s labor supply elasticities in added worker effect studies
Country Time Data Sample households Wife’s labor supply (semi-)elasticity Comments
1.Variation in spousal income in a structural life-cycle model of household labor supply
Haan and Prowse (2015) DE 1991-2005 GSOEP Married couples aged Participation −0.025a Comparison of simulated optimal behavior




−0.056a when spouse is vs. is not subject to unanticipated
job destruction
Blundell et al. (2016) US 1999-2009 PSID
Households with participat-
ing and married male
Hours (total response) −0.75 Permanent shock in spousal wage process identi-
fied in structural model
head aged 30–57 Extensive margin −0.168
Blundell et al. (2018) US 1999-2015 PSID
Married couples with wife
aged 25–65
Permanent shock in spousal wage process identi-
fied in structural model
with children aged ≤ 10 Hours (total response) −0.296
Extensive margin −0.193
Intensive margin −0.170
no children aged ≤ 10 Hours (total response) −0.14
Extensive margin −0.065
Intensive margin −0.088
2.Quasi-experimental variation in spousal income through job displacements
Stephens (2002) US 1968-1992 PSID Married couples aged 25–65 Hours −0.50 Displacement through plant closure/moving, lay-
off, firing
Kohara 2010b JP 1993-2004 Panel survey Wife aged 24-35 in 1993 Hours −0.893a Layoff, plant closure, and bankruptcy
Eliason (2011) SE 1987 Admin panel Married couples aged 25–51 Earnings 0.44 Plant closure
Hardoy and Schøne (2014) NO 2002 Admin panel Married couples aged 25–55 Employment 0.09 Closure, mass layoff; couple required
Earnings 0.07 to stay married in post-treatment period
with wife not employed at
displacement
Earnings −0.5




Continental Europe (C-EU) refers to AT, BE,
DE, FR, LU, and the NL
3.Quasi-experimental variation in spousal income through social insurance benefits
Cullen and Gruber (2000) US
1984-88,
1990-92
SIPP Married couples aged 25–54 Hours [−0.49,−1.07] Lower and upper bound estimates, variation in
spousal UI benefits
Autor et al. (2019) NO 1989-2011 Admin panel
Married couples, one spouse
(< 62) applying for DI ben-
efits
Employment −0.345
Simulated response to permanent change in
spousal income in structural model, no separate
elasticities by sex
Fadlon and Nielsen (2017) DK 1980-2011 Admin panel
Married/cohabiting couples,
widows (< 67) with spouse
dying at age 45–80
Participation −0.13 Variation in spousal survivor benefits
Notes: The (semi-)elasticity refers to the change in wife’s labor supply to a 1% change in husband’s income. For the elasticity of hours and earnings, the wife’s response is relative to the baseline
mean (in %). For the participation and employment elasticity, the response is in absolute terms (in percentage points). a Assuming a mean husband’s income loss of 20%. b This study is
published in the Journal of Population Economics Volume 23(4). The details for all other listed studies can be found in the List of References in the paper.
Table B.2: Gender identity norms and beliefs on child care in Austria and some selected high-income countries
Share of survey respondents which strongly agrees
with the respective statement across countries
AT DE DK FR IT NO SE GB US Total
1.) A pre-school child is likely to suffer if [. . . ] mother works 0.37 0.26 0.04 0.20 0.16 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.17
2.) A working mother [as good as] a mother who does not work 0.23 0.18 0.56 0.51 0.19 0.47 0.51 0.23 0.29 0.32
3.) Important for successful marriage: Sharing household chores 0.28 0.23 0.45 0.39 0.30 0.34 0.55 0.45 0.49 0.36
4.) Both husband and wife should contribute to household income 0.29 0.17 0.26 0.39 0.25 0.35 0.54 0.14 0.23 0.28
Notes: These figures are based on data from the European and World Values Surveys and include male respondents between 25 and 55 years of age, and female respondents between
25 and 50 years of age. The original survey questions on statement 1 is as follows ‘A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works’. The original survey questions on
statement 2 is as follows ‘A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work ’. The original survey questions
on statement 3 is as follows ‘Important for successful marriage: Sharing household chores’. Respondents are asked to evaluate this statement on an ordered scale from ‘Very’ (1),
‘Rather ’ (2), to ‘Not very’ (3). The table summarizes the share or respondents (by country), which strongly agrees with statements 1 to 3, and which answers statement 4 with very
important. The original survey questions on statement 4 is as follows ‘Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income’. Respondents are asked to evaluate these
three statements on an ordered scale from ‘Agree strongly’ (1), ‘Agree’ (2), ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ (3), ‘Disagree’ (4), to ‘Strongly disagree’ (5). In the case of some country-years
the respondents where given a 4-point scale to answer, which does not include the answer possibility ‘Neither agree nor disagree’. The data comprises for each country observations
from at least two points in time. The first period is for each country the year 1990. The second (and third) period is AT: 1999, DE: 1997 and 1999, DK: 1999, FR: 1999, IT: 1999,
NO: 1996, SE: 1996 and 1999, GB: 1998 and 1999, US: 1995 and 1996. The total number of observations varies across questions (Min: 11, 574, Max: 16, 729).
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Table B.3: Effects of husband’s displacement on household employment
Control group 1 Control group 2 Control group 3
Husband Wife Husband Wife Wife
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prior event
δ−5 −0.008 0.002 −0.009 −0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003)
δ−4 −0.003 0.002 −0.004 0.002 −0.004
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
δ−3 −0.002 0.001 −0.005 0.001 −0.002
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
δ−2 −0.002 −0.000 −0.003 −0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
δ−1 −0.000 0.001 0.000 −0.001 −0.000
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Post event
δ1 −0.280 0.004 −0.278 0.004 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
δ2 −0.173 0.009 −0.162 0.007 0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
δ3 −0.144 0.013 −0.132 0.009 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
δ4 −0.131 0.014 −0.123 0.009 0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
δ5 −0.123 0.013 −0.116 0.010
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Pre-event mean 1 0.490 1 0.486 0.468
Households 101, 609 93, 666 45, 886
Observations 4, 386, 508 4, 502, 579 2, 161, 764
Notes: This table displays the impact of husband’s displacement on own and spousal employment based on a
specification similar to equation (2.2), which includes displaced group, distance to event, and industry×quarter
fixed effects. In contrast to equation (2.2), we estimate the effect of the displacement separately for each year y.
The dependent variable is equal to one if husband/wife in household i is employed in a given quarter. Column
(1) and (2) ((3) and (4)) compare individuals in households with a displacement to a reweighted control group
with no firm event (with households in which husbands keep their jobs during a mass layoff). In column (5),
we match to displaced households a control group of households from the same marriage cohort that experience
displacement four years after the reference date. The coefficient δy measures the average difference between
employment in displaced and reweighted control groups y years to the reference quarter relative to the difference
at the reference quarter. Pre-event mean refers to the mean employment in the year before the reference date.
Standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications, with clustering at the household level) and reported in
parentheses.
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Table B.4: Effects of husband’s displacement on household earnings
Control group 1 Control group 2 Control group 3
Husband Wife Husband Wife Wife
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prior event
δ−5 −6.642 5.572 −3.709 −4.608
(4.983) (6.223) (5.540) (4.848)
δ−4 9.554 4.556 5.236 0.606 −3.661
(3.833) (5.853) (5.202) (4.679) (6.814)
δ−3 9.840 1.943 2.542 −1.637 −1.202
(3.538) (5.389) (4.639) (4.155) (5.982)
δ−2 9.687 −1.050 5.231 −1.866 4.143
(3.011) (4.360) (3.686) (3.671) (4.908)
δ−1 −2.522 −0.694 −1.990 −1.148 1.391
(1.702) (2.647) (1.925) (2.457) (3.001)
Post event
δ1 −810.046 5.201 −783.445 5.618 11.390
(6.049) (2.696) (5.564) (2.283) (3.153)
δ2 −612.960 9.363 −554.224 7.261 11.581
(6.611) (4.071) (6.382) (3.552) (4.768)
δ3 −554.129 13.180 −482.088 9.510 15.370
(7.308) (4.547) (6.944) (4.120) (5.643)
δ4 −523.447 15.659 −454.925 10.312 14.027
(8.092) (5.122) (7.372) (4.600) (6.212)
δ5 −504.559 12.939 −434.683 13.541
(8.370) (5.385) (7.774) (4.923)
Pre-event mean 2458.082 658.549 2463.521 647.718 613.938
Households 101, 609 93, 666 45, 886
Observations 4, 386, 508 4, 502, 579 2, 161, 764
Notes: This table displays the impact of husband’s displacement on own and spousal monthly earnings in Euro
(2000 prices) based on a specification similar to equation (2.2), which includes displaced group, distance to event,
and industry×quarter fixed effects. In contrast to equation (2.2), we estimate the effect of the displacement
separately for each year y. The dependent variable is set to zero if an individual is not employed. This table is
constructed in the same way as Table B.3. Pre-event mean refers to the mean earnings in the year before the
reference date. Standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications, with clustering at the household level) and
reported in parentheses.
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Table B.5: Effects of husband’s displacement on wife’s job search





δ−4 0.001 −0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
δ−3 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
δ−2 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
δ0 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Post event
δ1 0.009 0.005 0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
δ2 0.007 0.003 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
δ3 0.007 0.001 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)




Pre-event mean 0.041 0.041 0.039
Households 101, 609 93, 666 45, 886
Observations 4, 386, 508 4, 502, 579 2, 161, 764
Notes: This table displays the impact of husband’s displacement on spousal unemployment. The dependent
variable is equal to one if the wife in household i is unemployed in a given quarter. The estimation is based
on a specification similar to equation (2.2), in which the coefficients δy measure the average difference between
displaced and reweighted control group for each year y relative to the quarter one year before the reference date.
Pre-event mean refers to the mean unemployment in the year before the reference date. Standard errors are
bootstrapped (500 replications, with clustering at the household level) and reported in parentheses.
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Table B.6: Effects of husband’s displacement on household income, control group 1
Prob. of HH receiving Monthly household income
UB UA Gross Net Net + benefits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prior event
δ−1 -0.004 0.001 −17.208 −0.588 −2.297
(0.003) (0.002) (7.634) (4.988) (4.923)
Post event
δ1 0.223 0.015 −835.031 −530.986 −422.586
(0.004) (0.002) (14.467) (9.102) (8.483)
δ2 0.069 0.038 −794.45 −489.393 −442.212
(0.004) (0.002) (19.488) (12.243) (11.867)
δ3 0.037 0.024 −770.498 −472.311 −443.354
(0.004) (0.003) (20.720) (13.008) (12.682)
δ4 0.028 0.018 −734.077 −445.916 −425.226
(0.004) (0.003) (22.537) (14.106) (13.780)
δ5 0.025 0.017 −715.350 −432.797 −414.887
(0.004) (0.003) (23.667) (14.803) (14.518)
Displaced×Post 0.077 0.023 -769.902 -474.298 -429.653
(0.003) (0.002) (18.332) (11.442) (11.164)
Pre-event mean 0.040 0.015 3701.048 2515.338 2530.745
Households 40, 771
Observations 1, 049, 450
Notes: This table displays the impact of husband’s displacement on household income measures based on a
specification similar to equation (2.2), which includes displaced group, distance to event, and industry×quarter
fixed effects, for the subsample of households with a reference date in 2001 or later. In contrast to equation (2.2),
we estimate the effect of the displacement separately for each year y. The dependent variable is equal to one
if the household receives unemployment insurance benefits and unemployment assistance in column (1) and
(2), respectively. In column (3), the outcome is household gross earnings (sum of the couple’s labor earnings).
Household net earnings in column (4) are gross earnings minus social security contributions and payroll taxes.
In column (5), we add unemployment benefits and assistance to the former. All income variables are measured
in Euro (2000 prices) on a monthly basis. We compare individuals in households with a displacement to a
reweighted control group of households with no firm event. The coefficient δy measures the average difference
between the outcome variable in the displaced and the reweighted control group y years to the reference date
relative to the corresponding difference at the reference quarter. Pre-event mean refers to the mean outcome in
the year before the reference date. Standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications, with clustering at the
household level) and reported in parentheses.
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Table B.7: Effects of husband’s displacement on household income, control group 2
Prob. of HH receiving Monthly household income
UB UA Gross Net Net + benefits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prior event
δ−1 -0.002 0.001 −42.231 −18.200 −17.807
(0.002) (0.001) (7.563) (4.935) (4.850)
Post event
δ1 0.217 0.013 −829.348 −530.235 −423.316
(0.003) (0.001) (13.795) (8.667) (8.138)
δ2 0.055 0.035 −754.309 −467.076 −427.325
(0.003) (0.002) (18.595) (11.692) (11.333)
δ3 0.026 0.023 −703.547 −434.679 −412.512
(0.003) (0.002) (20.218) (12.712) (12.363)
δ4 0.018 0.017 −658.016 −401.865 −385.809
(0.003) (0.002) (21.624) (13.554) (13.252)
δ5 0.015 0.015 −610.017 −370.923 −357.572
(0.003) (0.002) (22.906) (14.353) (14.074)
Displaced×Post 0.066 0.021 −711.126 −441.015 −401.320
(0.003) (0.002) (17.695) (11.046) (10.789)
Pre-event mean 0.040 0.015 3772.018 2553.295 2575.851
Households 34, 031
Observations 947, 225
Notes: This table displays the impact of husband’s displacement on household income measuresbased on a
specification similar to equation (2.2), which includes displaced group, distance to event, and industry×quarter
fixed effects, for the subsample of households with a reference date in 2001 or later. In contrast to equation (2.2),
we estimate the effect of the displacement separately for each year y. The dependent variable is equal to one
if the household receives unemployment insurance benefits and unemployment assistance in column (1) and
(2), respectively. In column (3), the outcome is household gross earnings (sum of the couple’s labor earnings).
Household net earnings in column (5) are gross earnings minus social security contributions and payroll taxes.
In column (6), we add unemployment benefits and assistance to the former. All income variables are measured
in Euro (2000 prices) on a monthly basis. We compare individuals in households with a displacement to a
reweighted control group of households with husbands who keep their job during during a mass layoff event at
the reference date. The coefficient δy measures the average difference between outcomes in the displaced and the
reweighted control group y years to the reference date relative to the corresponding difference at the reference
quarter. Pre-event mean refers to the mean outcome in the year before the reference date. Standard errors are
clustered at the household level and reported in parentheses.
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age 0− 2 −509.603 0.011 7.949
(15.118) (0.008) (11.793)
age 3− 9 −552.944 0.008 12.988
(10.531) (0.005) (6.477)
age 10− 15 −652.137 0.009 6.222
(14.648) (0.005) (7.414)
No child −707.224 0.001 -6.027
(12.433) (0.005) (8.154)
Control group 2
age 0− 2t −473.784 0.005 6.828
(13.840) (0.007) (9.986)
age 3− 9 −501.594 0.007 11.157
(10.004) (0.004) (5.325)
age 10− 15 −585.793 0.015 14.937
(13.394) (0.004) (6.393)
No child −615.452 0.005 0.324
(12.210) (0.004) (7.418)
Control group 3
age 0− 2 −625.170 -0.001 25.420
(13.635) (0.008) (11.193)
age 3− 9 −681.030 0.013 21.459
(9.822) (0.005) (6.683)
age 10− 15 −778.636 0.011 14.136
(13.567) (0.007) (8.661)
No child −839.497 0.006 6.401
(12.906) (0.007) (11.360)
Notes: This table displays the impact of husband’s displacement for subgroups defined by the age of the youngest
child at the reference date. It is similar to Table 2.6, but it additionally includes the effects on husband’s earnings
(1) and wife’s earnings (3). The estimates measure the average difference in the corresponding outcome variable
between displaced and reweighted control groups after the reference quarter rel. to the difference at the reference
date.
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Table B.9: Displacement effects by availability of nursery at reference date
No nursery in district Nursery in district
Outcome Husband Wife Husband Wife
Earnings P(employed) Earnings Earnings P(employed) Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control group 1
Displaced×Post −503.182 0.005 20.075 −526.537 0.011 -7.443
(18.987) (0.010) (12.455) (25.127) (0.014) (21.868)
ηparticipation −0.020 −0.053
(0.045) (0.065)
Pre-event mean 2333.331 0.164 166.678 2496.618 0.206 243.037
Households 11,058 7,170
Control group 2
Displaced×Post −460.569 0.008 12.111 −482.589 0.003 4.978
(17.073) (0.008) (10.093) (22.442) (0.011) (17.933)
ηparticipation −0.044 −0.021
(0.040) (0.058)
Pre-event mean 2339.078 0.162 162.721 2497.289 0.205 241.980
Households 10,754 6,892
Notes: This table displays the impact of husband’s displacement on own earnings, spousal employment and
earnings by the availability of nurseries at the reference date. Nurseries provide child care for the under-three-
year-old. The availability is measured at the community level. We only look at wives with children aged 0–3 at
the reference date. Standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications, with clustering at the household level)
and reported in parentheses.
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Table B.10: Displacement effects by wife’s earnings potential, control group 2
Low High
Outcome Husband Wife Husband Wife
Earnings P(employed) Earnings Earnings P(employed) Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Measure 1: Earnings before marriage
Displaced×Post −511.376 0.007 6.656 −592.745 0.010 13.671
(6.587) (0.003) (3.848) (15.434) (0.005) (9.707)
ηparticipation −0.034 −0.045
(0.014) (0.024)
Pre-event mean 2390.720 0.456 544.524 2718.341 0.579 1002.762
Households 63,911 17,986
Measure 2: Experience before marriage
Displaced×Post −518.182 0.006 6.614 −539.480 0.010 9.419
(8.613) (0.004) (5.680) (9.089) (0.003) (5.340)
ηparticipation −0.024 −0.046
(0.018) (0.016)
Pre-event mean 2428.900 0.458 581.638 2496.457 0.507 706.263
Households 40,263 41,594
Measure 3: Education
Displaced×Post −453.777 0.008 7.848 −619.957 0.010 13.339
(8.453) (0.004) (4.808) (12.191) (0.005) (8.780)
ηparticipation −0.042 −0.043
(0.020) (0.020)
Pre-event mean 2315.542 0.399 457.583 2696.034 0.500 697.313
Households 40,168 26,208
Notes: This table displays the impact of husband’s displacement on own earnings, spousal employment and
earnings by measures of wife’s earnings potential. Measure 1: High indicates that the wife earned more than
33% of the wage of husbands in the year before marriage. Measure 2: High indicates above median experience
compared to other wives in the year before marriage. Measure 3: High indicates that the completed education
of the wife is beyond compulsory schooling and apprenticeship education. Pre-marriage wage and experience
are only available for those married after 1974. Education is only available for women with children. Standard
errors are bootstrapped (500 replications, with clustering at the household level) and reported in parentheses.
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B.3 Robustness analysis
In this section, we briefly summarize robustness checks using alternative definitions of displaced
and control workers and variations in the weighting procedure.
We start with sensitivity checks of our estimations using control group 1 and 2. First, we use
an alternative, more restrictive measure to identify mass layoffs. Now firms experience a mass
layoff, if at least ten and at most fifty percent of all workers are displaced from one quarter to
the other.101 The graphical evidence (see Figure B.16a) and the corresponding estimates (see
column (1) of Table B.11) illustrate that our main estimation results are robust to a change in
the definition of mass layoffs. Second, we match (in addition to the variables used in the main
specification, see footnote 50) also on employment outcomes of wives up to one year before
the reference date. The resulting estimates (see Figure B.16b) are similar and not statistically
significantly different from the ones in the main specification. Third, we focus on displaced
workers from plant closures. Workers who got displaced due to a mass layoff events are more
prone to selection issues, since the underlying process determining leavers and stayers within
struggling firms might be endogenous to workers’ labor market outcomes. In contrast, there
is no selection within a firm when it closes down, since all employees are eventually displaced.
The resulting estimates (see Figure B.16c) are slightly smaller and not as precisely estimated
as in the main specification, but they are indicating that results are robust. Fourth, we focus
alternatively on displaced workers from mass layoffs and exclude those from plant closures.
Cases from plant closure might be more selective at the firm level. For instance, we can observe
that these firms are typically much smaller than other firms with a mass layoff event or no
event at all (see Figure B.7). In addition, we also match on the firm size up to one year before
the reference quarter. The resulting estimates (see Figure B.16d) are very comparable to those
from our main results.
We now explore the robustness of our estimation result based on control group 3. This approach
exploits the timing of displacement and requires the choice of a duration ∆ between the events
of the households in the treatment and the control group. Importantly, there is a trade-off in
this choice: With a smaller ∆, the treatment and control group’s displacement is closer in time
and there are hence more likely to be comparable. A larger distance in the date of event allows
us to compare outcomes of the two groups for more periods (Fadlon and Nielsen, 2017). In our
baseline specification we choose a ∆ of 16 quarters. Now we consider values of 4, 8, and 12. It
turns out that the specific choice of ∆ is not crucial (see Figure B.17 and Table B.12).
101Again, this relative cutoff applies to all establishments with 100 to 600 workers in the base quarter. For
smaller firms, the cutoffs are more than 6 workers leaving in firms with less than 20 employees and more than
10 if the establishment has more than 20 and less than 100 workers. For establishments with more than 600
workers, at least 60 employees have to leave the firm in order to make it count as mass layoff.
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Figure B.16: Displaced husband’s wife employment, robustness checks control groups 1 and 2
(a) Stricter mass layoff cutoffs
(b) Reweighting includes wives’ pre-event
employment
(c) Displaced from plant closures only
(d) Displaced and non-displaced from mass layoff
firms only
Notes: This figure provides robustness checks to Figure 2.5a and 2.5b. In Panel (a), we apply a stricter cutoff
for mass layoffs. In Panel (b), we additionally include employment outcomes of wives (up to one year before
the reference date) in the weighting procedure. In Panel (c), the group of displaced workers includes only those
with a displacement due to a plant closure. In Panel (d), we only look at displaced and non-displaced workers
at firms that have a mass layoff in the quarter after the reference date. We also match on the firm size up to
one year before the reference quarter. The graphs are constructed in the same way as in Figure 2.5.
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Figure B.17: Displaced husband’s wife employment, robustness checks control group 3
(a) Control group displaced in ∆ = 4 (b) Control group displaced in ∆ = 8
(c) Control group displaced in ∆ = 12 (d) Control group displaced in ∆ = 16
Notes: This figure provides robustness checks to Figure 2.5c by showing the effect of husband’s displacement
on wife’s employment for different choices of ∆. We compare wives of men that are displaced at the reference
date (blue, square) to that of men displaced ∆ quarters after that date (red, x). The employment pattern of
the control group is adjusted by its mean difference relative to the displaced group.
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Table B.11: Robustness checks for control group 1 and 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prior event
δ−5 0.001 −0.002 0.002 −0.002 0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
δ−4 0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
δ−3 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
δ−2 −0.002 −0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
δ−1 −0.001 0.000 −0.003 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Post event
δ1 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
δ2 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
δ3 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.011
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
δ4 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
δ5 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Pre-event mean 0.489 0.486 0.484 0.470 0.485
Households 87, 876 101, 609 70, 942 75, 212 100, 036
Observations 3, 823, 455 4, 387, 451 3, 123, 503 3, 745, 965 4, 320, 949
Notes: This table reports different robustness checks to the results in Table B.3 that are based on control group
1 and 2. The dependent variable is equal to one if wife in household i is employed in a given quarter. The
coefficient δl measures the average difference between employment in the displaced and the control group l years
to the reference date relative to the corresponding difference at the reference date. Pre-event mean refers to
the mean employment in the year before the reference date. In the robustness checks, we vary the approaches
used in Table B.3 in the following ways: (1) We compare displaced and control group 2 with higher mass layoff
cutoffs requirements, (2) We additionally balance displaced and control group 1 with respect to the pre-event
employment outcomes of wives, (3) We only include individuals affected by a plant closure in the displaced group
and compare them to controls with no firm event, (4) We only take displaced and non-displaced husbands from
mass layoffs and additionally balance them with respect to husband’s employer size, (5) Instead of matching,
we control for the variables included the weighting procedure by including them in a simple regression model.
Standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications, with clustering at the household level) and reported in
parentheses.
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Table B.12: Robustness checks for control group 3







δ−1 −0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Post event






Pre-event mean 0.482 0.472 0.464
Households 46, 730 46, 263 45, 476
Observations 766, 593 1, 324, 436 1, 779, 150
Notes: This table illustrates the robustness of results for control group 3 in Table B.3 to different choices of
∆. Column (1) shows the effect of husband’s displacement on wife’s employment comparing households that
experience displacement at the reference date to those displaced 4 quarter in the future. Column (2) and (3)
refer to estimations using as a control group those displaced 8 and 12 quarter in the future, respectively. The
dependent variable is equal to one if wife in household i is employed in a given quarter. The coefficient δl
measures the average difference between employment in the displaced and the control group l years to the
reference date relative to the corresponding difference at the reference quarter. Pre-event mean refers to the
mean employment before the reference date. Standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications, with clustering
at the household level) and reported in parentheses.
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C.1 Additional figures
Figure C.1: Employment shares of EU8 workers by their nationality
Notes: This figure shows the employment shares of workers from EU8 countries by their nationality. We only
focus on workers in our sample municipalities. Year y refers to the period between May y and April y + 1.
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Figure C.2: Percentage of EU2 workers across industries
Notes: This figure shows the employment of EU2 nationals across industries relative to the employment of all
workers in the corresponding year and industry. We only consider workers in our sample municipalities. Year y
refers to the period between May y and April y + 1.
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Figure C.3: Net earnings and price levels in EU8 countries relative to Austria
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Notes: This figure shows the net earnings and price levels in EU8 countries relative to Austria from 2000 to
2015. Net earnings are annual net earnings in Euro of a single person without children who earns 67% of the
average worker’s earnings. Price level indices refer to actual individual consumptions. Source: Eurostat.
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Figure C.4: Austrian border crossings to neighboring EU8 countries
Notes: Border crossing points are indicated by brown dots. The gray lines within Austria show the main road
network. Source: Statistics Austria, open street map.
Figure C.5: Municipalities’ workforce size by the distance to the EU8 border in 2003
Notes: This figure plots the number of workers in 2003 of all municipalities in Austrian states that share a
border with an EU8 country against their travel distance to the closest EU8 border.
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Figure C.6: EU8 employment shares by the distance to the border
Notes: Figure C.6 plots the employment shares of EU8 nationals against the travel duration to the closest EU8
border. The blue circles show the EU8 employment share for a 20% random sample of municipalities in 2003;
the size of each circle is proportional to employment in 2003. The fitted values are from a regression of EU8
employment shares by period on a third order polynomial in travel duration. Period 0 refers to May 1997 to
April 2004 (prior EU8 accession), period 1 to the period from May 2004 to April 2011, and period 2 to the
period after May 2011.
Figure C.7: EU2 employment shares by the distance to the border
Figure C.7 plots the employment shares of EU2 nationals against the travel duration to the closest EU8 border.
The blue circles show the EU2 employment share for a 20% random sample of municipalities in 2003; the
size of each circle is proportional to employment in 2003. The fitted values are from a regression of the EU2
employment shares in the period before EU8 accession (May 1997 to April 2004) on a third order polynomial
in travel duration.
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Notes: Import and export shares refer to the total merchandise trade accounted for by the partner in a given
year. Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS).
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C.2 Additional tables
Table C.1: Free movement of labor from EU8 to EU15 countries
Date of introduction Countries
May 2004 UK, Ireland, Sweden
May 2006 Greece, Portugal, Spain, Finland
May 2006 to May 2009 Italy, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, France
May 1 2009 Belgium, Denmark
May 1 2011 Austria, Germany
Source: Own collection of data from governmental websites.
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Table C.2: Heterogeneous effects on monthly earnings of Austrians
Age group
Average Blue Male ≤ 30 30− 45 45 <
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δ
[0−20]
pre 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.004 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
δ
[0−20]
trans 0.008 0.009 0.001 -0.007 0.016 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
δ
[0−20]
free 0.023 0.028 0.004 0.000 0.036 0.019
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014)
δ
[20−60]
pre 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
δ
[20−60]
trans 0.010 0.011 0.006 0.001 0.018 0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
δ
[20−60]
free 0.016 0.018 0.008 -0.006 0.030 0.014
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Mean in 2003 1,663 1,579 1,955 1,565 1,683 1,752
Observations 26,695
Municipalities 1,405
Notes: Similar to Table 3.4, this table displays the impact of the EU Eastern enlargement on the earnings of
Austrians based on equation (3.2). The dependent variable in column (1) is the log of average monthly earnings
(real, 2000 prices) of Austrians in a municipality and in columns (2) to (6) the log of average monthly earnings
(real, 2000 prices) of Austrians in a municipality in the corresponding subgroup. The mean in 2003 refers to the
average of mean monthly earnings of Austrians over all municipalities in 2003. Standard errors are clustered at
the municipality level.
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Table C.3: Heterogeneous effects on monthly earnings of non-EU8 foreigners
Age group
Average Blue Male ≤ 30 30− 45 45 <
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δ
[0−20]
pre -0.018 -0.016 -0.036 -0.019 -0.023 0.018
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.020) (0.026)
δ
[0−20]
trans -0.031 -0.032 -0.028 -0.039 -0.028 0.000
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.027) (0.020) (0.025)
δ
[0−20]
free -0.044 -0.040 -0.043 -0.046 -0.051 0.008
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.027) (0.033)
δ
[20−60]
pre -0.003 0.001 -0.011 0.025 -0.004 0.000
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018)
δ
[20−60]
trans -0.025 -0.025 -0.024 0.002 -0.027 -0.018
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019)
δ
[20−60]
free -0.037 -0.028 -0.035 0.007 -0.046 -0.025
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.019) (0.024)
Mean in 2003 1,508 1,462 1,651 1,366 1,557 1,630
Observations 26,695
Municipalities 1,405
Notes: Similar to Table 3.4, this table displays the impact of the EU Eastern enlargement on the earnings of
non-EU8 foreign nationals based on equation (3.2). The dependent variable in column (1) is the log of average
monthly earnings (real, 2000 prices) of non-EU8 foreigners in a municipality and in columns (2) to (6) the log
of average monthly earnings (real, 2000 prices) of non-EU8 foreigners in a municipality in the corresponding
subgroup. The mean in 2003 refers to the average of mean monthly earnings of non-EU8 foreigners over all
municipalities in 2003. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
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Table C.4: Effects of the EU Eastern enlargement: robustness check
Employment Earnings Firms
All EU8 Austrians Non-EU8 Austrians Non-EU8
foreigners foreigners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
δ
[0−20]
pre -9.455 -3.167 -6.842 0.553 0.002 -0.018 -0.561
(4.706) (0.555) (4.266) (0.553) (0.005) (0.017) (0.197)
δ
[0−20]
trans -1.408 4.265 -4.007 -1.666 0.008 -0.030 -0.060
(6.746) (1.070) (5.737) (0.952) (0.006) (0.016) (0.238)
δ
[0−20]
free 13.062 20.497 -4.154 -3.281 0.023 -0.043 0.473
(12.229) (3.547) (9.421) (1.905) (0.009) (0.022) (0.380)
δ
[20−60]
pre -7.080 -0.867 -5.832 -0.381 0.002 -0.003 -0.190
(4.042) (0.235) (3.662) (0.558) (0.004) (0.013) (0.160)
δ
[20−60]
trans 13.065 1.018 11.272 0.775 0.010 -0.026 0.307
(5.901) (0.396) (5.162) (0.943) (0.004) (0.012) (0.188)
δ
[20−60]
free 26.476 7.649 16.832 1.995 0.016 -0.037 0.872
(9.931) (1.337) (8.039) (1.998) (0.006) (0.016) (0.276)
Observations 26,695
Municipalities 1,405
Notes: This table displays the impact of the EU Eastern enlargement on different outcomes based on equa-
tion (3.2), which includes municipality and year-by-regions fixed effects. We additionally include a Bartik-type
variable to control for differential time trends that are driven by the initial industry structure in a municipal-
ity. T he upper (lower) panel focuses on δ[0−20] (δ[20−60]), which capture the difference in outcomes in the
corresponding year between municipalities within 0 to 20 (20 to 60) minutes and municipalities with a driving
distance ≥ 60 minutes from the next EU8 border. This difference is standardized to 0 in 2003. pre refers to the
period May 1997 to April 2003, trans to the period May 2004 to April 2011, and free to the period May 2011
to April 2016. The dependent variable is the employment by all workers in column (1), EU8 workers in (2),
Austrian workers in (3), and non-EU8 workers in (4). In column (5) and (6) the dependent variable is the log of
average monthly earnings (real, 2000 prices) of Austrians and non-EU8 foreigners, respectively. In column (7)
the dependent variable is the number of all firms with more than five employees. Standard errors are clustered
at the municipality level.
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For copyright reasons, this appendix is not included in the online version of the dissertation. An
electronic version of the appendix can be accessed at http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeoa.2018.12.001.
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Summary
Labor market and demographic developments are highly interrelated. This dissertation ana-
lyzes important intersections between the two. Its four chapters are based on large, mostly
administrative micro data. The first three chapters apply innovative quasi-experimental meth-
ods, while the last chapter provides a descriptive analysis .
The first chapter investigates empirically how maternal labor supply responds to an increase in
fertility in the context of Mexico, where the average household income is low and informal child
care and flexible employment opportunities are easily available. To overcome the endogeneity
of fertility decisions, an instrumental variable approach that exploits parental preferences for a
mixed-sex children composition is used. The rationale is that, compared to parents who have
children of different sexes, parents with children of the same sex are more likely to have an
additional child. At the same time, children’s sex mix is assumed to be virtually randomly
assigned. Relying on this instrument-induced variation, an increase in family size beyond two
children is found to raise women’s probability to be employed. This positive effect is driven
by an increase in informal work, which tends to be easier to combine with child care respon-
sibilities, and by low-wealth households, for which additional income is particularly valuable.
Moreover, the presence of grandparents who potentially provide informal child care seems to
be important. Further analyses support the internal validity of these findings. The effect of
having more than two children on the propensity to be informally employed is bounded to be
non-negative for all mothers in the sample, which supports the external validity of these results.
The second chapter examines the labor supply responses of wives to a negative income shock
experienced by their husbands for married couples in Austria. The empirical analysis is based
on detailed administrative data and focuses on a sample where husbands lose their job due to
mass layoffs or plant closures. Three different control groups are used to estimate the effect
of husbands’ job loss on spouses’ subsequent labor supply. The main results are remarkably
consistent across these groups. Husbands lose substantially both in terms of employment and
earnings over a five-year period after displacement. The labor supply responses of wives are
positive and statistically significant. However, the additional earnings generated by wives are
small compared to their husbands’ loss. Government transfers and taxes are more important
providers of insurance, at least in the short run. Further results indicate that gender roles,
preferences for time spent with children, and availability of formal child care play a strong role
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in the wives’ labor supply decisions.
The third chapter investigates how local labor markets are affected when receiving a large num-
ber of immigrant workers. The empirical strategy combines temporal variation in immigration
resulting from the EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 and the later implementation of free labor
market access to EU8 workers with the spatial variation that comes from the tendency of im-
migrants to go to municipalities that are close to their home country. The analysis based on
social security data with information on both employees and employers finds significant changes
in labor markets in the Austrian border region after 2004. First, the employment share of EU8
nationals in the region increases from 2.2% in 1997 to 9.3% in 2015. Second, this increase is
larger in municipalities that are the closer to the border compared to those further away. Third,
there is no decline in the employment of Austrian nationals, but average employment among
non-EU8 foreign workers decreases significantly and steadily in municipalities with increased
immigration after 2004. At the same time, Austrian workers experience an increase in their
earnings, while non-EU8 foreign workers face substantial decreases. Finally, the number of
firms is found to increase with immigration.
The fourth chapter analyzes how mortality for mid-aged individuals is changing for several
important demographic subgroups in Germany over the period from 1990 to 2015, with a
focus on deaths from drug overdoses, suicides, and alcohol-related diseases, termed as deaths of
despair. The results show a very clear pattern: mortality rates declined between 1990 and 2015,
with no increases in deaths of despair for any of the subgroups. These findings starkly contrast
with those for the US, where midlife mortality rates are increasing for white non-Hispanics since
1998.
German Summary
Entwicklungen am Arbeitsmarkt und demographische Entwicklungen sind eng miteinander
verknu¨pft. Diese Dissertation analysiert wichtige Schnittmengen zwischen diesen beiden Bere-
ichen. In vier Kapiteln erfolgt eine Analyse großer, meist administrativer Mikrodatensa¨tze.
Dabei werden in den ersten drei Kapiteln innovative, quasi-experimentelle Methoden ange-
wandt, wa¨hrend das letzte Kapitel eine deskriptive Analyse entha¨lt.
Das erste Kapitel untersucht empirisch, wie sich eine Erho¨hung der Fertilita¨t auf das Arbeit-
sangebot von Mu¨ttern auswirkt. Die Untersuchung erfolgt am Beispiel Mexikos, wo das durch-
schnittliche Haushaltseinkommen niedrig ist und eine informelle Kinderbetreuung sowie flexible
Bescha¨ftigungsmo¨glichkeiten leicht verfu¨gbar sind. Um einen Kausaleffekt der Fertilita¨t auf das
Arbeitsangebot zu bestimmen, nutzt die empirische Analyse im Rahmen eines Instrumentalvari-
ablenansatzes aus, dass Eltern eine Pra¨ferenz fu¨r Kinder unterschiedlichen Geschlechts haben.
Haben Eltern zwei Kinder des gleichen Geschlechts, ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit gro¨ßer, dass
sie noch ein drittes bekommen. Gleichzeitig ist die Geschlechterszusammensetzung der ersten
beiden Kinder zufa¨llig. Unter Ausnutzung dieser quasi zufa¨lligen Variation in der Fertilita¨t
kommt die empirische Analyse zu dem Ergebnis, dass eine Zunahme der Familiengro¨ße u¨ber
zwei Kinder hinaus die Wahrscheinlichkeit erho¨ht, dass Frauen bescha¨ftigt sind. Dieser pos-
itive Effekt ist darauf zuru¨ckzufu¨hren, dass Mu¨tter durch die ho¨here Fertilita¨t bedingt eine
informelle Bescha¨ftigung aufnehmen, die in der Regel leichter mit Betreuung von Kindern zu
vereinbaren ist. Außerdem wird ein ho¨heres Arbeitsangebot von Mu¨ttern insbesondere fu¨r
Haushalte mit geringem Vermo¨gen beobachtet, die ganz besonders auf zusa¨tzliches Einkommen
angewiesen sind. Weiterhin nimmt mit steigender Fertilita¨t die Wahrscheinlichkeit zu, dass die
Großeltern im gleichen Haushalt wie die Familie leben und mo¨glicherweise informelle Kinder-
betreuung bereitstellen. Weitere Analysen belegen die interne Validita¨t dieser Befunde. Ein
zusa¨tzliches o¨konometrisches Verfahren zeigt, dass der Effekt eines Anstieges in der Fertilita¨t
auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer informellen Bescha¨ftigung fu¨r alle Mu¨tter in der Stichprobe
gro¨ßer oder gleich null ist.
Im zweiten Kapitel wird am Beispiel O¨sterreichs betrachtet, wie das Arbeitsangebot von Ehe-
frauen auf einen negativen Einkommensschock ihrer Ehema¨nner reagiert. Die empirische Anal-
yse basiert auf detaillierten administrativen Daten und konzentriert sich auf Paare, in denen
Ehema¨nner aufgrund von Massenentlassungen oder Betriebsschließungen ihren Arbeitsplatz
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verlieren. Es werden drei verschiedene Kontrollgruppen genutzt, um die Auswirkung des Ar-
beitsplatzverlusts der Ehema¨nner auf das Arbeitsangebot der Partnerinnen zu scha¨tzen. Die
Hauptergebnisse sind u¨ber diese Gruppen hinweg konstant. Ehema¨nner erfahren durch den
Arbeitsplatzverlust u¨ber einen Zeitraum von fu¨nf Jahren substanzielle Bescha¨ftigungs- und
Einkommenseinbußen. Gleichzeitig hat dieses Ereignis einen statistisch signifikanten, positiven
Effekt auf das Arbeitsangebot der Ehefauen. Das zusa¨tzliche Einkommen, das die Ehefrauen er-
wirtschaften, ist jedoch im Vergleich zum Einkommensverlust des jeweiligen Ehemannes gering.
Das Steuer- und Transfersystem bietet zumindest auf kurze Sicht mehr Absicherung. Weitere
Analysen legen nahe, dass Geschlechterrollen, Pra¨ferenzen hinsichtlich der Kinderbetreuung
und die Verfu¨gbarkeit von formaler Kinderbetreuung eine wichtige Rolle fu¨r die Arbeitsange-
botsentscheidungen der Ehefrauen spielen.
Das dritte Kapitel analysiert, welche Folgen ein Anstieg der Einwanderung von Arbeitsmi-
grantInnen fu¨r lokale Arbeitsma¨rkte in o¨sterreichischen Grenzregionen hat. Die empirische
Methode nutzt die Vera¨nderungen in den Einwanderungszahlen, die durch die EU-Osterweiterung
im Jahr 2004 und der spa¨ter erfolgten Umsetzung des freien Arbeitsmarktzugangs fu¨r EU8-
ArbeitnehmerInnen hervorgerufen wurde. Kombiniert wird dieser Umstand mit ra¨umlichen Un-
terschieden in der Einwanderung. Diese ergeben sich dadurch, dass ZuwandererInnen eine starke
Tendenz haben, in o¨sterreichische Gemeinden in der Na¨he ihres Heimatlandes zu gehen. Die
Analyse auf Basis von Sozialversicherungsdaten mit Informationen zu ArbeitnehmerInnen und
ArbeitgeberInnen findet signifikante Vera¨nderungen in Arbeitsma¨rkten o¨sterreichischer Gren-
zregionen zu EU8-Staaten. Erstens, der Bescha¨ftigungsanteil von EU8-Staatsangeho¨rigen in den
Regionen steigt durchschnittlich von 2,2% im Jahr 1997 auf 9,3% im Jahr 2015. Zweitens, dieser
Anstieg ist gro¨ßer in Gemeinden, die na¨her zur Grenze liegen im Vergleich zu solchen, die weiter
entfernt sind. Drittens, es ist bei o¨sterreichischen Staatsangeho¨rigen kein Bescha¨ftigungsru¨ck-
gang in Gemeinden mit erho¨hter Zuwanderung nach 2004 zu verzeichnen. Gleichzeitig sinkt
in diesen Gemeinden die durchschnittliche Bescha¨ftigung von ausla¨ndischen Arbeitskra¨ften,
die nicht aus einem der EU8-La¨nder stammen, jedoch stetig. Weiterhin erfahren o¨sterreichis-
che Arbeitskra¨fte einen Anstieg ihrer Einkommen, wa¨hrend nicht-o¨sterreichische Arbeitskra¨fte
einen Einkommensru¨ckgang verzeichnen. Daru¨ber hinaus nimmt die Zahl der Unternehmen mit
ansteigender Einwanderung zu.
Im vierten Kapitel wird untersucht, wie sich die Mortalita¨tsraten von Ma¨nnern und Frauen
mittleren Alters in mehreren demografischen Gruppen in Deutschland im Zeitraum von 1990
bis 2015 entwickelt haben. Ein besonderer Fokus wird auf Suizide und Todesfa¨lle, die mit Drogen
und Alkohol zusammenha¨ngen, sogenannte deaths of despair (deutsch: Tode aus Verzweiflung),
gelegt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen ein sehr klares Muster: Die Mortalita¨tsraten sind zwischen 1990
und 2015 gesunken und fu¨r keine der demografischen Gruppen wird ein Anstieg in den deaths
of despair verzeichnet. Diese Ergebnisse fu¨r Deutschland stehen im Gegensatz zu den USA,
wo die Mortalita¨tsraten bei weißen, nichthispanischen Menschen mittleren Alters seit Ende der
90er Jahre steigen.
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